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ABSTRACT
THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE 1918–1986
by Joel Richard Bius
May 2015
The military-industrial complex has been the topic of intense conversation among
historians since President Dwight Eisenhower first gave the phrase life in January 1961.
The term typically conjures up images of massive weapons procurement programs, but it
also ironically involved one of the world’s most highly-engineered consumer products,
the manufactured cigarette. “The Soldier and the Cigarette: 1918–1986” describes the
unique, often comfortable, yet sometimes controversial relationships among the military,
the cigarette industry, and tobaccoland politicians. The dissertation argues that the federal
government’s first cigarette warning in 1964 changed a relationship between soldiers and
cigarettes that the Army had fostered for almost half a century. Thereafter, the Army
faced formidable political, cultural, economic, and internal challenges as it sought to
unhinge a soldier-cigarette bond that it helped to entrench.
“The Soldier and the Cigarette” is also a study in modern American
corporatocracy. Through a lens of corporatocracy, the dissertation reveals an American
political economy that can only be described as paradoxical, involving a host of
characters possessing vested and varied interests in the cigarette enterprise. Whether
bureaucrats, soldiers, lobbyists, government executives, legislators, litigators, or antismoking activists, all struggled over far-reaching policy issues involving the cigarette.
Under the visible hand of modern economic arrangements, these groups attempted to
balance issues of conscience, commerce, and personal freedom, as well as the needs of
ii

big business, taxpayers, and the military-industrial complex. This study is important
because the soldier-cigarette relationship established by the Army in WWI, renewed time
and again thereafter, and then broken apart in 1986, underpinned one of the most prolific
social, cultural, economic, and health care related developments in American history: the
rise and proliferation of the American manufactured-cigarette smoker and the lucrative
industry supporting them.
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1
INTRODUCTION
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist.
–President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961

The military-industrial complex has been the topic of intense conversation among
historians since President Eisenhower gave the phrase life during his January 1961
farewell address.1 The term typically conjures up images of massive weapons programs
involving supersonic bombers, strategic missiles, armor-plated tanks, nuclear submarines,
and complex space systems. Eisenhower was concerned the vast amounts of money and
power involved in the design, procurement, and deployment of these weapons would take
on a life of its own, creating a dangerous relationship between the military, industry,
politicians, and big business.
However, it also ironically involved one of the world’s most highly engineered
consumer products, the manufactured cigarette2 “The Soldier and the Cigarette: 1918–

1

Examples of scholarly works which discuss the military-industrial complex from various angles:
Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and The Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York :
Basic Books, 1985); Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There In the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the
Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Aaron L. Friedburg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State:
America’s anti-statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2000); Ann R. Markusen, The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American
Right (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2001); Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The
Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984);
and Hedrick Smith, Power Game: How Washington Works (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).
2

Cassandra Tate, Cigarette Wars: The Triumph of the Little White Slaver (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 65; Robert Proctor, Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and
the Case for Abolition (Berkley: The University of California Press, 2011), 29, 39–40. The manufactured
cigarette (as opposed to hand-rolled) first appeared in noticeable numbers when James Bonsak invented a
cigarette rolling machine in 1885. James B. Duke’s American Tobacco Company bought the rights to this
machine and began manufacturing cigarettes at a rate of 210 per minute. This allowed Duke to gain a

2
1986” describes the unique, often comfortable, and yet sometimes controversial
relationship among the military, the cigarette industry, and tobaccoland politicians during
the twentieth century. For purposes of continuity and focus, “The Soldier and the
Cigarette” centers on the manufactured cigarette smoking culture in the United States
Army from 1918 to 1986 excluding other branches of service and modes of tobacco
intake. The dissertation argues that initially the Army, an organization with vested
interests in soldiers’ combat readiness, health, and morale, played the leading role in this
relationship. Well into the twentieth century, the Army freely distributed billions of
manufactured cigarettes to soldiers via combat rations, or at great discount through the
military resale system. This distribution system supported a cult of smoking in the Army
that effectually entrenched the relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and the
cigarette enterprise.3
After the Surgeon General issued the federal government’s first warning about
health hazards associated with smoking in 1964, the nature of this relationship changed.
After five decades encouraging the soldier-cigarette relationship, “The Soldier and the
Cigarette” argues the Army faced formidable political, cultural, economic, and internal
challenges as it sought to unhinge the soldier-cigarette bond it had helped entrench. Not
only is the dissertation an exhaustive study of change over time presenting an Army
monopoly on the cigarette market. By the time of WWI, the industry was able to manufacture 480
cigarettes a minute. Today, the industry can make 19,480 per minute.
3
Allan Brandt, Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product that
Defined America (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 50. Brandt describes the moral dilemma faced by the
military in the early twentieth century: “On the one hand, the military represented conventional nineteenthcentury views of discipline, morality, and health as well as the conviction that the state had the essential
responsibility of protecting ‘manhood’ from vice . . . the cigarette, like alcohol, was often seen as
undermining the control essential to military discipline . . . and did not project a desirable image of military
decorum.” Also, the term cigarette enterprise, or just the enterprise, is used throughout this work as a
collective term to describe a formal and informal grouping comprised of the cigarette industry, cigarette
brands, lobbyists, growers, tobacco state politicians, smokers, and other individuals or groups that have a
unified stake in promoting cigarette smoking, culture, and sales.

3
transitioning from extreme measures to support the cigarette vice to decisive actions to
restrict it, it is also a study in modern American corporatocracy.
The Oxford Dictionary defines corporatocracy as “a society or system that is
governed or controlled [to some extent] by corporations.”4 The term corporatocracy is
often a loaded, pejorative term. Some on the far left use it to refer to those who exploit
third world countries, break up unions, start war to profit from war, and reap earnings
from human misery. A more moderate interpretation defines corporatocracy as simply the
reality of the modern economic arrangements that have governed the American economic
system throughout most of the twentieth century.
The latter definition is the lens appropriate to the discussion of the soldier and the
cigarette. Under this framework, elements of corporatocracy collectively include federal
activism, too big to fail bailouts, powerful special interests, political action committees,
corporate capitalists, and a political-economy that can only be described as paradoxical.
The story of the soldier and the cigarette occurs where these elements of corporatocracy
intersect with a host of characters possessing vested and varied interests in the cigarette
enterprise. Whether bureaucrats, soldiers, lobbyists, government executives, legislators,
litigators, or anti-smoking activists, they all struggled over far-reaching policy issues
involving one of the most lucrative consumer products ever developed.
Under the visible hand of modern economic arrangements, these groups interacted
on a field paved with irony and hemmed by special interests. Whether elected, appointed,
or retained, they attempted to blend issues of conscience, commerce, and personal
freedom. At the same time, they strove to incorporate the needs of big business,

4

The Oxford Dictionary Online, s.v. “corporatocracy,” accessed January 29, 2015,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/corporatocracy.

4
taxpayers, the cigarette industry, and the military-industrial complex.5 Within this
framework, the soldier and the cigarette bonded and then broke apart. This study of
entrenching, unhinging, and corporatocracy is important because the cigarette-soldier
relationship established by the Army in WWI, and renewed time and again thereafter,
underpinned one of the most prolific social, cultural, economic, and health care related
developments in American history: the rise and proliferation of the American
manufactured-cigarette smoker.6
The relationship between the soldier and the cigarette has a rich and storied
history. Dating to the close of the Civil War, Confederate sailor and tobacco farmer
Washington Duke returned home to find thousands of soldiers camped on his small North
Carolina farm. Duke was drafted into the Confederate Navy at age 42 and was anxious to
return home and put the war behind him. Approaching his homestead, however, he was
shocked to find the war in his front yard. After General Robert E. Lee surrendered at
Appomattox on April 9, 1865, the rest of the Confederate Army followed suit in North
Carolina when Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston surrendered to Union General
William T. Sherman on April 26, 1865, at the Bennett Farm, located just a few miles
from Washington Duke’s homestead. Thus, a makeshift camp materialized on Duke’s
land.
As the gaggle of bored blue and grey soldiers awaited orders, or pardons in the
case of Confederate soldiers, Duke attempted to resume his life. Returning home
5

Terms like “visible hand” and “modern economic arrangements,” accesses a vast literature most
completely encapsulated in the works of Alfred Chandler Harris in The Visible Hand: the managerial
revolution in American business (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1977) and Michael Lind in
Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States (New York: Broadside Books, 2012).
6

Tate, Cigarette Wars, 75–76; Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 57.

5
penniless, necessity became the mother of invention when Duke concluded these bored
soldiers, weary of camp life and thirsty for any diversion, were ideal customers for the
yellow leaf tobacco stored in his barn.7 He and his son, James B. Duke, pitched their
product to the soldiers as small packages of ribbon-cut tobacco sufficient for pipe or
cigarette paper. Subsequently, Duke’s blend of Carolina gold-leaf tobacco became
popular among Union and Confederate veterans once they returned home and resumed
civilian pursuits. When Duke founded the American Tobacco Company in 1890 and
focused its energies on the emerging cigarette market, he leveraged popularity among
veterans to monopolize the entire manufactured cigarette market by the early twentieth
century.8
During WWI, American soldiers were rationed smooth smoking, flue-cured,
manufactured cigarettes for the first time in American history.9 Through flue curing,
American cigarette producers blended, toasted, and rolled cigarettes into a deeply
inhalable product enabling the most inexperienced smoker or virgin starter to become a
sophisticated, veteran smoker in no time. Chapters II and III (“The Rise of the Soldier

7

Tobacco is a unique agricultural product in that bulk, raw tobacco can be stored for years before
being brought to market. Indeed this process of aging and flue curing was perfected by the cigarette
industry in the early twentieth century and allowed them to bring a very enjoyable blend of cured tobaccos
to the market in the form of a deeply inhalable and satisfying manufactured cigarette. So, the fact that Duke
left large bundles of unprocessed tobacco leaf at his farm three years prior and returned to process it for
sale to the soldiers is ironic, because that three year curing period became industry standard during the
twentieth century.
8

“Duke Homestead,” Division of Archives and History, Department of Cultural Resources, North
Carolina Historic Sites, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.dukefamily.org/Duke_Homestead.htm;
Ronald Troyer and Gerald Markle, Cigarettes: The Battle Over Smoking (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1983), 33.
9

Tate, Cigarette Wars, 69. To some degree, the Army was aware of the dangers of deeply inhaling
cigarette smoke as early as 1915, when West Point advised its cadets “smoking cigarettes is [no] more
injurious than other forms of tobacco unless continually inhaled well into the lungs.” By issuing the
soldiers the new American-blended, flue-cured, manufactured cigarettes during WWI, the Army gave them
the most inhalable, smooth smoking object ever created.
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and the Cigarette” and “The Damn Y, the Soldier, and the Cigarette”) explore the early
stages of the soldier-cigarette relationship and how it eventually erupted into an insatiable
demand. Pre-WWI American smoking culture, armed progressivism, the Y Man, and the
battlefield conditions that gave rise to the soldier-cigarette relationship are explored in
these chapters.
If the Progressive Era was known for moralism, social uplift, association,
efficiency, clean living, and “the strenuous life,” then it should be no surprise that the
organizations fighting the war and supporting the war effort were a reflection of the
times.10 In The Killing Ground, Tim Travers describes the British Officers who
commanded soldiers during WWI as products of British civilian society and military
culture. Likewise, American military officers, YMCA volunteers, and civilian officials
who led, trained, and equipped soldiers in the Great War were products of the American
progressivism associated with this period.11 For example, the YMCA Men and Women
who served both at home and overseas during WWI were archetypes who captured the
spirit of the Progressive Era. As they served the millions of Doughboys deployed to
Europe, the Y workers carried a substantial portion of work involving relief and soldier
welfare during WWI.12 Two decades of American progressivism affected War
Department decisions regarding soldier welfare, how the Army was organized, who was

10

Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses (New York: The Century
Company, 1900).
11

Timothy Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence
of Modern Warfare: 1900–1918 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987).
12

Howard Hopkins, History of the YMCA in North America (The University of Michigan:
Association Press, 1951), 499. Using data pertaining to resources expended, Hopkins estimates the YMCA,
as compared to all the other relief agencies, performed 90.55 percent of all the civilian welfare work for the
American Expeditionary Force (AEF).

7
responsible for various aspects of soldier morale, and important to the story of the soldier
and the cigarette, whether or not soldiers received a cigarette ration.13
These armed progressives were relatively successful in restricting soldiers’ access
to prostitutes and alcohol. However, progressives not only looked the other way in the
case of manufactured cigarettes, they actively participated in giving these instruments of
vice to the soldiers. By war’s end, relief agencies distributed over two billion
manufactured cigarettes to the Doughboys. Further, through the combat ration and other
means, the government furnished over five-and-a-half billion manufactured cigarettes to
soldiers at a cost of $80 million to the American taxpayer.14
Chapter IV (“General Peyton March, the Soldier, and the Cigarette”) further drills
into the genesis of the soldier-cigarette relationship and focuses on Chief of Staff of the
Army General Payton March and the factors driving him to reverse a War Department
order and initiate a cigarette rationing program one year after America entered the war.
When Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, the nation ordered
millions of young men to arms and created a conscripted military service. Influenced by
the tenets of the Progressive Era, Congress and the War Department took extraordinary
measures to ensure these soldiers were protected from vices traditionally associated with
soldiering: alcohol and prostitution.15

13

For a good description of Progressivism during this period, see Robert Wiebe’s Search for
Order, Michael McGerr’s A Fierce Discontent, and T. Jackson Lears’ Rebirth of a Nation. For a discussion
regarding the problems with the term Progressive Movement, see Peter G. Filene’s “Obituary for the
‘Progressive Movement,’” American Quarterly, 22, no. 1 (Spring, 1970), 20–34.
14

15

Tate, Cigarette Wars, 75–76.

Edward Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in WWI
(Louisville: The University of Kentucky Press, 1998), 357, 363. According to Coffman, 3,703,273
American men served in the Army during WWI. At the end of their service with the AEF, most were
discharged rather rapidly, allowed to take only a helmet and gas mask as mementoes. During the war,

8
These progressives were generally successful in shielding the soldiers from the
traditional vices. However in the case of the emerging cigarette vice, they either looked
the other way or actively participated. When General March and the Army added their
blessing with the cigarette rationing program, the nicotine addicted Doughboy veterans
completely transformed the American cigarette industry and the nation’s smoking
culture. Most historians agree that more than any other single factor, the Great War
“legitimized the cigarette” and “moved cigarettes into the mainstream of American
culture . . . by linking them to an icon of manliness and civic virtue: the American
soldier.”16 Historians Allan Brandt and Robert Proctor argue that “WWI would mark a
critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern
consumer culture,” Proctor adding that the war “turned smoking from a marginal
indulgence of questionable morality to an unobjectionable mark of stalwart manhood.”17
In the end, the decision to ration soldiers billions of cigarettes created an enduring
American icon: the soldier and the cigarette.

50,475 Americans were killed in action and another 193,611 were wounded in action. By comparison to the
Allied Force, and representative of the total devastation of the Great War, the total amount of US casualties
for the entire war was “175,000 less than those the British suffered in the Somme in 1916.”
16

Jarrett Rudy, The Freedom to Smoke: Tobacco Consumption and Identity (Montreal: McGillQueens University Press, 2005), 110–111, 132; Tate, Cigarette Wars, 65–66; Julian Sivulka, Soap, Sex,
and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning,
1998), 166. Rudy makes a further link between cigarette smoking and masculinity. “Ultimately, it was the
association between cigarettes and First World War Soldiers, largely promoted by newspapers that made
cigarettes ‘manly’ giving them new legitimacy. The First World War has been seen by some as marking a
trend away from ‘rugged masculinity’ toward a ‘domestic masculinity.’” Sivulka adds yet another reason
why WWI made cigarettes culturally acceptable for the first time: sanitation. “During WWI, cigarettes
gained wider acceptance when both soldiers and civilians found smoking cigarettes to be more convenient,
cheaper, and more sanitary than chewing tobacco.” During a time when society was gravely concerned
about disease (more soldiers would die from disease than combat), the idea of germ-ridden spit floating
around in the bottom of a trench or on a factory floor was viewed with disdain.
17

Brandt, Cigarette Century, 51–54; Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 45.

9
In terms of historiography, the argument presented in Chapters II through IV of
“The Soldier and the Cigarette” differs from that of the only other historian who has
written on this specific topic. In Cigarette Wars, Cassandra Tate argues, “Congress
ordered the War Department to include [cigarettes] in rations issued to soldiers
overseas.”18 It was actually the military, and specifically General Peyton March, who
ordered the War Department to rescind its previous decision to exclude the cigarette. The
War Department then requested that Congress earmark additional funding for
government-procured cigarettes.
This may seem strange to think a general officer could exert such strong influence
over the civilian-led War Department. However, the War Department had been greatly
fractured for over a century and had just gone through an extensive reorganization before
the war, bringing the logistics and procurement bureaus under the control of the newly
empowered Army Chief of Staff billet. When March assumed this office, he quickly used
these powers to make extensive changes, the cigarette ration being just one of them. As a
result of the military’s leadership in the soldier-cigarette relationship and pro-smoking
policies, a culture of cigarette smoking infiltrated the Army. Underpinned by soldiers and
veterans, the rise in the consumption of manufactured cigarettes after the war resulted in
one of the “most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded” in American history.19
The ration of four manufactured cigarettes a day became the standard issue for the
next 55 years, except during WWII when that number quadrupled. WWII is the focus of
Chapter V (“Smoke em’ if you got em’: the Greatest Generation Goes to War”). This
18

19

Tate, Cigarette Wars, 66.

Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 45. The Doughboys developed a nearly insatiable demand for
cigarettes during WWI. “Per capita consumption of manufactured cigarettes in the United States nearly
tripled from 1914 to 1919 . . . this is one of the most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded.”

10
chapter explores the continued entrenchment of the cigarette-smoking culture America
inherited from the Doughboys and WWI. The chapter starts with a description of the
prolific smoking culture in America fueling a WWII Army made up of conscripts. To
assuage their nicotine habit, the Army went to great lengths and expense to procure and
freely distribute hundreds of billions of manufactured cigarettes to the soldiers, openly
encouraging them to smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em.
This chapter spends considerable time examining the proceedings of the United
States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program. Known as
the Truman Committee, the panel convened during September and December 1944 to
examine the cigarette ration, among other issues. Regarding cigarettes, the committee
was specifically concerned with the Army’s procurement of large amounts of cigarettes
for soldiers’ rations. The Army cigarette program drove up the price and affected the
availability of cigarettes to the American public. The irony is thick . . . Americans’
demand for manufactured cigarettes had been borne on the backs of Doughboys; now the
Doughboys’ GI sons siphoned off their cigarette supply and caused a shortage of
immense proportions.
During the hearings, Army officials testified that they had procured nearly 100
billion manufactured cigarettes for fiscal year 1944 alone, an amount that ensured every
Army soldier would receive 1.3 packs (16 manufactured cigarettes) per day. In the midst
of the testimony presented to this panel, an Army logistics officer gave shocking
testimony to the concerned Congressmen. To their surprise, he told them his department
procured cigarettes under the assumption that every single soldier in uniform at that time
smoked cigarettes, a premise that was not far off the mark.

11
No greater evidence exists for the entrenchment of the relationship between the
soldier and the cigarette during and after WWI than this revelation regarding Army
procurement and consumption policies during WWII.20 After issuing five-and-a-half
billion manufactured cigarettes to soldiers during the entirety of WWI, just 26 years later
the Army issued nearly 100 billion cigarettes during a single year of WWII and required
the cigarette industry to turn over 18 percent of its output for military purposes.
Americans only smoked 2.5 billion cigarettes in 1900, and lung cancer was so rare (only
140 cases worldwide) it was considered an odd “treat” when medical school students
could examine a cadaver with the disease.21 After WWI, the number shot up to 45 billion
cigarettes smoked in 1920, with 2,837 cases of lung cancer reported by 1925. After
WWII, the number increased again to 341 billion cigarettes smoked in 1945 with 12,130
cases of lung cancer reported. This massive groundswell of cigarette-smoking WWI and
WWII veterans was instrumental in establishing America as a cigarette-smoking nation.22
As a result of the pro-smoking environment established during WWI that
continued during WWII, millions of veterans returned home acculturated to cigarette
smoking, many becoming nicotine addicts.23 Note especially that in the end, soldiers’

20

Cigarette Rations, The United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National
Defense Program, 78th Cong. Part 26, page 12108, (1944), accessed January 30, 2015,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fwz24f00/pdf.
21

Brandt, Cigarette Century, 3. Brandt says, “A steep rise in lung cancer—a disease virtually
unknown at the turn of the twentieth century—had . . . ominously followed in the wake of the rise of the
cigarette.”
22

Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 45 and 57. Cigarette smoking peaked in America in 1980 when 632
billion cigarettes were smoked. Whether coincidence or not, the first noticeable drop in cigarette
consumption in the United States since 1900 was reported in 1985, the same year the Army initiated its first
smoking cessation campaign and Congress attempted to pass legislation as part of the Defense
Authorization Act for 1986 to end subsidized cigarettes for service personnel.
23

A. Lee Fritschler and James M. Hoefler, Smoking and Politics: Policy Making and the Federal
Bureaucracy (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), 10. Expressed in terms of per capita

12
overwhelming demand for cigarettes was not purely a function of chemical dependency
driven by nicotine. Though dependency was a contributing factor, Tate argues the culture
of the military, the soldier’s lifestyle, and the combat environment were the primary
factors driving cigarette demand. “When soldiers recorded their own thoughts about
cigarettes, they emphasized the social context, smoking as a display of camaraderie, a
remedy for boredom, a solace to the dispirited . . . learning to smoke was as much a part
of [a soldier’s] initiation into military life as learning to swear.” 24
The Greatest Generation was also a prolific smoking generation transforming
America from a society that smoked only about two billion manufactured cigarettes a
year on the eve of WWI to a country that burned through an average of 350 billion
cigarettes each year between 1946 and 1964.25 Veterans were afforded every opportunity
to continue their smoking habit through generous smoking benefits guaranteed them by
Congress. Congressional representatives were keenly aware of the power wielded by the
veteran voting bloc and fiercely guarded veterans’ commissary benefits and access to
cigarettes. They provided free cigarettes in Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital facilities and
underwrote veterans’ smoking routine by offering them low-cost, subsidized cigarettes in
the Post Exchange (PX) and commissary. Moreover, despite scientific data that
definitively proved that smoking caused lung cancer (1950), and the 1964 Surgeon

annual consumption, the numbers are telling. In 1900, Americans over 18 smoked on average only 49
manufactured cigarettes a year. After millions of veterans were given billions of cigarettes as part of their
service during the two World Wars, the Korean War, and as a drafted military force on the Cold War
frontiers, they formed the foundation of cigarette smokers in America who were by 1963 smoking on
average 4,345 cigarettes per person, per year—or “11 cigarettes per day for every American over the age of
18.”
24
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The 1946 to 1964 average figure is an informed estimate. However the 1945 and 1963 figures
quoted earlier are accurate and verifiable.
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General’s Warning to smokers, the military continued to issue cigarettes to soldiers as
part of their rations in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.26
As an institution, the military was the cigarette industry’s most reliable cradle to
grave supplier of cigarette smokers and starters. However, after half-a-century
entrenching the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, the federal government
began to question the military’s cigarette policies. A small cabal of fiscally conservative
Congressman and concerned government officials took steps to sever the relationship
between soldier and cigarette in the early 1970s. They were motivated to action by the
mounting data supporting the dangers of smoking and the rising costs of the AllVolunteer Force (AVF). The AVF was not a use and dispose force as the drafted force
had been; the AVF was comprised of long-service professionals who carried a hefty price
in terms of health care expenses, as well as a myriad of other costs.
As the nation ended the draft and committed to this long-service, professional
AVF, a veteran Congressman named Charles Bennett quietly took measures to end the
military’s requirement to ration cigarettes to soldiers. He was concerned that “the
taxpayer was being taken for a ride in two directions at once” due to the requirement to
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pay for the soldiers’ cigarettes and the mounting health care costs attributed to excessive
smoking in the military.27 Thus the primary concern of fiscal conservatives committed to
the removal of rationed cigarettes was the monetary liabilities presented by soldiers’
association with cigarettes. Chief among these were trepidations connected to the longterm expense of cigarette-related health issues assumed by the American taxpayer when
the Army transitioned to an AVF.
The Army’s transition from a drafted to a volunteer force, the vast expenses
associated with this transition, as well as the enterprise’s concerns regarding its faithful
soldier starters, is the subject of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII (“The Soldier, The Cigarette,
and the All-Volunteer Force,” “Soldier Starters,” and “Health Care and the AVF”).
America’s move to replace the draft and Congress’ elimination of the cigarette ration ran
parallel with the cigarette industry’s response to shifting cultural perceptions regarding
cigarette smoking in America. Industry executives were concerned the cigarette
enterprise was locked in an uphill battle against negative public opinion over the
scientific data connecting cigarettes to various health hazards and diseases. If measures
were not taken soon, movement up that hill would stall, and, like an airplane that runs out
of airspeed and altitude at the exact same moment, the industry would crash and burn.
Just as the federal government showed alarm at the proliferation of costs
associated with Americans who smoked, the cigarette industry was concerned with the
loss of profits associated with Americans who did not smoke. Powerful tobaccoland
politicians and cigarette industry executives took extraordinary measures during this

27

Charles Bennett, Note to file, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The
University of Florida. In the Bennett papers, Congressman Bennett includes a “Note to File” that details the
exact day/time/place and circumstances that motivated him to pursue removing cigarettes from combat
rations.

15
period to ensure cigarettes survived amidst a sustained war on tobacco, of which the
battle over soldiers and cigarettes was only one front.
As the 1970s drew to a close, the battle lines were clearly drawn. The country had
transitioned from a drafted force to an AVF, and government appropriators now
questioned what they had bought. Specifically, they questioned the vast expenses
associated with a recruited, professional, all-volunteer military establishment. As small
pockets of the federal government took steps to extinguish the relationship between the
soldier and the cigarette, the cigarette industry and key tobaccoland politicians committed
to a program guaranteed to further entrench cigarette smoking as a masculine norm
among America’s volunteer force.28 The enterprise was rather successful in this
endeavor, and statistics reveal a majority of the soldiers in the Army were avid smokers
as the Carter years gave way to the Reagan Revolution.
During the 1980s, many Congressmen and Department of Defense (DoD)
officials worried that the overwhelming number of smokers in the Army would represent
substantial cost liabilities in the near future. The actions taken to address the growing
evidence that the AVF was a prohibitively expensive force, with short- and long-term
health care expenditures associated with smoking only adding to this expense, are the
subject of Chapters IX, X, and XI (“Cap, Joe, and the Jesse Helms Crew Go to War,”
“The Cigarette Snowball,” and “The End of the Soldier and the Cigarette: SFA2000
Invades the DoD”). These chapters describe the legendary struggle between career
28
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bureaucrat-litigators, represented by the likes of Casper Weinberger and Joe Califano,
and enterprise politicians and lobbyists, represented by characters such as Jesse Helms
and Horace Kornegay.
As Congress approached mid-1980s budget drills in a fiscally-constrained
environment, concerned government officials were doubtful they could implement
effective policies to curb smoking-related health care expenses and address the combat
readiness issues presented by soldiers addicted to cigarettes. They were especially
perplexed by enterprise tough men like Helms, Kornegay and Dan Daniel from Virginia.
Considering the power of tobaccoland politicians and the deep pockets of the cigarette
lobby, whose reaction is also documented in this chapter, government appropriators faced
a daunting task as they attended to taxpayer liabilities represented by the expensive
smoking culture in the Army.
Fueled by Surgeon General C. Everett Koop’s 1984 Smoke Free America 2000
(SFA2000) Campaign, and a 1985 DoD study revealing 54 percent of uniformed
personnel serving in the military were smokers as opposed to 32 percent of the general
public, elements within Congress and the DoD initiated a broad and far-reaching
campaign to substantially decrease the smoking rate among uniformed personnel.29 Their
actions ignited a firestorm of controversy as both sides of the cigarette debate dug in and
prepared for battle.30
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On one side were the industry officials, pro-tobacco legislators, and concerned
military smokers interested in perpetuating the special relationship between the soldier
and the cigarette. Led by pro-tobacco Congressmen and industry lobbyists, the enterprise
circled the wagons in a last-ditch effort to safeguard its unfettered access to the lucrative
military market. They wielded extensive influence over various defense-related
committees and subcommittees and railed against legislation or regulatory measures
aimed at curbing soldiers’ access to cigarettes. They fought the Army’s efforts to
institutionalize smoking cessation plans and stripped language in defense appropriations
bills that would have removed commissary and PX cigarette subsidies. They utilized a
finely tuned and superbly coordinated campaign to connect smoking to vitality, maturity,
liberty, individual rights, and freedom of choice: all themes resonating with the military
market.
The other side was represented by small elements within the DoD, as well as
several elected officials who were still concerned with the expenses associated with
soldiers’ smoking habits and the moral liability of encouraging a practice that would
ultimately destroy their heart and lungs.31 With the lines drawn, these officials soon
discovered that severing the long-standing bond between the soldier, the cigarette, and
the enterprise was a difficult, complex, and a time-consuming task.
Similar to WWI when the military, knowingly or unknowingly, took actions
entrenching the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, in the 1980s, powerful
internal forces within the DoD, under the guise of soldier rights and freedom of choice,
blocked efforts to unhinge the soldier-cigarette relationship. In a stark moment of
31
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frankness, Secretary of Defense Weinberger described DoD’s difficulty as it endeavored
to implement responsible cigarette policy in a corporatocracy starved for cigarette
revenue and taxes. He said, “The tobacco issue has presented the government (federal,
state and local) with a paradoxical situation attempting to balance the negative health
impacts against the positive economic impacts (Italics mine).”32 In the end, the Army, in
a bold move just as decisive as General March’s decision in 1918 to issue cigarette
rations, stepped through a tiny crack in Weinberger’s DoD Health Promotion Directive
1010.10 guidance to once and for all end the soldier-cigarette culture dominating Army,
and by extension American culture, for nearly 70 years.
“The Soldier and the Cigarette” employs a research methodology leveraging the
extensive repository of primary source documents contained in the Legacy Tobacco
Documents available online through the University of California-San Francisco. The
Legacy Documents contain over 70 million optically scanned documents, thousands of
which relate directly to the soldiers’ experience with cigarettes during the entire period
covered in this dissertation. It is difficult to describe the richness of this digital archive—
one could spend years mining the data, exploring any topic from representations of
females in modern advertising to links between cigarette advertising and newspaper
profitability.
Allan Brant, a pioneer in this area of research, offers the best description of the
importance of the Legacy Documents to scholars in this field. Brant comments, “the
availability of research materials limits every historical inquiry,” adding that his study
would have been no exception were it not for one of the great ironies of “modern
32
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corporate history.” During the discovery process utilized during the Master Settlement
proceedings, the industry employed a tactic of “vetting internal materials and policies
with legal council to claim attorney client privilege” in an effort to hide the most
damaging documents. This tactic backfired when judges, as part of the massive Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the industry and the plaintiff states, required the
industry’s legal teams to turn over all these confidential documents, which were
subsequently digitized and meticulously organized.33
Robert Proctor, another pioneer scholar in this field, adds that research leveraging
archives like the Legacy Documents “represents a new kind of historiography: history
based on optical character recognition, allowing a rapid combing of the archives for
historical gems (and fleas).” An archive this immense enables “research opportunities
that are largely unprobed . . . [and] entirely new kinds of topics . . . [including] the history
of single words or turns of phrases.” Proctor adds, “It is hard to say how this will
transform historical writing, but we are likely to find new paths opening up that we could
not have imagined.” “The Soldier and the Cigarette” steps into this path by using the
power of the Legacy Archive to narrowly focus on one topic—the soldiers and
cigarettes.34
This mountain of archival documents is supplemented with a vast array of other
primary sources including personal memoirs, Congressional proceedings and hearing
transcripts, government studies, military regulations, oral histories, and newspaper
articles from the periods covered. Finally, these archival and primary sources are
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supported by an extensive array of secondary source literature covering topics directly
and indirectly related to the soldier-cigarette saga.
From 1918 to 1986, the military established a powerful sub-culture of cigarette
smoking soldiers. The relationship was so entrenched it took 37 years to sever after the
1964 Surgeon General’s Report warned Americans that cigarettes were hazardous to
one’s health. The manufactured cigarette, despite its simplicity in appearance, had a
profound and far-reaching effect on American history. “The Soldier and the Cigarette”
cuts across a broad spectrum of historical methodologies and schools of inquiry. Though
it is grounded in the field of War and Society, a school seeking to understand military
history with an eye toward appreciating how war affects society and culture, and vice
versa, it also speaks to many other disciplines. It is at once social and cultural history as
the soldier’s relationship with the cigarette displays elements of class, mentalité, and
material culture. It touches on economic and advertising history as it traces the effects of
the most highly-engineered and profitable consumer product ever created. It leverages
aspects of political history as it uncovers the nuances of a federal system allowing for a
corporatocracy of special interest groups and politicians with specific political, economic,
and agricultural interests to dominate the American legislative process. In the end, “The
Soldier and the Cigarette” moves the field of War and Society into new territory as it uses
the manufactured cigarette as a vehicle to explore the interaction between war, society,
and corporatocracy during the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER II
THE RISE OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE
When America entered WWI, manufactured cigarettes were only slightly popular
in America. The first nationwide manufactured cigarette campaign prior to WWI was R.J.
Reynold’s (RJR) debut of the Camel cigarette brand in 1913.1 The manufactured
cigarette, as opposed to the hand rolled, had first appeared in noticeable numbers when
James Bonsak invented a cigarette rolling machine in 1880. James B. Duke’s American
Tobacco Company bought the rights to this machine, and began manufacturing cigarettes
at a rate of 210 a minute. This allowed Duke to gain a monopoly on the cigarette market.
By the time of WWI, the industry was able to manufacture 480 cigarettes a minute;
today, the industry can make 19,480 per minute.
These new manufactured cigarettes were easy to smoke, fairly cheap, and readily
available. They were easy to smoke due to the relatively new flue-curing and blending
process, and were “sweet and flavorful from [their] use of candied-up air-cured burley,
and . . . mild and inhalable by virtue of its incorporation of low pH flue-cured leaf.” Fluecuring and blending was a process whereby the industry perfected combining the “lower
pH of flue-cured with the higher pH of sweet-flavored burley.” Cigarette historian Robert
Proctor calls this industry innovation “the deadliest invention in the history of modern
manufacturing,” because this seemingly minor adjustment to cigarette production created
the “milder, more flavorful, and inhalable . . . American blend [that] would quickly take
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Great War.
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the world by storm.”2 The storm was only a spot on the horizon at the start of WWI; by
the end of the war it was a dark cloud, and by WWII, the storm had grown into a
worldwide hailstorm of cigarettes.
Yet this hailstorm was in the distant future. Though RJR had an impressive, wellcoordinated roll out of its smooth smoking cigarette, the manufactured cigarette still only
garnered less than seven percent of the tobacco market on the eve of WWI.3 As it had
been for centuries, the market was still dominated by cigars and pipe tobacco, followed
by chewing tobacco and snuff.4 There are several reasons why cigarettes were not as
popular as other forms of tobacco in early twentieth century America. Retailers and
traditional tobacco men thought they were cheap and poor of quality. One retailer, upon
hearing of a cigarette ban in his state, exclaimed “I am tired of getting off my stool 250
times a day to sell a five cent package of cigarettes and then making only ten cents on the
whole lot.”
Cigarettes were also seen as “perverse” and a “moral and cultural offense.” They
were viewed as a form of tobacco consumption “typically practiced by disreputable men
(and boys).” The highly influential temperance movements dominating the Progressive
Era both politically and culturally lumped cigarettes with alcohol, labeling them both as a
despicable vice. In progressive America, they became a symbol of the “seismic . . . moral
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and cultural crisis in the nation” and were associated with juvenile delinquency and
criminal behavior.5
However the most important determinant regarding cigarette acceptability hinged
upon their reception by the cult of manhood that dominated American society during the
early twentieth century. Among the refined and gentlemanly, cigarettes were juxtaposed
against the more culturally accepted and masculine pipes and cigars, which were
typically smoked in private rooms and gentlemen’s clubs. Many American men
considered cigarette smoking an effeminate vice associated with immigrant city dwellers
and those unable to exercise self-control. The literature on the cult of manhood is
extensive. 6 Consistent themes in this canon include the concepts of manhood, self5
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control, the comparison of the dominant American white male against the immigrant,
non-American factory worker, and fears that white male virility was in danger. One
journalist from the period, reflecting on the rise of cigarette smoking, commented that
cigarette smoking was “for a time considered a sissy habit” associated mainly with
factory-bound, immigrant city dwellers whose work patterns drove a desire for “a short
smoke such as a cigarette offered.”7 WWI Historian Tim Travers recalls British General
Baden-Powell who, when commenting about the state of young men prior to WWI,
“criticized loafing, hooliganism, cigarette smoking, watching football . . . and gambling –
all of these [cause] loss of self-control, and hence loss of manliness.”8
Bert Moses, a contemporary journalist from this period, commented that
“somehow or other, every good, decent and manly American instinct protests against the
thing [cigarettes] . . . The man with a cigar or a pipe loses none of his manly attributes
because of the [cigar or pipe] habit.”9 Cigarette smoking researchers Troyer and Markle
provide a similar sense of the effeminate nature of cigarette smoking, commenting that
the “Cigar and pipe smokers characterized cigarette smoking as the improper use of a fine
product.”10 Robert Proctor adds further nuance to the effeminate discourse surrounding

in the accident of personal, material birth. Roosevelt is clearly the perfect locus genii and patron saint for
the museum and its task of regeneration of a miscellaneous, incoherent urban public threatened with
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cigarettes with his assessment that “Cigarettes were for dandies and sissies.”11 In an
article penned in 1920 by journalist Torrey Ford, he wondered at Americans “taking
increased joy in more tobacco,” and concluded that WWI had changed the way American
saw cigarettes: “Ten or fifteen years ago, cigarettes didn’t have much of a standing in the
community. There was a neat distinction between the man who smoked cigarettes and the
man who smoked cigars or a pipe. That distinction seems to have disappeared today.”12
Prior to the surge in cigarette smoking resulting from WWI, the anti-cigarette
environment was bolstered by the overarching progressive impulse towards moderation,
self-control, efficiency, and in the case of some vices, complete abstinence. The
progressives’ were determined to provide American soldiers with an “invisible armor”
sufficient to make their morals and conscience impervious to the designs of the enemies
of decency. The invisible armor discourse was first employed in a speech by Secretary of
War Newton Baker where he stated,
These boys are going to France; they are going to face conditions we do not like to talk about, that
we do not like to think about . . . I want them armed; I want them adequately armed and clothed by
their Government; but I want them armed with invisible armor to take with them. I want them to
have an armor made up of a set of social habits replacing those of their homes and communities …
13
a moral and intellectual armor for their protection overseas.

Julian Sivulka, an historian of American advertising, says that “moralists blasted
cigarettes, referring to them as ‘coffin nails’ and ‘gaspers’ . . . others held that cigarette

20-45, 110-111, 122, 132-147; and read Tate, Cigarette Wars.
11

Robert Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 211.

12

Torrey Ford, “America Is Taking Increased Joy in More Tobacco,” The Tobacco Leaf, accessed
October 7, 2014, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf.
13

Fred D. Baldwin, “The Invisible Armor,” American Quarterly, 16, no. 3 (1964), 432-44.

26
smokers were most likely criminals, neurotics, or possibly drug addicts.”14 Progressives’
and moralists’ concerns regarding cigarettes and vice in general, seen in Baker’s speech
quoted above, were especially alerted when it came to the gathering of America’s boys
for war.
When Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, drawing
millions of young men for conscripted military service, progressives took extraordinary
measures to ensure soldiers protection from the vices traditionally associated with
soldiering.15 For example, they banned liquor sales and shut down slums around training
camps. They made it a crime for any civilian to give soldiers alcohol; they could not even
offer a glass of wine at Sunday dinner. There is scant evidence that the Army was
concerned with tobacco or cigarettes at all in the months prior to America’s entrance into
the war. This is a bit odd considering groups like the Women’s Christian Temperance
Union, the Anti-Cigarette League, the Non-Smokers Protective League, and the YMCA,
consistently targeted cigarettes as a pernicious vice during this period.16
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The Army sent all potential citizen soldiers a document to read before they
arrived at training that described what to expect to help alleviate fears and shed light on
the unknown. In true progressive fashion, smoking, a vice that had not yet achieved
derision on par with alcohol or illicit sex, is only mentioned in context to moderation.
The Army instructed potential soldiers to “cut down [and] get your wind” if “smoking
immoderately” was part of their daily routine. In the same sentence, it encouraged
prospective soldiers to “chew their food well . . . drink a great deal of cool (not cold)
water . . . [and] don’t eat between meals.” Finally they encouraged moderation with
tobacco, especially while exercising or marching . . . smokes were “much more enjoyable
if you wait till you can sit down quietly during one of the periods of rest.”17 For sure,
there was no plan to issue the soldiers cigarettes as part of their daily rations.
WWI would turn this relationship—at times casual, at other times hostile—
between the manly cult and the manufactured cigarette on its ear. After the Great War,
the manufactured cigarette in America soon became the most successful consumer item
ever developed, making it a central issue to any understanding of twentieth century
American culture, society, politics, or economy. Historians of the cigarette-smoking
culture in America agree that the Great War “mark[ed] a critical watershed in
establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern consumer culture,” turning
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early support for “Societies . . . formed to fight demon nicotine.”
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smoking “from a marginal indulgence of questionable morality to an unobjectionable
mark of stalwart manhood.”18
Entrenchment
It was early September, 1917. As his family back home readied for bed, Private
Jonathan Lee from the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was on the move in
France.19 Lee was part of the first American units marching to their assigned sectors on
the Western Front.20 For the AEF, this would be a day to remember: the day American
combat units first entered the trench line to serve alongside hardened British and French
combat veterans. The veterans Lee joined were seasoned combat veterans with three
years fighting already under their belts. The Allies had fought the Germans to a standstill
in several major campaigns, suffering millions of casualties. Things were certainly not
going the Allies way as the first American forces deployed into the trenches. French units
had already mutinied, and morale was at an all-time low.21 Lee’s unit was part of the
leading edge of what would grow to a massive expeditionary force. In America’s 32
training camps, a multitude of conscripted soldiers were already in the pipeline. The AEF
18
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would not reach full strength until the spring of 1919; until that time, it was up to Lee and the rest
of the AEF provide relief to the Allies and join on-going operations on the Western Front.22

For this young American conscript marching toward the sound of battle, the
sights, sounds, and smells were overwhelming. Trench warfare was a grueling
experience, full of danger, deprivation, and isolation. Historians Geoffrey Jensen and
Andrew Wiest argue that, despite advances in technology, warfare was still essentially
unchanged at its most basic level:
While industrialization improved the killing capabilities of the army, in terms of both hardware
and the wherewithal to keep its troops fighting, it did little to influence the way in which the
average soldier spent his time, whether in or out of the line, largely because the stationary nature
of the war.23

Though he faced a combat environment churned by the modern advances in lethality, his
was similar to the age-old destiny of millions before him: cold, mud, boredom, hunger,
noise, and death.24
As Lee moved forward, he saw lines of French soldiers slouching towards him,
going the opposite direction. Trench war was a grinding schedule.25 The Allied soldiers
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Lee passed had completed a four day rotation in the trenches and were moving to the rear
areas to rest and recuperate. They were burdened by their filth-soaked coats that weighed
as much as 58 pounds with the extra accumulated dirt, grime, sweat, and caked-on
blood.26 They were chilled to the bone, some wounded, and others sick. They left several
comrades behind, buried in miry graves behind the trench line, some having drowned in
mud.27 They left deceased comrades tangled in the barbed wire or at the bottom of bomb
craters somewhere in no man’s land. Men were missing in their formation; they were
returning with fewer men than they had deployed with a month earlier. Lee was aware of
the trench schedule, but he now saw the effects of that schedule firsthand as he observed
these tired, worn men. He wondered if his training had prepared him for what lay ahead,
or if he would survive.
Upon entering the reserve trench, Lee continued forward in communication
trenches running perpendicular to the frontline. After moving through the support
trenches, he moved another hundred meters, and encountered the Western Front for the
first time. He smelled the trenches long before he saw them.28 Years later, the stench still
stung, as generations of WWI veterans recalled the smells associated with trench warfare.
The sources of these pungent odors were numerous and unrelenting, namely the smells of
rotting flesh. As thousands of soldiers vied for ground in the several offensives of the
previous three years, they were blown to bits by millions of artillery shells hurled into

frontline.
26
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their slow-moving lines.29 Bodies were torn asunder, human remains littered the churned
landscape, and into this terrain were carved hundreds of miles of trenches. An eyewitness
to the destruction of the land later commented that “the ground had been so churned up
and fought over that even the military graves and their occupants had long since
disappeared.” In a letter home during the war, this observer said “It makes one think of
the surface of the moon . . . the only figure that comes to mind is that of the gigantic
spoon furiously stirring a liquid earth until it becomes frozen or rigid, and then sprinkling
over the top if it bits of wood, steel, bones, rags, and other debris.” 30 Indeed, walking
through the trench was walking through an open grave.
One French soldier commented, “We all had on us the stench of dead bodies. The
bread we ate, the stagnant water we drank, everything we touched had a rotten smell,
owing to the fact that the earth around us was literally stuffed with corpses.”31 The smells
of human excrement, urine, and mud added to the pungent aroma. British units, for
example, detailed unlucky soldiers, known as “shit-wallahs,” to act as trench sanitation
agents. These special details might designate a shell crater in the trench line as the
regimental latrine, simply covering it over when it was full. Sometimes empty ration tins
were employed as toilet bowls and buried in mud when they overflowed.32 The effect was
predictable, and the earth was rent with human excrement. The mud and squalor were so
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atrocious, soldiers urinated in their rifle barrels in a panicked effort to break loose dirt
and un-jam their main battle weapon.33 Added to the smells of putrefaction and human
waste were the body odors of thousands of soldiers who went weeks on end without
showers, living under the acrid aroma of nitrate that hung in the air, the result of a million
explosions.34
In addition to the smells, the other horror Lee and generations of WWI veterans
vividly remembered was the fear and stress of trench warfare. Their constant
companions, fear and stress were sustained by prolonged exposure to the enemy and the
elements. Living like cave dwellers, “Death’s Men” existed on a fine line between
nervous breakdown and combat effectiveness. Death or maiming seemed to lurk around
every corner. First was the combat death resulting from close contact with the enemy;
killing was the business of warfare and 50,475 American soldiers died in WWI. Upon
hearing the screams of wounded men, and seeing the destruction of poison gas and the
results of shell shock, one observer commented on the “brutality and waste” of modern
warfare saying that “the thing hits you between the eyes . . . as you watch it your mind
revolts against the idea that this is the accepted and time-honored technique by which
homo sapiens, on the pinnacle of creation, settles his little differences.”35
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Lee spent the next four days manning the frontline trench, where he was a mere
one-hundred meters from the Germans. He marked his time in constant vigilance,
standing alert and participating in endless equipment repair and trench maintenance
details. The environment was unforgiving and included both the harsh weather, which
eroded their trenches and soaked their equipment, as well as the combat environment.
More soldiers died in the trenches from German snipers than from any other source–
death could come at any moment.36 He endured stand-to alerts, exercises, drills, and precombat checks. He participated in several nighttime raids into no man’s land, and had
even gone over the top as part of a general offensive.37 In the vernacular of his Civil War
ancestors, Lee had ample opportunity to “see the elephant,” a term used by Civil War
soldiers to describe their initial experience with combat and death fifty years earlier.38
However, Lee also dealt with the fear and stress associated with the intangibles of
war. If he refused to go over the top when the order came, the AEF commander, General
Pershing, authorized officers to shoot stragglers or deserters on site. One division
commander permitted his officers to “throw bombs into dugouts of men who refused to
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go over the top.”39 In addition to these, he also had to face the dual threats of disease and
accidents, both of which together killed 63,195 American soldiers.40 If these factors were
not enough to drive a man crazy, random death could come at any moment, a fate that
added to the stress and fear. A soldier might peer through one of the many lookout portals
in the trench wall, as he had a hundred times before, only to have his eye, and then his
head, instantly pierced by a well-placed shot from a German sniper. The results were
horrifying. Historian Denis Winter observes that witnessing death in this manner had a
profound effect on the soldiers, as there are “references without number to the depths of
fear soldiers felt when confronted with death in its most tangible form.”41 One soldier
spoke of the sheer indiscriminate nature of the killing, recalling an officer who was struck
down by a chance artillery shell while on a leisurely stroll in the woods miles from the
frontlines.42 Another soldier was killed when a stray bullet was cooked off in a fire,
piercing the man’s gut. With his comrades helplessly watching, he died an agonizing
death.43
To make matters worse, even when combat ended on November 11, 1918, the
stress of Army service did not end with the war as rampant rumors frayed the soldiers’
already shattered nerves. Some were convinced they would go to Russia next to fight
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against the Bolsheviks. On top of the stress of uncertainty, Pershing added the additional
requirement that soldiers had to drill at least 25 hours a week. One morale worker
commented on the sheer absurdity of such a program: “Most of the men were not looking
forward to any career as soldiers . . . to see a Battery that has fired 70,000 rounds in the
Argonne fight going listlessly through the movements of ramming an empty shell into a
gun for hours at a stretch, or training the sights on an enemy that does not exist, is
depressing enough to watch, and its effect on the spirits of the men is apparent.”44 Long
hours of boredom, stress over the unknown, and mandatory, senseless drill, increasingly
meant one thing: copious amounts of cigarette consumption.45
Such a dangerous and unpredictable environment meant that nearly everyone was
on edge – especially at night. Shrouded in darkness, soldiers like Lee moved about the
trench at night calling out the watch word every five steps, weary of the nervous trench
dweller who might shoot at them by mistake. Despite these precautions, many were killed
by their fellow soldiers who mistook them for German raiding parties who came to kill
them in their sleep. One soldier told a story about “one of the finest sergeants in one of
the companies . . . greatly respected and loved by all his comrades . . . [that] did not
respond to the sentinels call, and in a moment he was lying dead in the trench.” A
particularly optimistic, if grave, soldier recalled that it was better to be shot at night by
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your own men because their aim was diminished in the low light conditions and aid
stations were relatively free at that hour.46
Lee slept in catacomb-like chambers dug into the walls of the trench. He lived in
constant fear of a direct hit by artillery that would easily bury him alive in his sleep if it
did not instantly turn him into atoms. The Germans fired thousands of artillery rounds
each month, and Lee weighed his probability of survival. He was constantly awakened by
the sound and smell of men’s feet shuffling by on the duck boards forming the floor of
the trench. Rats and lice were omnipresent. The rats were enlarged from gorging
themselves on human remains. Cats were deployed against these giant rats, and the cats
were never seen again; they were presumed killed in action (KIA), eaten by their prey.
Some were so familiar with the rats they named them, not even phased when they ran
across their bodies as they slept.47
After four days enduring the frontline trench warfare environment, Lee went
through a back-out procedure as his unit moved to the support trench line for four days.
He then moved to the reserve trench line for another four, and finally, Lee emerged caked
in mud, just like the British and French units he observed a month earlier, as he marched
to the rear area. As described by soldier-poet Siegfried Sassoon, Lee had finally obtained
what his “animal instincts” desired above all else: “freedom from . . . oppressiveness.”48
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The AEF soldier would continue in this schedule until the war was won, or he was killed
or wounded–whichever came first.49
The Soldier and the Cigarette
It was from these dangerous, dirty, smelly, deadly trenches and combat conditions
that an insatiable demand for cigarettes emerged among the AEF.50 In the cigarette, Lee
and his Doughboy comrades found a source of solace that calmed their fears, steadied
their hands, and helped them pass the time. In 1920, Torrey Ford said,
Any soldier would trudge fourteen kilometers and run the risk of being declared A.W.O.L. on a
slight rumor that American cigarettes could be bought at a certain station. No man thought it a
waste of time to spend four hours standing in line on his free afternoon for the opportunity of
buying a couple of packages of cigarettes . . . they said an army ‘traveled on its stomach,’ but it
51
seemed more to the point that it proceeded along with its cigarettes.

that the sky was one of the redeeming features of the War. Behind the support lines where I stood, the
shell-pitted ground sloped somberly into the dusk; the distances were blue and solemn, with a few trees
grouped on a ridge, dark against the deep-glowing embers of another day endured . . . the evening star
twinkled serenely. Guns were grumbling miles away . . . Moments like those are unpredictable when I look
back and try to recover their living texture. One’s mind eliminates boredom and physical discomfort,
retaining an incomplete impression of a strange, intense, and unique experience. If there be such a thing as
ghostly revisitation on this earth, and if ghosts can traverse time and choose their ground, I would return to
the . . . sector as it was then. But since I always assume that spectral presences have lost their sense of smell
(and I am equally uncertain about their auditory equipment) such haunting might be as inadequate as those
which now absorb my mental energy. For trench life was an existence saturated by the external senses; and
although our actions were domineered over by military discipline, our animal instincts were always
uppermost. While I stood there then, I had no desire to diagnose my environment. Freedom from its
oppressiveness was what I longed for.”
49
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Another journalist from the period penned an article shortly after the war also extolling
the virtues of the cigarettes in warfare:
A spiritless army is doomed in advance to retreat. And the one thing that more than any other
keeps an army on the go is tobacco . . . Our boys were willing to forget trench feet and cooties and
shellshock as long as they were allowed the consolation of inhaling tobacco. One of the most
popular of their trench songs advised, ‘Smile boys, smile, while you’ve a Lucifer to light your fag’
. . . and they did. 52

If the French soldiers were known for their state-sponsored brothels and the British for
their daily rum rations, the Doughboy and his cigarette quickly became the enduring
American image of WWI.53
The historical record is replete with examples of the unique relationship each of
the allied countries had to vice. Through film, the cultural image of the American soldier
with the cigarette was established very soon after America entered the war. In Charlie
Chaplin’s 1918 film “Shoulder Arms,” Chaplin “chose a rifle, a gas mask, and a cigarette
as essential props for his portrayal of a Doughboy.” One historian describes how the
“French and British officers gave their men a measure of rum or brandy before they were
ordered to attack; American officers passed out cigarettes instead.” 54
YMCA volunteer James Shillinglaw records one particularly unfortunate event
regarding the Tommys and the Rum: “at six the Germans came over the top and by nine
52

Morrie Ryskind, “Rolls Into Its Own,” October 29, 1921, accessed October 7, 2014,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf.
53

The Infantry Journal, vol. 14, pt 1, 54, 855. In an ironic oversight considering America’s
dryness, the U.S. Army Infantry Journal reprinted and published a British Officer’s checklist for combat
and service in the field; step 25 reads, “Are my men as comfortable as I can make them? Do I always see
that the rum is correctly issued?” In another portion of the Infantry Journal, a British Officer’s guidance
regarding “Infantry Work on Western Front” encourages officers to give the rum issue “at stand down in
the morning if all is reported clear by patrols and sentries. Keep some extra for men who have done good
work on patrol, etc.; they may return rather exhausted and an extra tot to those deserving of it is much
appreciated. See to the issue of the rum ration yourself and be present when it is dished out, otherwise there
is sure to be trouble through some section commander or noncommissioned officer not playing the game
over it.” Again, this is all very humorous considering the lengths progressives and the army was going to
prohibit the rum issue and block access to alcohol both stateside and in France.
54
Tate, Cigarette Wars, 84, 88.

39
they were past the third line of defense. By the end of the night they had gone 15
kilometers and probably captured 35,000. British officers were drunk. To think of this
stupidity, and after four years’ experience with the Hun.”55 However, in all fairness, other
historians have recorded that this German advance in 1918 slowed to a halt when German
soldiers stopped to imbibe upon British rum. With no such state-sanctioned access to rum
or women, historian Richard Schaffer describes the growing relationship between the
American soldier and cigarette the best:
Americans did not issue alcoholic rations before battle . . . nicotine was their [the Americans] drug
of choice – as tranquilizer and stimulant . . . observers noted the power of tobacco . . . Lieutenant
Frank P. Isensee watched officers and men . . . leaving their jump off point . . . smoking their
cigars and cigarettes and shouting commands . . . advancing while shells landed among them, most
of the men smoking cigarettes; all were calm, not talking much.56

To understand the Doughboys’ and subsequent generations of soldiers’
commitment to the manufactured cigarette, one must understand the pharmacology of
nicotine. Half a century after the soldier-cigarette bond was first cemented, the cigarette
industry sponsored scientists at a gathering to articulate and record why people smoked.57
In doing so, their papers and essays were gathered in a conference report explaining in
vivid detail why a soldier would reach for his cigarette first, and his food, water, or a
blanket second.
55
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The report found that “cigarette smoking was a diversional activity,” a general
adaptation to stress when flight is not an option, and a “defense mechanism” that has a
“tranquilizing effect” and offers a sense of euphoria.58 Smoking was presented as a
scientifically proven way to steady the hands and calm a person down, even while
increasing heart rate so one is more alert. Smoking was proven to reduce aggression.59 It
was even described as providing a level of “pulmonary eroticism,” an apt way to describe
the euphoria and release of a smoke.60
Prior to the war, the cigarette had gone through a bit of a revolution. Through a
process called flue-curing, American tobacco was blended, toasted, and rolled into a
smooth and deeply inhalable product.61 When inhaled in this manner, besides creating
addiction if done repeatedly over extended periods, it also creates a deep sense of
euphoria as the blood vessels are constricted and the nicotine absorbed. Science also had
proven that chronic smokers could take considerably more shock than a non-smoker.62
Hollywood was quick to pick up on this smoking theme; the report described how John
Wayne “could take more on the chin” with a cigarette as without.63 All of these traits and
physiological benefits of smoking were absolutely essential to soldiers involved in
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combat conditions presented in WWI, or any war for that matter. The report
acknowledged this soldier-cigarette connection as well, singling out soldiers as the prime
examples of the benefits of smoking at one point: “Soldiers smoke before a battle . . . to
quiet themselves under stress.”64
The enterprise scientists’ bottom line was clear: science proved that for a soldier
in combat, a cigarette can deliver certain physiological effects that will allow him to
cope, make him a better shot, calm his nerves, and increase his ability to take shock and
risks. In a war that placed men in the direct line of fire for weeks of shock over an
extended period, the most significant driver of the demand for cigarettes by far in WWI
was this relation to nerves.65 Soldiers were told not to speak about fear, so they dealt with
fear by smoking cigarettes. One soldier, recalling a terrifying seven hour artillery barrage
during the Battle of Ypres, declared that he “smoked eighty cigarettes,” adding that he
did not know “what I should have done without them.”66
One medical officer recalled a soldier who entered his tent on a stretcher,
grievously wounded, missing a hand, and suffering from a crushed leg. The doctor
observed that the only comfort for this poor fellow were the cigarettes he enjoyed,
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“lighting each cigarette from the stump of the old one.”67 There are graphic images of
soldiers, blinded and burned by gas warfare, their heads wrapped in bandages, with only
their lips protruding, a cigarette delicately placed between the lips. In a strange way,
cigarettes kept men connected with compassion and helped them stay linked with the
peaceful world they had left behind.
In addition to these pharmacological effects of nicotine on the soldier’s ability to
persevere in combat, there were also very practical reasons why they appealed to millions
of soldiers like Lee. The “little white slavers,” as industrialist Henry Ford described them,
helped cover up the horrific odors of the battlefield.68 Cigarette smoke dulls the sense of
smell and leaves only the sweet aroma of tobacco in the nostrils. The smell of tobacco
was preferred over the disgusting smells that would have invaded their senses otherwise.
One group of German soldiers, for example, demanded a double ration of cigarettes after
the Verdun offensive to “mask the overwhelming stink of the corpses” and putrefaction
encountered when they overran the pulverized French defensive lines.69
Another practical aspect of smoking was the connection it gave the soldier to
dignity and humanity at a time when he was often surrounded by neither. While living
what many saw as a cruel, animal-like existence in the trench, an important aspect of the
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soldiers’ connection to humanity was his ability, and freedom, to smoke. Caught up in the
savagery of killing and maiming, a smoke provided a solemn moment of reflection and a
bit of relief from the shock of the battlefield. In this way, cigarettes helped the soldier
maintain his composure in the midst of horrific circumstances, giving him fortitude and
bearing.70
As the soldiers’ devotion to the physiological and practical aspects of cigarette
smoking grew stronger during the war, they became particularly agitated with the various
temperance organizations tirelessly working to take the cigarette from their hands. One
soldier, who came from a family of moralistic progressives, wrote his anti-cigarette
brother a particularly scathing letter upon seeing a mangled soldier soothed by a cigarette.
He told his brother, who was active in the anti-cigarette movement, not to dare talk to
him about the supposed evils of the cigarette habit. He then claimed that if Jesus were to
come to the frontlines, He would surely be the first to hand out cigarettes to the soldiers,
adding that the “cup of cold water in my name” referred to in the Biblical parable would
likely “be a cigarette” if Christ was to visit the Western Front.71
A Y Man, as men who volunteered for service with the YMCA were known, once
exposed to the conditions in the trenches, commented to a fellow Y Man, “If I have a
Bible and a packet of cigarettes in the trenches, I’d give a boy the cigarettes.”72 One
might disagree with their theology; however, their commentary expresses the seriousness
of the soldiers’ feelings about cigarettes during the Great War. Finding humor in the
70

Rudy, The Freedom to Smoke, 132-134, 141.

71

Rudy, The Freedom to Smoke, 140.

72

Shillinglaw, An American in The Army and YMCA, 87. In response to this comment made by
Fred Smith at a meeting of Y secretaries, Shillinglaw records that Smith was given “a good talk on need for
more religious fervor.”

44
midst of war, historian and veteran infantryman Paul Fussell tells how WWI soldiers who
wanted to ensure their packages of tobacco and cigarettes made it through used a unique
labeling trick to ensure delivery. Soldiers instructed their family to write “Army
Temperance Society Publications Series 9” on the box containing the much-needed
cigarettes. Since a vast majority of soldiers wanted nothing to do with the various
cigarette and alcohol temperance societies, their cigarette delivery was almost guaranteed
when labeled in this manner.73
With this understanding of smoking pharmacology and practicality in place, it is
not hard to understand why demand for cigarettes grew by leaps and bounds during WWI
and subsequent wars. Popular culture was quick to pick up on this link as well. One
journalist from the period said that, “All in all, the war turned some millions of men back
into civilian life with a more or less set habit of driving in the daily ‘coffin nails.’”74 In an
article written for the Tobacco Leaf Journal soon after the war, an unknown author
describes the soldier’s militancy toward the “anti-cigarette” crowd:
Every now and then we hear rumblings and grumblings for the camp of . . . small minded people
who entertain the silly hope of placing the prefix ‘anti’ before . . . ‘tobacco’ . . . but as the
Doughboy just returned . . . says ‘they haven’t got a chance in the world – there are too many
sensible people left in America to let a little crowd of hard-boiled fanatics put over a thing like
that! . . .can you blame the returned soldier for becoming somewhat of a cynic about his homeland
when he is greeted in this way after the sacrifices he has made? Is it any wonder that the young
chap who has just gotten back into civvies is inclined to question just how much the nation
appreciated what he and his fellows have done?
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This particular author concludes by quoting a just returned Doughboy who described this
link between smoking, liberty, and patriotism by exclaiming “keep the home fags
burning!”75
Understanding the soldier’s demand for cigarettes is one thing; however
understanding why, in one of the war’s great ironies, the willingness to supply them was
even greater is a bit more difficult.76 By war’s end, the United States government
provided over 5.5 billion manufactured cigarettes to the Doughboys, aide groups like the
YMCA providing an additional two billion.77 This drastic reversal of pre-war policy
requires further exploration for any understanding of the powerful political-militaryindustrial themes that grew to characterize the soldier-cigarette relationship during the
twentieth century. After WWI, the bond between soldier and cigarette was continually
reinforced and became increasingly entrenched over the next eight decades. The
relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, forged in the trenches on the Western
Front, subsequently had a profound effect on American history as it resulted in the
world’s first mass wave of newly addicted nicotine consumers, a group that grew
exponentially both in number and influence in the decades following WWI.
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CHAPTER III
THE DAMN Y, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE IN WWI
During WWI, this combination of physiological, cultural, and practical stimulants
to cigarette smoking ensured that demand grew to enormous proportions. Despite this
insatiable demand for cigarettes among the American soldiers of the AEF, it may be
surprising to learn that the American government did not issue cigarette rations to the
Doughboys until nearly a year into America’s participation in the war. What ultimately
drove the military to take decisive measures and issue general orders placing
manufactured cigarettes into all combat rations? As with many of history’s questions, the
answer to this one is more complex than one might imagine.
The soldiers’ demand for the machine-rolled cigarette created an odd situation
that caught the US Army by surprise at the start of the WWI. The soldiers possessed an
ever-increasing demand for cigarettes, yet initially, the Army refused to issue them. This
forced the YMCA, a civilian relief agency active in the anticigarette movement, to step in
and become soldiers’ sole cigarette purveyor during the war. In order to understand why
the YMCA became so involved in the soldier-cigarette distribution system, and why this
eventually led to the Army’s entrance this transaction, one must first understand the
awkward relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and the Y Man.
If the Progressive Era was known for moralism, social uplift, associational
affiliations, efficiency, clean living, and the strenuous life, the YMCA men and women
who served both at home and overseas during WWI were archetypes that captured the
spirit of the times. David Lee Shillinglaw, John B. Ferguson, and Katherine Mayo were
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just three of 12,800 Y Men and Y Women who served the AEF overseas.1 Employed by
the YMCA to serve the millions of Doughboys fighting in Europe, they carried the lion’s
share of work related to relief and soldier welfare during WWI.2 Shillinglaw was a 28year-old man who dreamed of joining the Army and fighting in the Great War. Problems
with his vision eventually ended his prospects of serving in the military, so he
volunteered for service as a Y Man. He entered France on September 24, 1917, and was
immediately placed in charge of Y Hut construction. He moved about France building the
huts where the soldiers drank coffee, purchased cigarettes, and participated in morale and
welfare programs.3
The Y Huts Shillinglaw built were the hubs of morale activity during WWI, and
one of the chief activities was group singing, by far the most popular activities the Y Hut
sponsored.4 Singing activities may seem strange, but was considered a vital part of Army
morale by the armed progressives. These armed progressives were Army officers and
leaders greatly influenced by the progressive impulses toward efficiency, social welfare,
1
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morale, and good governance during this period. General Leonard Wood was a typical
armed progressive. Besides implementing progressive programs such as schools,
sanitation, and municipal reforms as military governor of the Philippines, Wood also
believed singing was a vital aspect of soldier morale. He once commented that “it is just
as essential that the soldiers know how to sing as that they know how to carry rifles and
shoot them. It sounds odd to the ordinary person when you tell him every soldier should
be a singer. . . [but] there isn’t anything in the world . . . that will raise a soldier’s spirits
like a good catchy marching tune.”5 When French and British military advisors came to
America to advise the Army training camps, they too insisted that the AEF train the
soldiers in group singing. Many of the more traditional senior officers like Peyton March
were skeptical about the singing programs, but this did not change the fact that the AEF
became not only a fighting force, thanks to the efforts of the Y Men, they became a
singing force as well.6
John B. Ferguson was a Presbyterian pastor from a country church in Franklin,
Indiana. He was too old for the draft yet still yearned to serve and was excited about the
prospect of working with the boys of the AEF as a Y Man. He saw Y service as a great
opportunity to assist the AEF, and, as a trained evangelical pastor, he saw an even greater
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opportunity to spread the gospel. He entered training to become a Y Man in September
1917, and soon after was working in the stateside training camps. He was eventually
transferred to France and served in the Y Huts near the frontline. He ventured forward
into the trenches and brought candy and chocolates to the soldiers and sold them the
cigarettes they so desperately needed. Wanting to give account of his sabbatical to his
church congregation and leave a record of his service during the war for his children to
read, Ferguson’s journal of his time as a Y Man was published in 1919 in Through the
War with a Y Man.7
Katherine Mayo was one of 3,480 women who served with the YMCA overseas.
She was invited by the Head of the Overseas YMCA, Edward C. Carter, to work as a
public relations specialist and press agent. Her job was to give Americans an account of
how the Overseas YMCA was using donations to support the soldiers. She was able to
travel to several different Y postings in France and was a keen observer and unashamed
admirer of Edward C. Carter. Former President of the United States William Howard
Taft’s edited, multi-volume Service with Fighting Men describes Mayo as a press agent
for the Y on “whom the public has learned to rely for accuracy and truthfulness.”8 Taft’s
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description of Mayo speaks to her bona fides as an accurate eyewitness to the operations
of the Overseas YMCA and the origins of the “that damn Y Man” moniker. In 1920,
Mayo published a chronicle of her experience with the Y Men in her book That Damn Y.
Shillinglaw, Ferguson, and Mayo, as well as all the Y workers, received some
rudimentary training before deploying to France. Unlike the AEF soldiers, they were not
taught how to kill with the bayonet or hit center mass from 500 meters with the standard
infantry rifle. Their training generally consisted of classes on YMCA procedures, how to
run a Y Hut, and how to set up and teach Bible studies. Y Men were screened for alcohol
and tobacco use, and were banned from participating in these vices while under the
auspices of the YMCA. Of the thousands of Y workers who served the AEF in France,
many were affiliated with Christian services, religious education, or church work before
the war. Most sought to engage in “practical Christianity,” putting hands and feet to their
faith. Shillinglaw captured this spirit best in a letter home where he commented that his
work in the Y hut was “worthwhile . . . It is practical Christianity” that acknowledges his
“responsibility wherever American soldiers are to uphold their moral and spiritual
welfare.”9
Some were pacifists or came from religious traditions that discouraged war. Many
were too old to serve or deemed physically unfit for the draft. Of course women were not
eligible for the draft at all and saw service as Y workers as the best way to contribute to
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the war effort. Others appeared as adventurers wanting an all-expense-paid tour of
France. However, the majority were competent, conscientious men and women who
wanted to do their part and share in the dangers of war. Ferguson recalls inspiration
gleaned from the words of a YMCA executive before he boarded his ship for France:
your job is to “render a definite service for men involving a real love for men; to help win
the war in which there is no place for pacifist or socialist; to set forth the kingdom of God
in unmeasured terms.”10 In many ways, they were merely answering their nation’s call,
when men such as General Pershing, Secretary of War Baker, YMCA Chairman Dr. John
R. Mott, and Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) Chief Raymond Fosdick
challenged the Y Men and Women to rise up and support the war effort.
The Y Men provided services that, at least on the surface, appear vital to the
Doughboys. However the Y Men were often the objects of ridicule, criticism, even rage
among the soldiers they served.11 Unfortunately, despite the good and kind intentions of
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the majority of these workers, they were, in the end, rejected by the military and war
department leadership that had cried out for their support.12 The volunteers’ motivation to
serve as Y Men instead of riflemen was called into question. They were often labeled
money grubbers and do-gooders and were falsely accused of marking up cigarettes, only
to then give soldiers Biblical lessons on charity and love for fellow man. As a result, in
addition to hypocrite, the Doughboys came to refer to them as “the damn Y Men.” Why
were soldiers cursing the men sent to serve them? As is often the case, the truth is buried
somewhere between fact, fiction, and myth.
The Facts Concerning the Y Workers
The facts are quite clear. The YMCA’s interaction with the AEF dates back to the
Mexican Border Expedition of 1916 where the YMCA was active in the Army camps that
dotted the border.13 Though the camp conditions were deplorable and many men
habitually frequented the liquor “resorts” and prostitute houses hastily constructed just
outside many of the camps, the YMCA did what it could to provide positive, wholesome
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outlets for the soldiers who chose to partake.14 When America declared war on Germany
on April 2, 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker immediately formed the Commission
on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) to ensure the AEF Training camps were free of the
moral depravity associated with the border expedition. To help guide the Army, Baker
appointed Raymond Fosdick to chair the CTCA.
Fosdick was a tireless progressive and was familiar with the soldier morale and
welfare mission. During the Mexican Border Expedition, Baker had sent him to inspect
the conditions in Army camps, and Fosdick was appalled by what he found. Though
Fosdick spoke highly of General Funston, the commander of the border force, he
eventually labeled Fosdick “The Reverend” because of his do-gooder mission, and
Funston grew suspicious of Fosdick’s methods. This was a similar fate that awaited Y
Men who served in France during WWI. Other senior army officers questioned Fosdick’s
intentions even more directly, informing him that “men were men, and sissies were not
wanted in the Army.” In the end, Fosdick was backed by Secretary of War Newton Baker
and President Woodrow Wilson, and the CTCA program moved forward forcefully.15
Fosdick’s staff grew to thousands, and included a vigorous law enforcement
branch to enforce Sections 12 and 13 of the Draft Law, which forbade soldiers access to
liquor and prostitutes, and allowed for the punishment of anyone who involved soldiers in
either of these vices. The government would go on to incarcerate 30,000 prostitutes
during the war, shut down hundreds of red light districts, and disband all saloons within
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ten miles of any Army training camp.16 The government did this by force, if required, and
dispatched Marines to patrol the streets of Philadelphia and threatened the removal of
training camps, and government funds, in cities that were slow to comply with Fosdick’s
instructions. In the CTCA and the power the organization wielded during the war, one
can see the extent to which progressives were able to impact all areas of American
society, including the mission of training for war.17
Fosdick’s sole responsibility was to guarantee the 32 Army camps training the
conscripts, regulars, and guardsmen provided an environment conducive to good morals,
social hygiene, and progressive efficiency. To succeed in this massive endeavor, Fosdick
asked various civilian agencies like the YMCA to provide personnel, supplies, and
expertise. It should come as no surprise that there was grumbling among the institutional
Army as old met new. Among pockets of the old Army—men who had cut their teeth
fighting Indians on the American frontier and insurgents in the Philippines—all this
“molly-coddling” was anathema. George T. Fry, the military editor of the New York
Journal and former Colonel of the Tennessee National Guard, was one of the old guard.
In an article for the Infantry Journal, Fry laments that the nation was saturated with
progressives:
obsessing themselves with the idea that unless the American Army is thoroughly molly-coddled
the world won’t be any safer for democracy than a bottle of rum is if found in transit through
Idaho; and they are working overtime to turn a perfectly good husky, built and geared for a scrap,
into a Little Lord Fauntleroy preparing for an evening’s entertainment in the nursery. If all of the
misdirected energy that is being wasted on plans to rescue the morals of the young fighter and
protect his chest, throat, indigestion, and home-cooking appetite from ruin were devoted to
providing the essential things for a real army, the aggregation that followed Old Man Xerxes over
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the plains would look like the Salvation Army compared to the Army of Freedom, and the Boche
18
would be sending distress calls.

However adamant they were about not “molly-coddling” the new Army, the old
guard was overruled. When the AEF deployed to France, the CTCA’s spirit of moral
activism and soldier welfare work followed the men across the ocean. Once in country
however, CTCA functions fell under the auspices of the YMCA, and came under the
direct supervision of Edward C. Carter.19 Picking up the CTCA’s extensive morale and
welfare mission, the YMCA subsequently became intimately involved in the life of the
Doughboys, and hordes of Y Men descended upon France during the war.20
One of Katherine Mayo’s earliest memories of the AEF was a near riot averted on
account of the swift action of a fellow Y worker, Mr. Frapwell. Mayo and Frapwell,
along with many Y workers, had deployed to France as advance echelon teams
(ADVON) to prepare for the arrival of the AEF. They were busy securing administrative
facilities, logistical contacts, and building materials when the Doughboys began to arrive.
As the first AEF soldiers disembarked in France, those already hooked on nicotine found
no place to obtain gold leaf relief. Mayo recalled “one wild cry” for smokes among these
panicked smokers. An alarmed Y worker ran up to Edward Carter, eyes wide, “shivering
with tension,” visibly distraught about the mayhem brewing at the port facility. The
disturbed man told Carter, “I tell you sir, they’ve simply got to have it. This thing has
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reached its limit. If you could only see those boys!” Prior to the AEF’s arrival, Carter’s
ADVON team frantically queried the YMCA home office in New York about various
logistical issues related to cigarettes and other sundries. However, the home office was
too embroiled in a moral dilemma regarding the prospect of providing cigarettes to
soldiers to respond.21 Carter and his ADVON team averted the nicotine riot through
purchases of drastically marked up cigarettes for soldiers’ consumption during this early
stage of the war, however this was an unsustainable solution.
For years, the YMCA proudly backed and even led various temperance
movements, including the anti-tobacco movement. Now, in one of the great ironies of the
war, as the soldiers deployed to the trenches they began fielding requests for millions of
packs of cigarettes to stock the shelves of the Y Huts. Moreover, as the demand for
cigarettes increased exponentially once the full weight of the AEF had experienced time
in the trenches, civic groups in America pushed the YMCA to sponsor charity drives to
provide the soldiers with gifts of cigarettes. Howard Hopkins, historian of the
progressives, argues that the war had a profound effect upon the YMCA and “association
thinking.” He says, “Some superficial attitudes underwent a degree of modification, such
as the previous intolerance of the use of tobacco which became untenable when the
Associations found themselves the largest distributor of the article in the world through
the canteen service.” The editor of the YMCA journal Association Men declared “we may
not like it, but we have no business criticizing those that do.” 22
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Essentially, the Y was forced to choose between the lesser of three evils: alcohol,
prostitutes, or cigarettes. Historian Cassandra Tate describes the conundrum saying, “the
goal of both organizations [YMCA and CTCA] was to divert the men from drink, drugs,
lust, and gambling by providing ‘substitute attractions’ such as athletics, groups singing,
inspirational movies and books—and tobacco, including cigarettes.”23 Jarrett Rudy
argues the cigarette presented the temperance societies with a choice as to “where a man
would go if he was not allowed to smoke indoors—a tavern. And if a man had to go to a
tavern to have a smoke, he would be exposed to more serious temptations, such as
alcohol or other unnamed vices.”24 However Robert Proctor probably captures the nature
of the shift in policy best with his comment that the cigarette critics were summarily
“silenced during the First World War . . . why should anyone worry about cancer or
emphysema thirty years down the road, when bullets are whizzing overhead?”25
While the YMCA sorted through these moral, cultural, and institutional issues
presented by this strange turn of events, Y workers paid enormous markups to obtain
cigarettes from the French market—costs they passed on to the soldiers. Commenting on
the Y’s reliance on local markets for goods such as cigarettes and the price inflation that
resulted, Mayo says that “the Y alone, in its first three months of buying, practically
exhausted the war-drained markets of the French.” Mayo also attributed the price
inflation to the fact that the Army quartermasters and the YMCA were bidding against
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each other on the local market, a habit that “bid prices up on each other, and thereby
reduced the purchasing power of the people’s funds.”26
Stung by frustration over supply and angered over cigarette prices, as the soldiers
deployed to their training areas in France, and eventually into the trench lines, the
relationship between the Y Men and the Doughboys quickly soured. Army officers, overtasked with the responsibilities of fighting the war, planning for troop deployments, and
attending to General Pershing’s never-ending list of demands and queries, begged the Y
workers to come to the front and give attention to the soldiers’ waning morale.
Expressing the severity of the situation, one particularly agitated commander exclaimed
to a Y Man, “for God’s sake come down here before it is too late and do something for
my men!”27
The Y workers quickly responded and were soon found among the soldiers on the
frontline. Initially lauded by the AEF, especially considering the lengths which they went
to provide cigarettes and move Y Hut operations forward, the Y Man soon became the
object of ridicule and mockery—even hate.28 After the war, Pershing once commented
that “the welfare organizations obtained prestige in reverse relation to the share of
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services given.” Pershing was expressing the sentiment of many progressives after the
war who felt the YMCA gave the most, but was also hated the most, and were offered
“doomed ungratefulness [for] the task” they were given. Upon hearing a report from an
overjoyed Y Man who reported that he overheard some soldiers say they were pleased
with the work of the YMCA, Edward Carter commented, “I am glad there are some who
are saying good things, and that the whole world is not against us.”29 Summing up these
sentiments, law professor, historian, and future Undersecretary of Commerce in FDR’s
administration John Dickinson, writing in 1922, recalled that the Y Man soon thereafter
became the “best loved institution in the Army and the most violently criticized [hated]
institution in the Army.”30
The Loved
Stories of the Y Men’s selfless acts motivated by love and compassion abound,
and many involved cigarettes and the Y’s collective desire to serve and attend to the
soldiers’ morale and welfare. Regarding the desire to act in service to fellow man,
Shillinglaw confided in his diary that he was particularly affected by a sermon given at a
church service in France for all Y workers preparing for field service. The pastor said,
“Four of ten commandments deal with love of God, six with fellow men, then two in the
New Testament with same thing.”31 In a strange way, Y Men often performed this service
of dispensing smokes to the soldiers motivated by the desire to serve fellow man, despite
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their personal beliefs about the moral, spiritual, and health hazards associated with
smoking.
Mayo recalls the story of one Y Man who was a conscientious objector and served
men in an aid station near the frontlines. He had never smoked a cigarette in his life, and
was personally opposed to the habit. Receiving wounded soldiers into the first aid tent, he
gently helped a grievously wounded soldier place a cigarette between his lips, laboring to
light it for him as cigarette lighting was not a skill the Y Man had ever attempted, much
less perfected. Successful in his task, he watched as the soldier drank in the tobacco, the
effect noticeable and immediate: instant calm in the midst of this soldier’s panicked battle
to stave off death. He soon realized he had used his last match, and became flustered as
he observed many more wounded soldiers clambering about for a cigarette and a light. So
he did something unthinkable a year earlier: he lit a cigarette for himself, using this
soldier’s now lit cigarette, and began puffing, and coughing no doubt, in order to light
other soldiers’ cigarettes one after the other—with his own cigarette. He had seen them
do this a thousand times; he now joined the ritual. When his cigarette burned down, he lit
another and then another, off the stumps of his own with the skill of a seasoned chain
smoker. In this way he lit “hundreds of cigarettes for wounded soldiers, one after the
other, all day long.”32
In like manner, Ferguson recalls the story of a colleague who was a particularly
pious pastor before volunteering as a Y Man, who overcame his own crisis of conscience
as he shook hands with his call to serve the soldiers. As he operated his mobile vending
station, selling cigarettes and candy to the soldiers, he mused about what his congregation
back home might think about their pastor selling cigarettes to the soldiers he had sworn to
32
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look after both morally and physically. He also grieved over the YMCA engaging in such
sinful activities on Sunday, something he felt would never happen back home. However
he overcame these emotions, as well as his personal grief over the soldiers’ constant
cursing, in order to bring a sense of comfort and relief to the men who had seen and
experienced the horrors of the active trench line. On the subject of smoking and cussing,
vices that often went hand-in-hand, Ferguson commented that “swearing seems to go
with army life . . . the American soldier soon became . . . adept” at the ancient art of
cursing in uniform. Ferguson added that the boys cursed so much he “soon found
[himself] swearing in my dreams.”33 He also wondered at the irony of the whole scene:
an ordained pastor, screened for smoking and drinking “alcoholic beverages” as a
condition of employment, selling cigarettes on Sundays to cursing soldiers.34
Shillinglaw also engaged in a bit of ironic discourse when he mentioned that
despite these strictures, some of the Y Men picked up the smoking habit as soon as they
were at sea in the Atlantic headed to France. The head of his shipboard group was
alarmed at the sight of Y Men smoking, a specter that caused a bit of a “storm in a
kettle.” He said the storm soon subsided, and “the narrow men are keeping their injured
feelings to themselves and the others are smoking.”35 Most Y Men, Ferguson and
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Shillinglaw included, cloaked themselves in the notion, or myth, that at least in the end,
the soldiers were protected from the greater evils of wine and women.36
The Hated
If the Y Men were acting in love and service, much of their activities were
eventually met with hate and consternation. Pershing’s insistence that the YMCA take
over) canteen operations in France initiated this atmosphere of disaffection with the Y
Men. Pershing’s Adjutant General described the reason behind Pershing’s firm desire that
the Y take a leading role: “the Commanding General does not approve of the
establishment of canteens by the [military] organizations themselves . . . because it will
take officers and men away from their proper functions of training and fighting, but will
be glad to have them established by the YMCA.”37 The nature of this decision is a hotly
contested issue in the historical documents. Mayo describes the Y’s association with the
canteen as a forced one for which “we had no choice,” and as a relationship that was the
“deadly tester of souls.”38 Historian Howard Hopkins offers a different angle, claiming
the Y’s chief executive in France, Carter, willingly accepted the Army’s request to take
over the canteen service. Hopkins was a historian, as well as a booster of the progressive
culture in America during this period, so it is understandable that he was slanted toward
portraying the Y as eager and capable.39 The truth is somewhere in the middle.
The facts are relatively clear. The mission to run the Army’s canteen service was
an operation many in the YMCA felt wholly unqualified to perform, but nonetheless a
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mission they assumed under the mantle of selfless service. Carter accepted the canteen
mission despite advice to the contrary from the Y’s own financial and legal counselors.
Mayo comments,
Y counselors, themselves large business men, had strongly disapproved. The work would involve
from twelve to fifteen million dollars of capital . . . a trained organization of from five to six
thousand grocery stores installed . . . and maintained under conditions more difficult and
40
hazardous than any known to the world before.

As supervisor of hut construction, Shillinglaw added to Mayo’s assessment. He was
particularly affected by Carter’s decision and felt it was the source of a great many of the
Y’s problems in France:
During and immediately after WWI, the YMCA was subjected to a good deal of criticism for its
conduct of the war work . . . the major difficulty from the time the organization committed
itself . . . was the size of the operation. Because the YMCA accepted the canteen responsibility, it
had to get into areas in which it had little familiarity. The job got bigger and bigger until it became
41
the largest monetary and organizational effort ever made by a voluntary philanthropic group.

From these comments and others, the Y’s leadership was obviously worried about
taking on such a large enterprise. Mayo frankly admits that it was impossible for Carter to
say no; how could he back down from the task for which he was sworn … to serve the
soldiers at all costs? How could he respond with “No—the price is too high?” He would
not, and did not, despite the Army breaking many promises regarding their relationship.42
Carter’s willingness to accept the mission was underpinned by certain key
assumptions that he would receive shipping support, exclusive merchandising rights, and
the opportunity to defray costs with profits. This was not an unfounded assumption; the
Adjutant General had already commented that in running the canteen system, the YMCA
should expect to make “a small profit” that it could use to defray the cost of other YMCA
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amusement and morale programs.43 Thus, Carter’s response to Pershing’s request
indicated the pecuniary nature of their affiliation with canteen operations. Carter said he
realize[d] that if we undertake to render the Army this service, it would involve us in a huge task,
involving a very large staff and several millions of capital, but, as we have assured you, we have
come to France to serve the Army in every possible way, and if our undertaking this job relieved
44
or aided the Army in any way, we would be glad to consider it.

When Carter submitted his plans and conditions regarding the YMCA’s
assumption of PX duties, Pershing responded: “I have carefully considered the headings
and heartily approve the program.”45 Though many in the YMCA felt wholly unqualified
and understaffed for this mission, in the interest of the troops’ morale and welfare and
their desire to support the Army, they put their hand to the work. However they did so
armed with an understanding that they would receive logistical support from the Army
and profits to defray the added costs.46
The final judgment on who was responsible for the Y’s assumption of Army
morale and welfare functions was settled after the war in hearings and investigations
purposed to discover how the YMCA handled (or some said mishandled) funds.
Pershing’s Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Frank R. McCoy, when asked about Carter’s
assumption of canteen duties, responded, “We were making [the] most of desperate
efforts . . . to think of every way we could save combat personnel. We decided to put it
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up to M. Carter.” When asked if Carter had suggested that the YMCA take over canteen
operations, McCoy indicated “Colonel Logan and I put that up to him first.”47
In the final analysis, the historical record clearly states that the Army, led by
Pershing, recruited the YMCA to take complete control of morale, welfare, and canteen
services during the war.48 On September 6, 1917, Pershing granted the YMCA full
authority to “establish exchanges for the American troops in France,” adding that they
were “intended to fill” the place of Army-run post exchanges so the military could focus
on their “paramount military function of training and fighting.”49 Commenting on this
momentous decision that tended to distract the Y Men from their core mission, Ferguson
said, “the Y did stand for some real spiritual and ethical ideals altho (sic) at times it
seemed our whole duty was the work of the canteens.”50
With the operational framework and proper authority to take over the morale
mission in place, Pershing next expressed his desire that the Y canteens be “pushed as far
to the front as military operations will permit” so that soldiers in the trenches could
receive “comforts and conveniences” where they were needed most.51 A key feature of
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this agreement was the Army’s commitment, by order of General Pershing, to remove
any and all Army Quartermaster or Service of Support Corps morale related facilities
from every part of the theatre where the YMCA operated canteens.52 This sequence of
events, culminating with the emergence of Y Canteens and Y Huts across the allied
sectors, effectually removed the Army from attending to the morale and welfare of the
soldiers, placing this burden wholly and completely on the backs of the Y Men and
Women.53
As it had since the AEF had arrived in France, now that the link between the Y
Men and the soldiers was officially recognized and sanctioned by the Army, the
relationship between the soldier and the Y Men plummeted even further.54 In accordance
with their agreement, besides giving the YMCA exclusive rights to operate canteens, the
Army was to allocate the YMCA precious shipping tonnage so they could transport the
goods needed to outfit the canteens, cigarettes being a vital commodity in these seaborne
shipments. However, on January 13, 1918, the Army informed Carter of its decision to
decrease the Y’s shipping allocation by fifty-three percent. How could the Y serve one
hundred percent of the troops with only forty-seven percent shipping capacity? The
answer was they could not. As a result, Mayo lamented “fifty-three percent of the troops,
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then, must remain un-served.”55 However the soldiers did not know about the dire
shipping situation or the fact that all shipping had been dependent on the activity of the
German submarine fleet. To the soldier, the YMCA’s management of the canteen “made
[them] appear to be a commercial and mercenary welfare organization” and they cursed
their “appointed purveyor because of his [the soldier’s] empty hands.” 56
By March 1918, Carter was feeling the pinch caused by the shipping
restrictions.57 He complained in a letter to the AEF Service of Supply Division (whose
chief, Charles Dawes, became Vice President of the United States during the Coolidge
Administration) that there was “constant complaint from commanding officers and men
throughout France, particularly at the front, regarding [the] utter inadequacy [of] Post
Exchange supplies.” Carter’s warning went unheeded, and the soldiers’ cries “increased
in volume and bitterness.” Further, Mayo claims that GHQ instructed Carter to “go on in
silence doing your best, and let them [the soldiers in the AEF] scold.” Mayo is adamant
in her assertion that GHQ was never at any moment unhappy with the YMCA’s
performance in running the canteens, despite the Y’s damnation by the enlisted men and
their officers.58
In addition to empty hands, the soldiers blamed the Y Men for their empty
pockets. The source of their angst was almost wholly related to concerns over the price of
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cigarettes. Despite the Y’s agreement with the Army regarding the suspension of
quartermaster morale operations in areas where Y canteens operated, the Army still
maintained some PXs in the vicinity of Y canteens. Because the Army did not have to
account for any overhead or shipping costs in the price of their cigarettes, soldiers
obtained cigarettes at much cheaper prices in the Army PX system as compared to the Y
Canteens. This gave the Army PX a marked advantage and presented soldiers with the
impression the Y Men were only in France to cheat soldiers and pursue profits. Soldiers
who had earned their meager paychecks in muddy trenches lined with the shattered and
broken bodies of their comrades were not happy shelling out money to the “damn Y
Men.” They were under the impression that the YMCA had “obtained large amounts of
money from” Americans to perform free welfare services among the soldiers, and the
soldiers envisioned that “considerable more would be given away . . . than was actually
the case.”59 Add to this the Salvation Army’s free cigarettes in the same areas and the
Red Cross’ free smokes at aid stations, and the fate of the Y Man was sealed.60 However
the sources of the soldiers’ disgust with the Y Men did not end there.
Donation Downfall
In a shocking change of heart that historian Cassandra Tate found particularly
ironic, the YMCA decided to cast aside its prewar fight against smoking, throwing its full
weight behind various donation campaigns that collected millions of cigarettes for the
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soldiers.61 Allan Brant describes how this decline in anti-smoking fervor during the war
was informed by the notion that “the campaign against tobacco . . . now appeared prudish
and out of tune with the moment. In the face of war’s bloodshed, the traditional notions
that a prohibition on tobacco protected the troops from moral harm and health risks
seemed frivolous.” Brandt claims that “few transformations in our culture are so vividly
clear as the shift from the bitter opposition to cigarette smoking voiced by the YMCA
before the war and its enthusiasm for distributing cigarettes during the war. Many YMCA
workers returned from their outposts in France as dedicated smokers.” Americans jumped
at the chance to support their Doughboys, and the YMCA and other Progressive Era
social welfare organizations happily assisted them with this endeavor.62
In addition to the cigarettes, the YMCA encouraged campaign participants to slip
personal notes to the soldiers in each pack of cigarettes they donated. These donated
cigarettes were boxed and shipped overseas where they were supposed to be given away
to the soldiers. It was only a matter of time before the overstretched Y Men, now running
the Army’s massive canteen system, accidently sold packs of donated cigarettes to the
soldiers. One can only imagine the response when these soldiers, already cursing the Y
Man for the high prices they paid for canteen cigarettes, returned to their tents to find a
nice note from a complete stranger gushing over the opportunity to give the Doughboys
free smokes. The response was automatic, hateful, and nearly universal by that point—
That damn Y Man!
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Memory, Myth, Legends, and Soldiering
The “donation downfall,” along with soldiers’ real or perceived conceptions
regarding Y Men and high price cigarettes, contributed to various forms of memory,
myth, and legend that worked against the Y Man. The way soldiers remember combat
and the myths and legends to which they fall prey during war are topics of great interest
to new military historians. In Paul Fussell’s excellent work The Great War and Modern
Memory, he recalls the Doughboys’ penchant for engaging in myth, legend, and rumor.
This habit is as old as soldiering itself. Be it a Roman fortress along Hadrian’s Wall or a
Civil War encampment near the Rappahannock River, soldiers throughout time have sat
around fires and pontificated over several standard questions and engaged in all manner
of rumor and conjecture. Where will the Army march next? When are they going to go
home? Why did another unit receive combat citations and theirs did not? WWI soldiers
were quick to join in this time-honored military tradition. Always on the alert for an
attack or preparing for the next offensive, soldiers supplemented their trench duties with
countless hours ruminating over the day’s happenings or engaging in spirited story telling
contests. In this way they created an environment ripe for some tall tales.
Fussell was a decorated infantryman in WWII and was imminently qualified to
give account of myths and legends among WWI. One legend told of Germans taking the
bodies of dead soldiers and cutting out the fat and boiling it down to produce much
needed heating and lamp oil, as well as other industrial chemicals. Another legend
claimed there was a zombie company of Allied and German soldiers that lived among
caves in no man’s land and only came out at night to gorge on the dead and wounded.
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Yet another accused the Germans of crucifying a poor Canadian soldier captured between
the lines during a raid.63
Besides these legendary myths, rumors regarding future combat actions or
deployments to other sectors circulated among the soldiers. As the end of the war
appeared at hand, many of these speculated that the AEF would go to Russia to deal with
the Bolsheviks. The soldiers spread other rumors detailing the pending revocation of their
draft status, a dreaded fate that would force them to remain in the Army permanently. In
his diary, Ferguson records many of these rumors as well. Soldiers thought they were
moving on to Italy because “had not the overcoats been called in?” Or maybe it was
Russia: “had there not been an issue of blankets?”64
Much of this rumor and legend was connected to the Y Man and the nature of his
service in France. In all fairness, Katherine Mayo, one of the Y Man’s staunchest allies,
admits that she had no connection to the YMCA when she went to France and that even
she was a bit prejudiced against the Y Man when she first arrived in France. It was a
sentiment that “intensified . . . into violent resentment” after her first few weeks in France
listening to soldiers’ “wrath and loathing” of the Y Men and “heartbreaking accounts of
the meanness, the stupidities, [and] the little big cruelties of that damn Y.” She confessed
that had she written an account of Y Men during this period, it would have simply echoed
the “green lies,” myths, and legends she was already aware of. However she gave it time
and soon based her recollections in “the most considered thought that I can give, on the
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widest and most sifted material available.” Grounded in what she felt was informed
objectivity, she gave an account that praises the work of the Y Men, despising the
injustice they suffered at the hands of ungrateful soldiers.65
Mayo describes one rumor particularly devastating to the already maligned
reputation of the Y Men. Soldiers were spreading the rumor that Y men denied cigarettes
and other sundries to wounded soldiers who did not have the money, or even the physical
ability, to pay for the items they so desperately desired. Listening in on a conversation
between two soldiers, Mayo overheard one recalling his experience at Belleau Wood
when he observed a stretcher team hurrying by with a wounded officer. The grievously
wounded soldier had his bottom jaw blown off and was in terrible shape. At that instant, a
Y Man passed by carrying a backpack loaded with cigarettes and chocolate cakes.
Noticing some sort of commotion between the stretcher bearers and the Y Man, the
soldier approached to see what was happening. The stretcher team told him that “the
captain, here, wants a cake of chocolate. He hasn’t eaten for two days but this fellow
won’t give it to him because he hasn’t got the price.” Enraged, the soldier turned to the
“damn Y scoundrel,” pulled his gun, and demanded that the Y Man give the wounded
captain whatever he wanted. The soldier described the “big tears of thankfulness a-rollin’
down his cheeks” when the wounded captain realized what this soldier had done for him
by putting the “damn Y Man” in his place.66
Elsie Janis and the Y Men
The distaste for the Y Men did not end with the men of the AEF; it bled over to
the women as well, which was a particularly painful blow. Already suffering from the
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frustration that accompanied every jeer and jab from battle-hardened Doughboys, the Y
Men also suffered the sarcasm of the AEF’s most beloved lady: Elsie Janis.
Janis was a well-known entertainer who went to France to entertain the boys of
the AEF during the summer of 1918. Janis meandered about the French countryside in
her sleek Cadillac touring car, escorted by her mother and a traveling entourage of
escorts. Writing about her experiences with the AEF soon after she returned home, her
stories are filled with sarcastic references to the Y Men. Her text overtly favored the AEF
soldiers over the “young Christians,” her mildly sarcastic name for the Y Men. The AEF
boys, in her opinion, were the real representatives of American virile masculinity in
France. She was confident that she had become intimately familiar with the Doughboys
jargon, songs, myths, and stories. She ventured into the trenches and even pulled the
lanyard on an artillery piece, pulling it over and over until “the observation posts reported
that there was nothing left of the positions we had been shelling.”67
Thoroughly familiar with the soldiers’ likes and dislikes, she became aware of
their loathing for Military Police (MPs). She described the MPs sarcastically as the
“[men] who tells the AEF how not to behave.”68 Nursing veiled contempt for the Y Men,
she made light of their do-gooder activities and was convinced they were frustrating her
efforts to gain close access to the young soldiers of the AEF.69 In a typically cynical
story, she describes an instance when she overtook Edward Carter’s “Young Christian
Packard” in her Cadillac. Janis described Carter as “kicking up more dust than any
67
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Christian car should kick up.” Determined to show up the “young Christian,” Janis ended
their “short but sweet argument as to who owned the road” by leaving him in the dust,
giving him some of the “thickest AEF Cadillac dust that ever flew.”70
Much of her jeering and jabbing of the Y Men was tongue-in-cheek humor.
However, Janis concludes her recollections of her time with “the boys” with a
particularly telling statement informed by her months of close observation of the AEF
grunts. In a passage that must be read with deference to context and due consideration
given to her previous statements about the Y Men, Janis concludes:
Most of the men liked the War, and most men will always like war, and as long as there are
women to fight for, men will fight, so if they really want to do away with war they must
exterminate women. We must not kill the spirit that won the War; we must not forget that for
every dear lad who was lost at least ten were made into real men . . . Oh, war had its good
71
points! (Italics mine.)

This statement is thick with double meaning. Many of the Y Men did not like war, yet
they chose to serve in a way that satisfied their conscience and was true to their
convictions, answering the nation’s call for volunteer welfare workers. The Y Men’s
status as brave, virile men was called into question by many of the soldiers they served,
and now Janis was extolling the virtues of men who would fight and protect women—a
statement that seems to exclude the Y Men. Finally, she lauds the “spirit that won the war
. . . [and] made real men,” a spirit the Y Man, at least in Janis’ estimation, did not
possess.72
The Day of Reckoning: The Y Man Meets the General
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Whether truth, fiction, rumor, or legend, the “damn Y Man” found he was the
object of intense ridicule—even hate. The facts concerning his service in France were
fairly clear, at least to the Y Men and the upper echelons of Army leadership, including
General Pershing and Secretary Baker. The majority of Y Men had every good intention
in volunteering, and they had dutifully responded to the Army’s requests. Yet their
decision to run the Army’s canteen and morale operations was a good deed that, in the
end, opened them up to slander and accusation.73
All of this frustration, hate, and sarcasm regarding the Y Men had a predictable
effect. Soldiers in every corner of the battlefield, from the trenches to the support areas,
loved to hate the Y Men. Shillinglaw was aghast at the criticism and sarcasm. Describing
how the Y Man was often blamed for logistic and pricing issues that were out of their
hands, he says,
Most of the soldiers who used the YMCA facilities had no knowledge of these problems and they
quickly criticized the organization for all manner of ills. In their bitterness over the conditions
which they found in the trenches, the soldiers were quick to cry “slacker” or “shirker” at a Y
74
canteen secretary.

Shillinglaw further lamented that one of his fellow Y Workers, who was too old for the
draft, couldn’t take the harsh ridicule anymore: “a good man resign[ed] his Y assignment
because of this criticism. C.D. Jackson was actually over draft age, but he looked young
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enough to be eligible. He worked hard . . . but he could not take the brutal criticism which
he got from the soldiers.”75
Ferguson remembers well his first encounter with stiff criticism. Despite the Y’s
tireless efforts to keep bringing in supplies as thousands of soldiers withdrew to rest areas
after their trench rotation, the Y Men could not keep up with their demands and “some
men began to complain bitterly.”76 They cursed the Y Man for bleeding them dry with
marked-up cigarettes, and they cursed the Army for not issuing them free cigarettes.
Cigarettes were the one item, in addition to bullets, that soldiers needed to win the war
according to Pershing, and soldiers despised giving their hard-earned pay to Y Men to
obtain them. Regarding the military necessity for cigarettes, top staff aide to Pershing,
Major Grayson M.P. Murphy, once said that “a cigarette may make the difference
between a hero and a shirker . . . in an hour of stress a smoke will uplift a man to
prodigies of valor; the lack of it will sap his spirit.” Ironically, Murphy was essentially
saying that “shirkers” (Y Men) were providing cigarettes to soldiers to help them avoid
being “shirkers.”77
In the midst of the soldiers complaining about cigarettes, commanding officers
extolling the benefits of tobacco, and a glaring absence of government cigarette rations, a
tall, ramrod straight, West Point-trained artillery officer stepped into the trenches in
February 1918. He was there to inspect the troops one last time before returning home to
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assume command of the Army.78 This officer was General Peyton March, the newly
appointed Army Chief of Staff (CoS), and he was on his way to Washington, DC. As the
new CoS, March subsequently took swift action to ensure the soldiers looked to the Army
for their well-being and morale—not the damn Y Man. His actions to address this morale
problem would have profound effects on twentieth-century America that still echo to the
present day.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL PEYTON MARCH, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE
When Major General Payton March inspected the trench-dwelling soldiers of the
AEF one last time in February 1918, he had been in France for seven months serving as
General Pershing’s Chief of Artillery. To his great dismay, he was recalled to
Washington, DC, by Secretary of War Newton Baker to become the new Chief Staff of
the Army. Secretary Baker had his eye on March for quite some time and informed
General Pershing that he desperately needed Pershing’s Chief of Artillery, saying, “I feel
it urgently necessary to have him.” March’s recall to Washington, DC, was covered by
the media outlets who hailed him the “foe of red tape” and a “real soldier in his prime.”
Baker’s desperation and the statements by the media belie the state of the Army General
Headquarters (GHQ) during this period: bogged down in red tape, mired in bureaucratic
bickering, and led by archaic generals whose time had long ago passed.1
Like any true Army combat-arms professional, March longed for the sound of
battle and men to lead. When he eventually met Secretary Baker for the first time as the
new Army Chief Staff, March informed Baker that he was “sick at the stomach” at his
removal from combat duty in France, adding that it was a matter that “was never referred
to again in all our long service together.”2 However, he knew the job to which he was
called was very important, and he appreciated the opportunity. March appealed to Baker
because he had experience downrange and was personally acquainted with the soldiers’
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needs.3 He also liked that March was known as a very direct ramrod (the “foe of red
tape”) fully capable of fixing the deadlock in Army GHQ and addressing the staff’s
inability to make decisions or see things through to conclusion.4
The previous two chiefs, Generals Tasker H. Bliss and Hugh L. Scott, were
deemed too outdated to handle the complexities of modern war and were quietly removed
from office.5 As March visited the troops and inspected the lines, some innate instinct
combined with his months of experience in France and informed his belief that something
was wrong. Considering the prioritization of his actions upon taking the helm as the
Chief of Staff, what he observed in the trenches convinced him that the Army was not
attending to the soldiers’ most basic needs. While visiting with the AEF staff in France
prior to departure, he realized the chasm between the GHQ and the AEF was extensive
both in distance and ideology. As he prepared to return home, he wrestled with his
conviction that drastic changes were in order to ensure the Army’s General Staff and
Supply Service Corps were properly oriented on the AEF soldiers on the frontlines. As
fate would have it, one of the bold decisions March made within days of taking command
of the Army has had profound economic, social, cultural, political, and health effects he
could never have fathomed.6
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As March sailed across the ocean, he processed all he had seen and experienced in
France, as well as the enormous task that lay ahead of him.7 First, he thought of death. By
the time he left France, millions of Allied soldiers and thousands of AEF soldiers had
perished in combat, with no end in sight. Tragically, he had once again experienced the
pain of death firsthand. His first wife Josephine had died while March was overseas in
1904, and now his eldest son and namesake, Peyton Jr., had met a tragic death while his
father was away. Peyton Jr., was a lieutenant in the Army and was killed in an aircraft
accident just before March set sail to return home. He drew comfort from President
Theodore Roosevelt, who sent him a letter expressing his grief over March having “drunk
the waters of bitterness,” adding that he might soon “have to drink of them” as well, for
he had sons in combat. Ironically, Roosevelt did eventually have to drink of these waters,
as his son Quentin was killed while engaged in air to air combat with the Luftwaffe. A
gracious, if gregarious man in life and death, Roosevelt later encouraged both March, and
himself, to “hold our heads high when we think of our sons.”8
March also drew additional support from Generals Pershing and Dawes, two men
with immense experience in grief and loss. Pershing had lost his wife and daughters to a
house fire in 1915 while serving on the Mexican Border Expedition, later commenting
when selected for Major General that “all the promotion in the world would make no
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difference now.”9 Pershing was forced to leave his young son, the only remaining
survivor of his family, with relatives when he took command of the expedition to France.
General Dawes, the Chief of the Service of Supply, had lost his twenty-two year old son
in a drowning accident at Lake Geneva in 1912. These men were tough Army officers
and men of their times—but they were also human. Dawes’ diary reveals an emotional
exchange between Dawes and Pershing about the pain they both shared in losing sons.
Dawes records a telling conversation in his war diary that he had with General Pershing
while together in a carriage in France:
I hope I do not fail him [Pershing]. We have both passed through the greatest grief which can
come to man. As we rode up together there occurred an instance of telepathy . . . neither of us was
saying anything, but I was thinking of my lost boy and of John’s loss and looking out the window,
and he was doing the same thing . . . we both turned at the same time and each was in tears. All
John said was, ‘Even this war can’t keep it out of my mind.’” 10

Despite the tragedy and death of the past, March had many challenges and
opportunities to welcome him upon dropping anchor in America. Upon disembarkation,
he promptly gave his daughter Vivian away in marriage to an Army Captain in New York
on March 1, 1918. Moreover, despite his “disgust” with having to leave his field
command in the AEF, he was soon to take charge of his beloved Army, an organization
to which he had given the greater portion of his life.11 After the war, March recalled that
“the declaration of war found the United States thoroughly unprepared for the great task
9
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which confronted it.”12 He had experienced this unpreparedness in France, and now he
knew a mountain of work awaited him. He heard reports that the GHQ was a failing
organization, a rumor he found hard to dismiss. One officer even predicted that the GHQ
would soon collapse and “break down.”13 The responsibilities were immense, for added
to the task of fixing the GHQ were the needs of a million men under combat arms and
additional millions at military training camps across the United States.
During his trip across, March also pondered one of his most deeply-held beliefs
regarding Army organizational culture. Dating to his days serving in Japan in 1904 as a
military observer of the Russo-Japanese War, March grew in his conviction that the
“American General Staff was a long way from being the effective agency the Japanese
General Staff was.”14 March was known to his peers as an Uptonian, a professional
military officer that followed and revered the teachings of Army General Emory Upton.
Upton was a West Pointer, decorated Civil War veteran, and staunch supporter of a
strong, large regular army structured around a professional, rigorously trained officer
corps. They were conservatives in the Army that believed in the Professional Military
Education (PME) system, expansion of the military academies, a general staff system
based on the German model, and a large standing army expanded by a supplemental draft
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in wartime. According to historian John Whiteclay Chambers, they were “distrustful of
‘instant’ soldiers as compared with ‘reliable’ regulars.”15
The opposite of the Uptonians were the progressive UMTers who believed in a
Universal Military Training system. They supported a small but professional officer corps
and expansion via universal conscription during war. They saw UMT as not only a
national defense measure, but a citizenship and moral training initiative—a proclivity that
belied their true roots in progressivism. President Teddy Roosevelt, General Leonard
Wood, and General Pershing were UMTers who stood in opposition to many of March’s
conservative views regarding America’s military establishment.16
With this conviction regarding the profession of arms, it followed that even at an
early date, long before the Great War, March advocated a reorganization of the Army. He
firmly believed that the Army staff was out of touch and irrelevant. Based on his earlier
experiences observing the efficiency of the Japanese General Staff, which was based
upon the German General Staff, he said he “knew, before I came back to America,
precisely the changes which I proposed to put into effect when I took over the Office of
Chief of Staff.” Interestingly, during his earlier experience observing Japan at war, March
predicted the Japanese aggression the allies were forced to confront 40 years later with
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blast, heat, and fragmentation. March said then that the Japanese “hated all white races”
and would find satisfaction with “nothing less than predominance in the Pacific.”17
March mostly took contention with the old staff system constraint of appointing
an officer to the Army Staff, and then leaving him there for the rest of his career. This
system tended to “solidify each . . . department into a compact bureaucracy preserving its
own unbroken traditions . . . and independence . . . from each other . . . and the rest of the
Army.”18 This system ensured a dearth in trained staff officers. Moreover, they were not
only in short supply, they were so removed from the line they were ineffective at best,
detrimental to the mission at worst. This situation was addressed incrementally with a
suite of acts rolled out between 1901 and 1913 that streamlined staff functions by
creating the General Staff Corps and the Army Chief of Staff position, as well as the
detail for duty system which detailed an officer to staff duty for four years and then
returned him to the line.
These reforms started with the innovations of Elihu Root, who served as Secretary
of War from 1899 to 1904. Historian James L. Yarrison declares these Root Reforms “of
great importance for the Army and its future,” because Root had spent time studying the
lessons learned from the war with Spain and concluded that “most of the mistakes made
during the war were the product of faulty organization and planning.”19 Replacing the
weaker Commanding General of the Army billet with the new General Staff headed by a
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“Chief of Staff of the Army,” Root centralized the power to command operations, supply,
logistics, and planning in one office.
Moreover, General Leonard Wood commented that the Detached Service Act of
1913, a follow on to the Root Reforms, was crucial because it established the
aforementioned detail system, ensuring that staff officers had “practical knowledge of the
needs of the [Line] troops . . . and appreciation of the conditions under which they are
living . . . [as] officers permanently detached from troops eventually lose touch with their
needs.”20 Though March and Woods came to despise each other, the detail system was
something upon which they readily agreed. Despite these needed changes that had
occurred during the two decades after the Spanish American War, staff dysfunction was
still rampant when March assumed command in 1918.
The greatest area of concern to March was not just the gridlock built up in the
staff, but the physical and ideological divisions between the line AEF units and the GHQ
staff. Regarding these unnecessary divisions, nothing caught March’s ire more than the
Sam Browne belt, an unauthorized uniform item that was the physical manifestation of all
he believed was wrong with the Army. March hated the Sam Browne belt because it was
rooted in the British aristocracy. He was particularly averse to the belt because the
Browne Belt cult painted staff officers in Paris as veterans and war heroes and staff
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officers performing similar duties at the GHQ as “slackers” and “swivel chair officers.”
To March, a true combat veteran, these distinctions were anathema, and were fits of
drama that directed attention away from the soldiers serving in the trench.21
However Pershing quickly adopted the Sam Browne belt and authorized it only
for AEF officers.22 Edward Coffman, March’s biographer, commented that “a small
difference in uniform, the Sam Browne represented a larger difference between March
and Pershing.”23 March also felt the belt was a waste of war industry material at a time
when leather was a rationed commodity in the United States. March was a staunch fiscal
conservative and estimated the Sam Browne belts would cost over two million dollars if
the war had gone on through 1919.
Moreover, he reasoned they were not only costly, they served no use to the
soldiers in the trenches, where enlisted soldiers carried rifles with shoulder straps and
officers, in true American fashion, used pistol belts and suspenders. March insisted that
the staff needed to focus time and resources on the needs of the soldiers in the trenches,
not the silly Sam Browne belt mafia. He asked Pershing to do away with the belt soon
after taking command of the Army. Pershing refused, his Chief of Staff General adding
that March was “narrow” and that going without the Sam Browne belt “was like going
without one’s pants.”24 To March, such elitism represented disconnects between the AEF
Staff officers in France and the GHQ Staff in Washington that went much deeper than a
21
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simple piece of leather. Even worse, it distanced the AEF staff officers from the men in
the trench. 25
With these anti-elitist sentiments in mind, March returned to the United States in
March 1918 and took command. Rather than focusing on soldiers’ needs and killing
Germans, March saw many officers and leaders more concerned with inter-Army cultural
wars and distracted by the staff-versus-line quagmire that had plagued the Army for
decades. March was determined to eliminate the apparent disconnects that fueled the
GHQ and AEF staffs’ lack of focus and internal dysfunction.26 He found the situation
worse than he thought. When he disembarked, he went directly to GHQ and was shocked
to find offices empty and dark:
I came down to the War Department that night and found the General Staff Offices dark, nobody
was there; I wandered along the deserted corridors . . . I found the corridor piled high with
unopened mail sacks . . . I finally found one officer on duty . . . and he was the only officer I did
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which he expressed in the way he recalled his staff’s quick and efficient handling of the cigarette rationing
issue. Also, to break up the us vs. them culture, he initiated a GHQ-AEF staff-to-line exchange program.
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find. The next night the entire General Staff were on duty, and they stayed on duty at night until
the end of the war.27

March took swift and decisive action. March, as an Uptonian, was a staunch
proponent of a professional, productive GHQ and a highly qualified officer corps. He put
an end to the lax nine-to-five schedules and initiated twenty-four hour, ‘round-the-clock
operations for the remainder of the war.28 He reorganized GHQ staff and made it more
efficient and responsive to the AEF. He implemented a staff-to-line exchange to improve
morale and create synergy. This program afforded staff officers with the opportunity to
go downrange in exchange for select AEF officers who would return stateside to serve on
the GHQ staff.29 One of his most controversial decisions was to remove former Chief of
Staff General Scott from command of Fort Dix. Scott had been retired in September
1917, one month prior to the AEF’s combat deployment to France, but as a close friend
of President Wilson, Scott was recalled to active duty and given command of Fort Dix.
Despite Scott’s political connections, March removed him from command to make way
for younger, more qualified Regular Army officers.30 Additionally, he ended the archaic
system of politically appointed officers. He insisted that only properly trained, combatready officers could have the privilege of leading his men.
Though he angered many Congressmen, Marsh stuck to his plans to build a
professional Army purged of aged retirees and well-connected political appointees. Thus,
March was the target of considerable angst from Congress. No decision was more
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controversial than his decision to block General Leonard Wood’s appointment to
command in France. Wood was a well-heeled political favorite of Teddy Roosevelt, and a
nasty fight ensued when March sacked Wood and placed him on the inactive retirement
list. Further, his policy of ending political promotions and not helping Congressmen
obtain draft deferments for their sons, did even less to endear him to certain elected
officials. After the war when Pershing and March were nominated to retain their war rank
as full generals, Congress approved Pershing and denied March. Despite this indignity,
March believed his Army purged of political appointees and inappropriate political
influence was a first in the history of modern war.31
After reorienting the General Staff on the soldiers, winning the war, and
addressing Army organizational and cultural issues, March turned to soldier morale
issues. He reinforced the newly formed Morale Branch, a Newton Baker initiative
hatched before March arrived. Though fully sanctioned by Baker, the GHQ staff drug its
heels for months, essentially ignoring the new branch and sticking to the time-honored
policy of allowing commanders in the field the leeway to command.32 March was a true
31

32

March, The Nation at War, 52, 56; Coffman, Hilt and Sword, 59.

Jennifer Keene, “Intelligence and Morale in the Army of Democracy: The Genesis of Military
Psychology during the First World War,” Military Psychology, 6, no. 4 (1994), 245; Thomas Camfield,
“Will to Win—The U.S. Army Troop Morale Program of World War I,” Military Affairs, October 1977,
125-128; Jensen and Wiest, War in the Age of Technology, 112; “Morale-Building Should be Eliminated
for Morale,” The Science News Letter, 41, no. 26 (1942), 411. Camfield details how much of the early
efforts to establish focused morale programs at the unit level and under the auspices of the General Staff
were based on captured German documents that described Axis morale programs. These programs were
resisted because “the suggestion that the American military should imitate the enemy did not sit well with
the Chief of Staff,” the Chief of Staff being March’s predecessor General Hugh Scott. The Chief’s office
responded to requests to establish a morale branch: “Disapproved. All divisions are commanded by officers
of long experience and are in direct contact with their divisions.” They later added, “The divisional
commanders are men of experience and good judgment; they are on the ground and in much better position
to tell what is needed than theorists who do not come in contact with the individuals they are trying to
educate.” The topic of morale management in age of science and technology is a hot topic among new
military history circles—is it an art or a science? In War in the Age of Technology: Myriad Faces of
Modern Armed Conflict, G.D. Sheffield posits that “despite the ‘scientific’ nature of warfare in 1914–1918,
the gauging of morale remained an art rather than a science, as it had been throughout history. The use of

92
believer in this command adage. However he viewed the morale branch through a slightly
different lens. He viewed the branch as a way to regain control of the morale mission. In
order to spur the staff to action and show the importance he placed on soldier morale, he
promoted the Morale Branch Chief Colonel Edward Munson to the rank of general. With
the branch and the newly minted general under the General Staff, March was happy to
absorb the CTCA into the Army chain of command and once again exercise full oversight
over soldiers’ morale and welfare.
March later claimed that the systematic management of soldier morale and
welfare was one of the greatest new achievements of the war.33 Though an enthusiastic
supporter of soldier morale, he had his limits. In many ways, he was still the old Indian
fighter who resisted programs that, in his opinion, turned disciplined military training into
“summer camp.”34 For example, he did not approve of a measure to rid the Army of
saluting. He still believed in rigid discipline and thought such uninformed measures
would only lead to Bolshevism.35 He did not like the singing programs touted by Munson

statistics was fraught with danger, while, conversely, the opinions of regimental and even staff officers,
however subjective, cannot be lightly set aside.” Dr. R.E.L. Faris, a research sociologist from the WWII
era, probably stated it best: “The best way to keep up American morale is to eliminate morale-building
programs—letting high morale grow naturally from the successes of an efficiently organized nation.” Faris
goes on to describe the true source of morale in any military organization as being grounded in confidence
that: 1) leaders, officers, and officials have the required ability to lead; 2) those with whom one is fighting
alongside will also do their part; 3) those appointed over you exercise proper coordination.
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and Fosdick.36 Upon meeting Fosdick for the first time, March ordered him to remove all
singing programs and athletic instructors at the training camps. He told Fosdick, “we’re
not running a circus or grand opera – take them out!” However, in time, he came to
recognize the value (in theory) of the CTCA’s work under the auspices of the Army
Morale Branch and often sought compromise.37
Despite these moves to orient his staff on soldier morale issues, March was still
disturbed that the GHQ and the AEF staff had nursed a culture where morale was seen as
a task for civilian agencies like the YMCA and the CTCA. March wanted no progressive
relief agencies serving in combat zones. March, the staunch Uptonian, felt the combat
zone was reserved for military professionals, not civilian volunteers. March was careful
to praise the work of the civilian morale workers, while at the same time claiming that it
was work reserved for the Army in combat zones.38
March had considerable distaste for Baker and Pershing’s decision to subcontract
the morale of the soldiers to the YMCA. Simply put, he despised the Y Men. March
firmly believed soldier morale was the commanding officer’s responsibility and that it
to cut through red tape and ensure the latest technology was immediately available to the soldiers on the
frontlines. He also made a Statistics Branch to measure GHQ efficiency and their ability to attain goals and
objectives oriented on winning the war.
36

“Varied Ground: Singing in the Training Camps,” Infantry Journal, XIV, no. 7 (1918): 540–
542. In this area, March’s resistance to group singing seems to have been out of place with the times. Even
the Infantry Journal, a trade publication of the hardened, company and field grade infantry officers that
serviced a rather conservative readership, acknowledged the importance of group singing in the camps. The
journal states, “Among the facts that have been established in the training camps this year is the fact that
every soldier likes to sing. It doesn’t matter in what direction his other preferences tend—he may or may
not care to read or go in for athletics or attend the movies—but he does like to join a dozen, or a hundred,
or a thousand other fellows in the songs they all know. Commanding officers of long experience have
recognized this fact in building the new American Army . . .”.
37

Fosdick, Chronicle of a Generation, 164. In the end, on issues like singing in camp, Fosdick
won out and March generally deferred to the morale experts like General Munson and the Morale Branch,
as well as Fosdick and the CTCA.
38

March, The Nation at War, 211.

94
was off limits to any subcontracting scheme, especially in a war zone. March believed “in
time of war there should [not] be any organization serving with the troops in the field
which is not militarized.”39 Pershing and March were noticeably incongruent on this
matter. Pershing was happy to subcontract morale so his officers could “fight the war.”
March would argue that morale was the war.40 He did not like the Y Men serving among
his soldiers and he “drew blood all along the line” when he registered his official
opposition to Y workers while he was the AEF’s Chief of Artillery. Angered over men
who appeared as healthy, “husky men” serving as morale workers instead of carrying
rifles, he said he believed “at the start that no man should be permitted to enter or become
a member of any noncombat organization who was capable of carrying arms.”41
Further, he accused the Y Men of having a higher Venereal Disease (VD) rate
than his own soldiers, which caused immense excitement at Y headquarters in Paris.
March was satisfied with the work the YMCA was doing at the stateside training camps,
but he declared that for “any army in the field, to achieve success, it is necessary to have
the commanding general in complete control of the entire personnel.”42 He demanded
that Fosdick, head of the CTCA, wear provisional military rank and a uniform when he
was in France. He deplored soldiers looking to others for their morale in the combat zone,
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and insisted that “military morale was a problem for the Army itself to solve . . . the
commanding officer of an organization is its real morale officer.”43
After the war, March described how Baker eventually reversed his position on
soldier morale and embraced March’s morale doctrine. He said, “As the war proceeded,
[Baker] completely changed his mind about the matter and came to the conclusion that he
had been wrong in his organization of these welfare bodies for war service. He became a
convert to the necessity of completely militarizing all such bodies.” Baker himself
repeated these sentiments in a speech he delivered to the Army War College in 1929. He
told the audience that if he were Secretary of War again, he “would not have with the
Army in the field any collateral welfare organizations” and was “persuaded that [morale
work] would have been, and in the future should be, done as well by the Army itself as by
outside agencies.” Baker argued that conducting morale operations in this manner would
allow the Army to “avoid a number of things that are highly undesirable.”44
March had a keen eye for detail. His experiences in France, culminating with his
inspection of the trenches before departing, left him with a particular conviction that the
greatest symbols of the Y Men’s connection to his soldiers were cigarettes. To soldiers,
cigarettes were instant morale and welfare. They were relaxation and serenity in a clean,
sanitary, disposable stick—“dream sticks [that] help you to pass away many a dreary and
home-sick hour.”45 March saw the agitation and discord created by soldiers angered over
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the “slackers” and “shirkers” they had to depend on for their cigarettes.46 Falling prey to
many of the rumors and legends about the Y Men, March developed a fairly harsh set of
beliefs himself. He freely admitted that he had “impatience with individuals who hid
behind this service [Y work] to avoid carrying a gun, or used it to obtain special favors
for themselves.”47 He felt they did “the work of women” and should carry a rifle or go
home.48 Morale was a command responsibility, sacred as the units’ battle standards or
unit guide-ons. March felt the progressive-oriented, civilian-led morale and welfare
programs had gone too far. Soldiers more focused on getting goodies and treats in the
trench, distracted by endless bickering over the cost of cigarettes instead of focusing on
the enemy in front of them, were not properly focused according to March. The Allies
had spent years in the trenches waiting for their next rum ration or trip to the brothel. The
Doughboys were in France for one reason: to shoot straight and kill the Boche. In
General March’s view, morale in the trench was a five-hundred-meter head shot, a
bayonet through the ribs, hot rations once a day, and copious amounts of free,
government-supplied manufactured cigarettes.
Peyton March and the Cigarette Ration
When March took command of the Army, he was also in sole command of the
War Department for his first months, as Secretary of War Baker was in France on an
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inspection visit. After taking the previously mentioned steps to address GHQ battle
rhythm and work shifts, fire or demote incompetent officers, and make organizational
changes to ensure efficiency and better staff response times, March had immediately
moved on to important soldier morale issues. At the top of his list was the cigarette
ration. March noticed that the staff reacted to difficult issues by giving excuses, shifting
the task to another department or agency, or giving reasons why a particular action was
not possible. March observed that “well-meaning and zealous officers came to me to tell
me I couldn’t do this or that thing because of some decision or regulation.”49
March did not suffer fools lightly and was disgusted by the staff’s can’t do
culture. He interpreted his position as the head of the Army to mean he “could do
anything necessary to carry out the military program” and determined he “would not have
any such officers” serving on his staff. March was going to enforce a paradigm shift that
would root out incompetence and reward men of action. According to March, nowhere
was this subsequent paradigm shift more evident than in the prompt, can-do response by
the staff to an order he issued in early March 1918. In this momentous order, he directed
the Army to procure stocks of manufactured cigarettes to issue as standard daily rations
to the soldiers in France. At the time, March could not realize the long-term impact this
order would have on the cigarette smoking culture in America.50
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When Secretary Baker returned to the War Department on April 16, 1918, he
quickly noticed that March had ordered a cigarette ration for the AEF in his absence.
Baker politely informed March that he had explicitly ordered that cigarettes not be
included in the soldiers’ rations a year earlier. He knew March was a man of action, but
was surprised that he had countermanded his guidance. In his recollections of the war,
March indicated he did not know of such an order by Baker when he gave the command
to initiate a cigarette ration. Moreover, he said the fact his staff officers had not balked at
his orders was rather satisfying because it “showed the distance that the War Department
had progressed along the lines I had marked out for it.” Rather than telling March why he
could not issue the cigarette ration or that the Secretary of War had already provided
guidance on the issue, the staff officers simply obeyed and “went out and did it on the
run.”51 As to Baker’s query regarding March’s apparent insubordination, March told
Baker:
I had become convinced, during my service in France, that the use of tobacco by the troops there
needed regulating. Tobacco was obtainable by the soldiers only by buying it [from Y Men], and
many tired men were deprived of the use of this solace because they had no money, while more
fortunate comrades with means of their own were getting all the tobacco . . . [therefore] I directed
that an order be issued making tobacco a part of the ration for issue to the soldiers.52

Baker supplied no objection, and with that, it was done: the manufactured
cigarette and the American soldier were officially linked, for the first time, through a
daily meal ration. This relationship with a tap root in WWI became deeply entrenched
over the next six decades.53 The tobacco ration was set at “four ready-made cigarettes”
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per day.54 When the New York Times heard about March’s decision, they reported, “A
wave of joy swept through the American Army today . . . this step has been long hoped
for by the soldiers . . .”55 The demand for cigarettes among the soldiers was so great the
government secured “the entire [1918] output of Bull Durham [cigarettes] for distribution
to the troops.” When shortages ensued, the Times encouraged Americans complaining
about the empty shelves at their cigarette retailer: “There is a remedy! Enlist and all will
be well!”56
Entrenched
After the Armistice, most of the Y leadership, including YMCA Overseas Chief
Edward Carter, left France rather quickly. Unfortunately the Army thanked the YMCA
for running the Army’s canteen system during the war by accusing the civilian relief
agency of profiteering and other nefarious activities. These accusations ignited a fairly
extensive investigation that lasted four years.57 Y Man David Shillinglaw was left to deal

which were less cumbersome that were other popular forms of tobacco. WWI entrenched the cigarette in
popular culture . . . this phenomenon is well documented in North America . . . after WWI, many
adolescent and young adult males started smoking . . .” (Italics mine.)
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with the Army’s investigators and white-gloved bean counters. He became the object of
intense scrutiny despite the fact his only experience was in building the Y Huts and
salvaging Y equipment after the war. In this high stakes game of musical chairs, the
music had stopped and Shillinglaw was the last one standing. The scrutiny and
accusations were so intense Shillinglaw eventually had a nervous breakdown and
returned home where it took him two years to sufficiently recover. Shillinglaw was never
officially accused of any wrongdoing; much of his anxiety was related to fear, intense
pressure, and his overwhelming desire to do a good job.58
Whether Shillinglaw and his fellow Y Men did a good or bad job, or were
servant-purveyors or pusillanimous profiteers, are questions that may never find adequate
answers. However, there is little doubt that WWI completely transformed the American
cigarette industry and the culture of smoking in America.59 Most historians agree that
more than any other single factor, the Great War “legitimized the cigarette” and “moved
cigarettes into the mainstream of American culture . . . legitimitiz[ing] cigarettes by
linking them to an icon of manliness and civic virtue: the American soldier.” Historian
Jarrett Rudy adds fidelity to this post-war link between cigarette smoking and
masculinity: “Ultimately, it was the association between cigarettes and First World War
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soldiers, largely promoted by newspapers that made cigarettes ‘manly,’ giving them new
legitimacy. The First World War has been seen by some as marking a trend away from
‘rugged masculinity’ toward a ‘domestic masculinity.” Rudy argues that after WWI,
inner-city, urban-dwelling labor men, for example, could achieve the same level of
perceived masculinity as rough-and-tough cow punchers or soldiers by simply smoking a
cigarette.60 Finally, historians Allan Brandt and Robert Proctor argue, “WWI would mark
a critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern
consumer culture,” Proctor adding the war “turned smoking from a marginal indulgence
of questionable morality to an unobjectionable mark of stalwart manhood.”61
Proctor further posits that the cigarette critics were summarily “silenced during
the First World War . . . why should anyone worry about cancer or emphysema thirty
years down the road, when bullets are whizzing overhead?”62 The Doughboys grew to
possess a nearly insatiable demand for cigarettes during WWI: “Per capita consumption
of manufactured cigarettes in the United States nearly tripled from 1914 to 1919 . . . this
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is one of the most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded.”63 The Great War had
established a smoking habit that would grow exponentially during the twentieth
century.64 One commentator from the period observed:
if there were any among all those millions of soldiers who were non-smokers when the War began
there were none by the time it was over. The officers in command fully recognized the value of
smoking as a means of deadening the men’s susceptibilities to the fearful strain to which they
were constantly exposed, as well as of mitigating the danger of periods of enforced idleness, and
they used every possible effort to ensure a constant supply of the requisite materials.65

The ration of four manufactured cigarettes a day became the standard issue for the
next 55 years, except during WWII when that number was bumped up quite drastically to
63

Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 45; The War Industry Board, American Industry in the War: A
Report of the War Industries Board (Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, 1921), 208.
During WWI, the Army’s demand for and subsequent rush on the cigarette market drove the Army to
create a Tobacco Section in the WIB on April 26, 1918. This section was created in response to March’s
order to procure cigarettes for rations and “in response to a growing concern over the price and supply of
tobacco not only for the armed forces but for the civil population.” In this report, it was estimated that “men
in service used on an average 60 to 70 percent more [tobacco] than they did in civil life.” This pattern of
the Army creating a Tobacco Section to coordinate procurement of tobacco, a national asset, was continued
during WWII. The section was called before Congress to give testimony in 1944 regarding the Army’s
procurement of nearly 300 billion cigarettes during the first four years of WWII. Preston Herbert was Chief
of the Tobacco Section in the Quartermasters Department for this effort during WWI.
64

Carl Avery Werner, “The Triumph of the Cigarette,” American Mercury (December 1925). The
astonishing increase in manufactured cigarette smoking in America was a phenomenon that those of the
period were quick to recognize as well; it’s not just a cultural shift modern observers alone note. In a
feature piece for American Mercury written by journalist Carl Avery Werner, he asks, “Do you remember
when they called it the coffin nail, and it was a common practice for austere gentlemen of Christian
principles to snatch it from the fingers of young smokers and trample it underfoot, and all the moral States
began passing laws against it, and the highest medico-ethical opinion held it to be a sure forerunner of heart
disease, tuberculosis, dipsomania and sin? What a change today! By the most conservative estimate, nine
out of ten American men of voting age now smoke cigarettes as regularly as they brush their teeth, and at
least five in every hundred of the females of the nation, past adolescence, do precisely the same thing.
Eighteen years ago there were consumed in this country, in round numbers, 7,000,000,000 cigars a year and
7,000,000,000 cigarettes. This year, 1925, the number of cigars smoked will still be only 7,000,000,000,
but the number of cigarettes consumed will run to 75,000,000,000 . . .” Regarding the genesis of this
remarkable increase in manufactured cigarette smoking, Werner directly points to WWI: “Then came the
war of 1917. Five million men, physically the flower of American manhood, were hurled into a maelstrom
of hardship, deprivation, danger and destruction. Smokers and non-smokers alike were collected and
thrown haphazard into the field. Sound young non-smokers witnessed husky, healthy and hard-boiled
cigarette smokers. Cigar and pipe smokers with a grudge against the ‘fags’ found their prejudice slipping
away. The general tendency was aided by the exigencies of the new and strange existence. The bulk and
fragility and frequently the unavailability of cigars, pipe tobaccos and pipes, on the one hand, and the
convenience, plentitude and general adaptability of cigarettes on the other, were circumstances that favored
the latter. And so the last vestiges of opprobrium that public understanding had not already removed were
dissolved in the training camps and trenches.”
65

Corte, A History of Smoking, 264.

103
sixteen cigarettes a day. Americans’ smoking habit, which would reach staggering levels
after WWI and not peak until 1980 in terms of billions smoked per year, was born during
the Great War.66 When General Peyton March decided to move the Army into the
cigarette rationing business, he initiated a storied relationship between the Army, the
soldier, and the cigarette that would be renewed time and again. The soldier and the
cigarette subsequently became the official national symbol of American warfare and
military service during the twentieth century.67 After the war, in what amounts to an ode
to the cigarette, Joseph Mills Hanson provides a final, telling description of the way the
soldier felt about the cigarette in WWI:
You played the game with fighting men? Why this is good! You’ve seen the big show then. Here,
have a Lucky. It’s the Doughboys drag. And always good to taste. But, say, the fag that burned a
spot of memory in my brain was one I got one night up in Lorraine–off of a long-geared chap
who’d made the grade with me that night in my first trench raid. I never saw his face all through
the scrap there in the dark. I’d like to see his map again, to thank him. Wounded, cold, and wet, it
meant a lot, that mashed-up cigarette.68
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CHAPTER V
SMOKE EM’ IF YOU’VE GOT EM’: THE GREATEST GENERATION GOES TO WAR1
In December 1943, Ann Dettori was twenty-two years old. Two inches shy of five feet in
height, she always walked tall on the way to her job as a riveter at the Grumman Aircraft bomber
factory on Long Island. A first-generation Italian-American Catholic, she was proud of her
contribution to the country’s war effort. That particular day she was doubly proud. Responding
to an appeal by management, she had decided to participate in a cigarette drive for the soldiers.
On her way to work, she stopped at the corner store to spend some of her hard-earned money on
a carton of cigarettes to send overseas. When she arrived at the factory, she found a slip of paper
and scribbled a handful of words that changed her life: “Good Luck and a Very Merry Xmas,
Ann Dettori, #94 Roslyn L.I.” Hoping her note would produce a pen pal, she carefully placed it
in one of the packs of cigarettes going over there and began the work day proud that she had
done “something decent.”
Sometime around Christmas of 1943, Staff Sergeant Clinton Putnal was going about his
day serving with the Army in North Africa. Putnal was a tall, Southern boy from an evangelical
protestant family in rural, central Florida. He served as a medic-crewman aboard an Army Air
Corps bomber flying medium-range missions against the Germans. Happy to receive a carton of
smokes from the good folks back home, he was even happier when he discovered the nice note
from an Ann Dettori. As he enjoyed a good smoke, he decided to write her. Several months later,
Ann, having forgotten about the note, was surprised to receive a letter from her new pen pal,
Staff Sergeant Clinton Putnal!
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The two began exchanging letters regularly. After several months, Clinton informed her
that he was being transferred to California where he would contact her later. He eventually wrote
and asked her to visit him there. She refused because her brother had recently been killed
fighting in Italy, and she felt she could not abandon her mother during this time of grief. On
February 20, 1945, Ann received the surprise of her life. While visiting a friend on Long Island,
she received a message from her mother to come home quickly; a young man in uniform named
Clinton was on the doorstep! Ann rushed home, and found her mother waiting for her.
While Clinton washed up, Ann’s mother admonished her not to “jump in his arms like a
hussy,” because she had raised her better. Of course, the first thing Ann did upon seeing the
handsome, tall soldier was to jump right in his arms. Seventy years later, Putnal says she “can
still feel his arms” wrapping tightly around her, adding that “when he held me in his arms that
day, I knew that was it.” That day, he asked Ann to marry him. The next day, they married at the
courthouse. Within two hours of her nuptials, Ann found herself on a troop transport train headed
back across the US to California in the arms of her handsome soldier, along with hundreds of
others. Clinton and Ann were married for 54 years. On the day he died, she found in his wallet
the note she had sent in that fated carton of cigarettes; he had carried it with him for over half-acentury. Next to Ann’s name on the message she had sent, Clinton had scribbled the following:
“+ Clinton Putnal Always Together.”2
This incredible, true story of life, love, soldiers, fate, and cigarettes is full of irony and
human interest. WWII would bring Americans together as no other event in US history before or
since. That a pack of cigarettes could bring two vastly different people together in a world falling
apart is one among a legion of paradoxical and exciting human interest stories that occurred the

2

Ann Putnal, interview by Joel R. Bius, September 2014, transcript, Center for Culture and Oral History,
University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS.

106
world over during WWII. Only two decades after the war to end all wars, it was tragically ironic
that Ann built bombers for Clinton to fly over North Africa as part of a second world war in the
span of just two decades. America once again harnessed all areas of industry and society to join a
war in Europe in its third year, just as it had in 1917 when they sent thousands like Jonathon Lee
to the trenches of the Western Front. By 1942, millions of draftees fought in a war that spread
from the jungles of the Pacific to the deserts of North Africa, with fortress Europe in between.
Women entered the foundries and worked alongside men making hundreds of thousands of
tanks, airplanes, ships, and other war materials. The mobilization for WWII was on a scale
unlike any the world had ever seen.
It was striking that the YMCA and organizations like the CTCA, which had played such
an integral part in WWI mobilization, were roundly denied direct access to WWII soldiers. When
Army planners exhumed the mothballed mobilization plans from WWI, they discovered an
abundance of after action reports (AAR) which subsequently informed WWII planning. In these
AARs, the WWI morale planners lamented decisions to subcontract morale to the YMCA and
other progressive relief agencies.3 In short, Newton Baker and Peyton March’s renunciation of
civilian relief work substantially influenced the generation of military and civilian planners who
led mobilization for WWII.
As a result, the YMCA’s access to the soldiers was severely curtailed. Neither Y Men nor
Y Women were allowed on any Army training camps, nor were they permitted to work amongst
the soldiers downrange in any WWII operational theatre. Y Camps were allowed near Army
Posts, but ironically were restricted like the bars and brothels of WWI, in terms of distance and
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proximity to WWII soldiers.4 The Army ran its own canteens leaving the YMCA to run Bible
studies and recreation leagues in facilities off-post.
Even more ironically perhaps, the Army wholeheartedly assumed the morale by vice
mission it was happy to subcontract during WWI. Instead of working in concert with civilian
agencies to limit soldiers’ access to instruments of vice, the Army actually insisted on issuing
them millions of condoms and billions of cigarettes from the outset of WWII. Minor grumblings
in the War Department in favor of a campaign against vice similar to that of WWI progressives
was ignored. In the case of condoms, the Army conceded that “we cannot stifle the instincts of
man, we cannot legislate his appetite. We can only educate him to caution, watchfulness and
perpetual hazards of promiscuous intercourse; and furnish him with adequate preventative
measures.”5 The Army slogan became if you can’t say no, take a pro. Allan Brandt calculates
that the Army, through free distribution and PX sales, provided as many as fifty million condoms
each month during the war, “an important reversal of WWI military policy” and “an implicit
recognition of the inability of officials to control the troops’ sexual drives.” 6
In the case of cigarettes, it is no secret that WWII soldiers smoked copious amounts of
whatever brands they could obtain. The unique relationship between soldier and cigarette during
WWII is captured in the simple fact that four of the Army’s massive demobilization camps were
named for the war’s most popular cigarette brands: Camps Lucky Strike, Twenty Grand, Old
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Gold, and Phillip Morris.7 Soldiers’ unfettered access to billions of manufactured cigarettes
during WWII required a massive mobilization and troop sustainment program. In addition to
adequate venereal disease preventative measures, in WWII, the Army also determined to furnish
the soldier with adequate smoking measures. If take a pro was the slogan associated with the
soldier and the condom, smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em! became the slogan associated with the
soldier and the cigarette.
The American G.I. was a product of the cigarette-smoking WWI Doughboy plus two
decades of profuse cigarette smoking among Americans that followed. These G.I.s wanted to
smoke ‘em and they didn’t have to go far to get ‘em during WWII. The Army supplied soldiers
with nearly half-a-trillion manufactured cigarettes through meals and daily rations. This
avalanche of cigarettes was supplemented by billions more purchased at greatly reduced prices
through the canteen system or given to soldiers as care packages by generous Americans like
Ann Dettori. If during WWI soldiers developed an insatiable demand for manufactured
cigarettes, the soldiers of WWII possessed this insatiable demand from the beginning. They
brought this demand to basic training, and carried it with them to the far-flung battlefields of
WWII.
Thus, the nation entered WWII as a great generation of smokers, and this had a marked
influence on the way the Army mobilized for war and procured the cigarettes needed to supply
millions of soldiers. Moreover, it was not just the soldiers who needed smokes; millions of
Americans back home demanded them as well. As Americans adapted to food rations, empty
shelves, and barren pantries that accompany total war mobilization, they came face-to-face with
the magnitude of the soldier-cigarette relationship. With one-quarter of the nation’s entire
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cigarette supply eventually earmarked for soldiers, drastically limited availability created
consternation among war workers and nervous Americans who needed cigarettes more than ever.
To understand how Americans dealt with cigarette shortages, the nature of the soldier-cigarette
relationship during WWII, and the herculean lengths to which planners went to supply them
smokes, one must first grasp the power and pervasiveness of smoking in America during this
period.
A Great Generation of Smokers
Americans of the Greatest Generation were prolific cigarette smokers. A marginal habit
when the nation went to war in 1917 had ballooned to an immense vice as much a part of
American culture as baseball or apple pie. In 1944, a representative of the cigarette industry
commenting on this rapid rise, said:
The First World War had a pronounced effect on the smoking habits of the American people and the
present war has had an equally profound effect. More persons of both sexes, old and young, are enjoying
the pleasure, satisfaction, and comfort of cigarettes than ever before. Glance back a quarter century. From
1914 to 1918, the period of World War I, cigarette consumption increased 300 percent. Yet, despite this
prodigious gain, in 1920 the per capita consumption of cigarettes was only 414. Today the per capita figure
. . . has reached the almost incredible figure of 2,240—a gain of 540 percent in less than 25 years. About 60
percent of this per capita increase has materialized since 1940 and—please note this carefully—this figure
would be still higher if there were enough cigarettes for everybody today.8

In 1935 with the US in the throes of depression, Americans smoked 134 billion total cigarettes.
Ten years later the numbers had risen to near astronomical levels: in 1945 alone, Americans
smoked 341 billion cigarettes.9 From a rate of 1,564 a year in 1935, then 2,240 cigarettes a year
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in 1944, by 1945 the rate had risen again to 3,449 annual cigarettes for every adult in America.10
These figures lead to the question: why were Americans smoking so much?
Norms and Nerves
A host of commentators, journalists, and enterprise insiders from the WWII period were
interested in this question regarding Americans and smoking behavior. Moreover, many
historians since have sought to understand WWII America in terms of culture, consumption, and
economic policy as they relate to smoking habits. Of all the answers offered as to why
Americans smoked so much during this period, they generally fall into two categories: norms
and nerves. The normalcy of cigarette smoking in America during this period is well
documented. By 1941, cigarette smoking had become a completely normal, culturally accepted
vice among Americans. Whereas progressives were aghast at young men, much less young
women, smoking before WWI, WWII it was so prevalent among Americans that one WWII
veteran recalls smoking in the locker room with his coach and the rest of his team during the
halftime of a pre-war junior varsity basketball game!11 In fact, abnormal would describe not
smoking during this period. One industry representative, when asked why people consumed so
many cigarettes during WWII, said that smoking simply afforded the average American
“comfort, solace, and pleasure” in the midst of a world spun out of control.12 By the end of the
decade, eight out of every ten American men were avid smokers.
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If smoking had become a normative American vice by WWII, it was also a nervous habit.
After suffering through the Great War, the Great Depression, and now another world war,
Americans were on edge.13 Just as the cigarette had become the craze in the trenches of WWI
where it calmed nerves and made the unbearable manageable, cigarette smoking took on even
greater vigor in the foundries, factories, homes, basic training camps, and battlefields associated
with WWII Americana. Using fear and security as unifying themes in his magnum opus on the
WWII era, Freedom from Fear, historian David Kennedy describes the conditions driving
American citizens to such nervous habits as chain smoking billions of manufactured cigarettes:
Not since the great surge of pioneers across the Appalachian crest in the early years of the Republic had so
many Americans been on the move. Fifteen million men and several hundred thousand women—one in
nine Americans—left home for military training camps . . . Another fifteen million persons—one out of
every eight civilians—changed their county of residence . . . By war’s end, one in every five Americans
had been swept up in the great wartime migration . . . endless workers poured into the great metropolitan
centers of defense production—Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, San Diego, Los Angeles, Oakland, Portland,
and Seattle.14

One observer noted that “War conditions increase the tendency to use tobacco products . .
. soldiers at the front . . . war plant workers . . . the general population . . . girls left at home . . .
wives left at home . . . mothers . . . [all] very strongly increased demand.”15 The consumption of
cigarettes tracked “almost exactly parallel” with the rise and fall of industrial output during
WWII. When workers worked, they smoked. When soldiers fought, they smoked. When workers
had money in their pockets, they consumed cigarettes. WWII was one of the most productive,
labor-intensive eras in American history; American workers reaped the rewards of steady
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employment and good pay. And when working under pressure of war, whether in industrial or
combat conditions, their reward often came as a pack of cigarettes.16
The demand for cigarettes among the American populace grew to incredible proportions.
Attempting to describe the nearly insatiable demand for cigarettes during WWII, tobacco
lobbyist Joseph Kolodny said in 1944 that it was impractical even to predict a ceiling for
cigarette consumption in America. He claimed that WWI and WWII had a significant impact on
cigarette consumption, stating: “The production and consumption of cigarettes has leaped to
astronomical heights in recent years, yet the saturation point is not yet in sight. As a matter of
fact, no one is capable of forecasting when a point of saturation will be reached. It is rather silly
to even contemplate any limit on cigarette consumption.”17
Kolodny further claimed that given an adequate supply of cigarettes, the demand for them
“has virtually no limits.” He also observed that civilians and soldiers under the wartime
conditions and pressures described above would sacrifice much in terms of rationing of supplies
and food; however they would not put up with degradation of their steady access to cigarettes.
Indeed Americans would “go nuts” without them.18
Recalling this “smoke or go nuts” theme, one veteran Marine Corps fighter pilot
remembered doing aileron rolls while on a strike mission over the Pacific so he could reach his
pack of smokes lodged in the floor plates of his aircraft. He may have been on oxygen at 15,000
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feet over enemy territory, but he was ready for a smoke!19 The Chairman of R.J. Reynolds added
to revelations regarding consumption mania, stating that “we are making approximately 330
billion cigarettes this year . . . and to top that, there is [still] a whole lot of unsatisfied demand.”20
Business Week magazine provided an appropriate summation of the triangular relationship
among nerves, disposable income, and consumption on the American worker and soldier: “the
combination of war nerves and war prosperity continues to pile up a record demand for
cigarettes.”21
That Americans consumed copious amounts of cigarettes during WWII is a wellestablished fact statistically and culturally. What did this consumption look like? During the war,
Business Week meaningfully described the enthusiasm for cigarette smoking and the fears nursed
by Americans deprived access to favorite brands. It characterized this dearth of smokes as a
“cigarette famine.” Using geography as a literary device, journalists described how L.A. cab
drivers might volunteer to get your cigarettes for you and help you avoid “the trouble of waiting
in line.” It was not the fact that cab drivers offered this service; rather, it is important to note the
long lines forming for cigarettes. This same journalist described how in Dallas, a girl waited
patiently for the mail to arrive from her soldier-brother in India to receive a carton of much
sought after Lucky Strike cigarettes. The irony was clear: unable to obtain premium cigarettes in
America, this girl had to depend on her brother to send them from half-a-world away. 22
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Another journalist described the long lines at Macy’s in New York City where lines of
“cigarette-starved New Yorkers” had become so long that the store had to close down its tobacco
department and resort to a complex rationing scheme.23 Finally, and most sarcastically, the
enemy happily joined in on all the lamenting about cigarette consumption anxieties in America.
In Tokyo, a Japanese journalist cheerfully quipped that “American women are smoking pipes
because they can’t get cigarettes.”24 Though Japanese awareness of Americans’ frustrations over
shrinking access to manufactured cigarettes was frustrating, they apparently failed to account for
Americans’ ability to adapt and overcome—in more ways than one. The Brown & Williamson’s
roll-your-own cigarette machine was a device born of depression-era ingenuity, and sales of this
machine soared from an average of 15,000 a month at the start of the war to a record-breaking
100,000 a month by the end.25
However, all was not bleak. One journalist reported a silver lining contained in the
cigarette shortage crisis, noting that the shortage would drive smokers to abandon “brand
consciousness in his frenzy to buy anything that can be smoked.”26 Moreover, civilian consumers
could take pride in their ability to endure extreme cigarette shortages or lack of access to
premium brands as a form of patriotism. Many civilians in America took comfort in thinking a
shortage in smokes on their side of the ocean possibly meant a G.I. on the other side had plenty
of gold leaf relief. On the other hand, just as many citizens did not take solace in this form of
tobacco patriotism. At best, they simply grew weary of cigarette shortages. At worst, they
accused the Army of overkill based on rumors of barges and warehouses packed to the brim with
23

Business Week, “Macy’s Rations Smokes” (February 3, 1945), 31.

24

Business Week, “Cigarette Famine,” 19.

25

Business Week, “Roll Your Own” (Dec. 2, 1944), 21.

26

Business Week, “Cigarette Famine,” 19.

115
thousands of stockpiled cartons of cigarettes, presumably wasting away. Alarmed at the growing
emergency, these cigarette-starved consumers began to complain to their elected representatives.
Soon, these complaints were loud and numerous enough to gain the attention of one of the
Senate’s most powerful leaders: Harry S. Truman.
The Truman Committee, the Soldier, and the Cigarette
Historian Donald H. Riddle describes the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the
National Defense Program, better known as the Truman Committee, as “the most important
single Congressional committee dealing with the mobilization program of WWII” as well as
“one of the most responsible investigating committees in recent history.”27 It was formed through
an act of Congress on March 1, 1941, to exercise oversight over the enormous defense build-up.
Recognizing the more-than-ample opportunity for graft, price-gouging, war profiteering,
corruption, waste, and political patronage, the committee met regularly and held hearings for the
next seven years, ultimately disbanding on April 28, 1948.
The committee wielded considerable influence and received testimony from some of the
leading industrialists and economic planning experts in America. It had a substantial impact on
policy and reflected the values and concerns of the nation as a whole, not just those engaged in
war fighting or war material production. In short, the Truman Committee was a reflection of
America—its concerns were America’s concerns. Thus, the issues upon which the Committee
chose to focus, as well as its findings, must be understood in that context. The Committee left a
mountain of reports and transcripts generated from an impressive array of hearings, both public
and private. In total, the Committee’s work was prodigious: “51 reports . . . totaling 1,946 pages
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. . . 432 public hearings at which 1,798 witnesses made 2,284 appearances producing 43 volumes
of printed testimony totaling 27,568 pages.”28
One of the more notorious Congressional investigating committees in American history
was the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. During the Civil War, this committee acted
as the sounding platform for Radical Republicans determined to overshadow President Lincoln’s
activities as Commander in Chief. The Joint Committee investigated nearly every aspect of the
Civil War. Truman had seen war, and being a student of history he determined not to repeat the
mistakes of the Joint Committee. Thus, different from the Civil War Joint Committee, the
Truman Committee “conducted investigations on almost all phases of the war effort except those
matters having to do with military strategy and tactics.” Prominent topics included everything
from rubber rations to labor-industry relations.29
With Truman’s characteristic determination as guide and his desire just to help the
President “win the war,” the committee mainly concerned itself with the “domestic side of the
war effort—the industrial mobilization.” With total mobilization on such a massive scale,
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conflict was bound to exist as “the armed services clashed with civilian agencies over
mobilization policies, and the role of the military in industrial mobilization.”30 The majority of
the complaints that reached the Committee originated with private citizens and arrived by mail,
in person, or telephone.31 Some of the topics were immense in their scope and complexity. One
that never reached the official attention of the committee was the Manhattan Project, the covert
venture to produce the atomic bomb. When the committee was perplexed by the deluge of
complaints regarding what appeared as strange, secretive military-industrial work in places as
varied as Tennessee and New Mexico, Truman approached Secretary of War Stimson for
answers. Stimson told him that “it was an undertaking paralleling a German project and that the
first country to succeed would probably win the war.” Truman subsequently dropped the matter
and mentioned it no more.32
Other topics and complaints were often silly and trivial. A particularly interesting group
contained citizens’ war-winning strategies or suggestions for ingenious weapons that would
smite the enemy with a single blow. One pestered the committee with his idea for a fleet of
single-seat air planes with soil enough to “bury Japan in defeat.” Another suggested the
manufacture of huge steel spheres with spikes to roll along and chew up armies like a “meat
grinder.”33 By 1944, however, the committee began to receive a mountain of complaints
involving an escalating crisis that directly affected Americans’ ability to persevere through the
long war. In a war with such high stakes, this problem, characterized by one Senator as a
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“crisis,” received the attention of a full committee hearing in late 1944.34 This crisis was an issue
of great import not just for the servicemen in Europe, Asia, or training camps stateside, but also
the men and women on the streets and in the factories. The issue was cigarettes.
The Army, the Soldier, and the Cigarette in WWII
When the committee convened in December 1944 to discuss the nature of the cigarette
shortage as well as possible solutions, it leaned heavily on the US Army to provide testimony
regarding the scope of cigarette procurement for soldiers. They also called leading cigarette
industry executives and logistics experts to testify regarding the cigarette enterprise’s efforts to
match demand. The Committee was particularly alarmed not only by the complaints from
civilians stateside, but also rumors of grumblings from soldiers about the availability of
cigarettes in theatre.35 A close reading and interpretation of the proceedings of this cigarette
shortage panel goes far to reveal the true nature and enormity of the soldier-cigarette relationship
during WWII.
The first business of the Committee was to ascertain the immensity of the soldiercigarette rationing schedule. By creating an entire branch within the Army Service Forces to
husband the Army’s cigarette procurement program, the Army signaled its remarkable
commitment to cigarettes. Department Chief Colonel Fred C. Foy provided the Committee
meticulous details on the size and scope of his department’s activities. The first bombshell was
the fact that by late 1944, the Army’s adjusted consumption rate had swollen to a projected 114
billion cigarettes for FY 1944, which represented the planning number it would assume for FY
34

United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette
Rations,” 12161.
35

These “grumblings” were largely unfounded and mainly had to do with access to premium brands. Also,
similar to the shipping issues central to soldier-cigarette grumbling in WWI, the fact that billions of cigarettes sat on
barges off the coast of Italy and France in 1944, waiting for port space, did not help things.

119
1945. This figure can be extrapolated from data supplied in the testimony showing the Army’s
initial request for 68 billion cigarettes in 1944 had fallen woefully short and was supplemented
with another order of 24 billion cigarettes bringing the total to 92 billion.36
Further, Foy reported that consumption in Army training camps and stateside required
accounting as well. Reporting that 800 million cigarettes covered only thirteen days of
consumption stateside, Foy estimated the Army needed roughly 22 billion cigarettes a year to
cover stateside requirements.37 The grand total of 114 billion cigarettes for the Army alone is
astonishing considering the fact that the entire United States adult population smoked only 134
billion cigarettes just a decade earlier, and the Army had only procured 21 billion cigarettes in
FY 1943.38
The testimony also contains data uncovering the Army’s consumption rate. To meet their
requirements, the Army had requested 23 percent of America’s entire run of cigarettes for FY
1944.39 However, the industry testified that based on the Army’s sustained, steadily growing
consumption rate, it felt the Army would require 30 percent of the entire run in FY 1945. This
would necessitate the industry’s production of an unprecedented 400 billion cigarettes in FY
1945 to meet both civilian and military requirements.40
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These huge consumption numbers, both planned and real, were not random guesses. They
were based on planning estimates generated in theatre by Army combatant commanders who
were given wide latitude to determine cigarette consumption requirements. By 1944, they had
pegged that figure at one pack per soldier, per day. This was codified in War Department
Circular 285, which established the one-pack-per-day consumption rate authorized for soldiers
on combat rations, as well as an additional one pack per day soldiers could purchase at the
commissary.41 This drove Foy’s requirements, and he reported that his procurement strategy was
guided by a 16 cigarettes per-soldier-per-day supply requirement.
Seeking fully to understand these figures and assumptions, a panelist at one point
interrupted Foy and asked him the question on everyone’s mind: “Do you just assume that every
soldier in the United States Army smokes?” To which Foy promptly replied with an emphatic
and frank “Yes!”42 This consumption calculus is what drove the Army to siphon off 23 percent
of all cigarettes produced in America. Camel alone designated 51.5 percent of its entire run for
soldiers in 1944.43 Regarding all these production and consumption figures, the Senators and the
Army officials on the panel never wavered in their determination to do whatever was required to
assure soldiers’ unfettered access to cigarettes. The Army was quite clear on its intentions: “we
are committed to buying whatever the demand is in theatre.”44 The Senators on the panel echoed
this commitment: “If the theatre commanders, if the boys, are getting all the cigarettes that they
41
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require, then we are off to a good start . . . but we want to be sure that they are getting the
cigarettes first, and in sufficient supply to meet their demands.”45
Hence the soldier-cigarette relationship was elevated to the highest levels of importance
during WWII. With these figures in mind, as well as the military-industrial-political commitment
to cigarette smoking soldiers, one can understand why the civilians back home in the panelists’
Congressional districts and home states were perplexed that one-quarter of all cigarettes
produced, and possibly more in the future, was going to the armed forces.46 Though encouraged
in their patriotism by American Tobacco, whose packages of Lucky Strikes were sans green dye
because “Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War,” there was still consensus among the civilian
smoking populace that times were not good.47 Considering that during this period over 80
percent of all Americans were smokers, this was a substantial outcry.48
Those who took in Business Week and the local and regional papers that reprinted their
syndicated articles during WWII found a steady stream of news and data supporting their fears
regarding the size of the Army’s cigarette procurement program. The magazine reported in 1944
that “consumption is too high . . . and the civilian does not get a nod from the manufacturers until
military demand has been satisfied.”49 It also reported that the Army had squeezed RJR for an
additional 150 million of the popular Camel brand cigarettes per week. RJR worked out a flex
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schedule with its labor union, but that would only account for an additional 65 million per week.
The remaining 85 million came out of production earmarked for civilian consumption.50
In addition to the soldier-cigarette “squeeze” on the cigarette supply, senators in the
Truman Committee were shocked to learn that behavior akin to a shark feeding frenzy was
informing consumer behavior late in the war. Civilians apparently bought and consumed
cigarettes even if they did not smoke simply because they were scarce and seen as valuable. Like
consumers who purchase something simply because it is on sale, whether needed or not, some
smoked or hoarded just because they could.51 Between soldiers’ burning up America’s stock of
cigarettes, leading to a cigarette shortage, and this form of complex, frenzied consumer behavior,
America found itself in a cigarette crisis in 1944. The next logical question the Committee asked
the cigarette enterprise, why do you not just produce more cigarettes to meet demand was
complex with no simple answer.
The Field-to-Lip Foxtrot: The Effects of Tobacco Aging, Labor Relations, and Echoes of the New
Deal on Cigarette Production
Scholars of the New Deal are forced to sort through the issues of production and
consumption as they related to the causes of and extraction from the Great Depression. This is
especially true regarding the issues presented by the soldier-cigarette issue and associated
shortages. Consumption oriented economists subscribe to the hypothesis that free markets are not
structured to provide full employment and sustainable distribution of wealth, and large-scale
government intervention in the economy is required in modern, industrial nations. During and
after the Great Depression, the federal government attempted to fix the failures of the free market
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and the problems created by the business cycle by engaging in deficit spending and manipulating
consumption.
With a renewed emphasis on consumerism, purchase power, government intervention,
and deficit spending, an American political economy emerged during this period that was
actually the completion of a half-century long move from a conservative production economy to
a liberal consumption economy. The purchase power of the middle class was henceforth a crucial
element of the American economy. In short, after the upheaval of the Great Depression many
saw a new America whose economy would rise or fall on the backs of wages and consumption.
These consumption oriented theorists reasoned that an industrial nation can produce all it wants,
but if there is irrational production, a deficiency in money supply leading to empty pockets, or if
prices go through the floor, destroying profit incentives, a modern economy will soon sink.52
An example of this irrational production is found in the Ford Motor Company’s
production of the Model T during the Roaring Twenties. What was a production rate of a Model
T every 14 hours ballooned to a car every 10 seconds on the eve of the Great Depression. David
Kennedy comments that America’s “fabulously successful [production] strategy,” represented by
the Model T Ford, “had its limits . . . mass production made mass consumption a necessity.”53
Many historians agree that irrational production on this scale and ignorance regarding the middle
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class purchasing power conundrum created the conditions that sent America spiraling toward the
massive business cycle backlash correction known as the Great Depression.
If a regulated consumption economy was what many New Dealers were looking for, they
found it in the manufactured cigarette. Legislators, the cigarette enterprise, and economists were
keenly aware that the cigarette was the prime positive example of consumption theories
dominating economic thought during this period. When Americans consumed cigarettes at WWII
levels, it resulted in a host of secondary and tertiary benefits. Growers received top price for their
leaf; flush with cash, they engaged in material consumption that supported local and state micro
economies.54 The enterprise was more than happy. Buttressed by an infinite customer base, the
astronomical quantities of cigarettes consumed during WWII ensured they could sell them at
price splits that guaranteed sustained consumption and lucrative profit margins. The vast
cigarette industry profits, second order transactions, advertisement revenue, and wealth in
cigarette industry stock had a profound effect on America’s twentieth century macro economy.
The federal government had no shortage of the spoils either. Cigarette purchases were
taxed transactions that brought billions in revenue to the government which in turn funded the
social welfare and recovery programs central to Roosevelt’s extended New Deal program.
Cigarette consumers were happy, the enterprise and its investors were ecstatic, and the federal
government had a golden goose that would produce fruits in the billions for the remainder of the
twentieth century. All these measures and supposed benefits were Keynesian in nature and
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formed the core of the New Deal program. The manufactured cigarette, sought after by soldiers
and hoarded by civilians, offers a unique lens to analyze the interplay among production,
consumption, managed economy, and political-industrial-military relations during this most
momentous period of American history.
The Field-to-Lip Foxtrot
As much as the New Deal political-economy appeared, at least to some, to dig America
out of the Depression, it acted as a juggernaut to the increased cigarette production required to
meet soldier and civilian demand during the height of WWII. The Truman Committee clearly
saw that America was the world’s “Arsenal of Democracy” during WWII, but why the nation
could not become the Sultan of Cigarettes and supply the world over with an endless stream of
smokes was not so obvious.55 The nation’s industrial production numbers during WWII were
nothing less than astonishing. The American labor force produced 295,486 airplanes, 60,973
tanks, 12.5 million rifles, and 41 billion rounds of ammunition during WWII.56 Historian David
Kennedy observes during the waning years of WWII, “every American combatant . . . could
draw on four tons of supplies” per man; by comparison, his Japanese opponent could count on
only two pounds per man.57
To meet the skyrocketing demand, cigarette production had escalated to record levels as
well. The American Tobacco Company, makers of Camel cigarettes, had doubled its cigarette
production since the start of the war. RJR had already worked to flex production schedules and
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labor arrangements to meet the Army’s demand for more cigarettes.58 Production numbers for
1943 had been 290 billion cigarettes and were 325 billion in 1944.59 To meet the demand, and
right the cigarette shortage, why couldn’t the industry produce a few billion more cigarettes?
Because the industry was limited by three factors: tobacco aging, labor relations, and echoes of
the New Deal.
Tobacco Aging
The most obvious reason why the enterprise could not produce billions and billions more
cigarettes in 1944 is that production was tied to the 1941 tobacco crop. Since manufactured
cigarette producers perfected the flu curing and blending process that elevated the cigarette as the
most appealing and lucrative consumer product ever made, the industry had been tied to a strict
three-year aging process. Back in 1941, the enterprise had forecasted demand for 1944 and then
contracted for enough tobacco leaf to meet that 1944 demand. The enterprise did not foresee the
epic rise in cigarette smoking that occurred in the intervening three years; it in turn was left
short-handed in 1944. As much as the enterprise might have wanted to make more cigarettes in
1944, it simply did not have enough raw materials.
During the Truman hearings, some questioned whether the industry could merely use unaged tobacco and borrow from the 1942 and 1943 crop that was aging at that time. Business
Week reported in 1944 that gossip on the street was that the industry may sacrifice this three-year
aging cycle to meet the door-busting demand. The magazine reported:
It’s a matter of trade gossip that many of the producers have cut quality to be certain of meeting volume
demand. One of the large companies is said to have cut by 50 percent the amount of scarce Turkish tobacco
which goes into its products . . . to get immediate relief, some manufacturers are represented as planning to
slash the aging process one year.60
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Despite this “trade gossip,” executives involved in the Truman Committee hearings made it clear
that the enterprise was not willing to sacrifice quality. Cutting down on Turkish tobacco in their
blend was one thing; using un-aged tobacco was another. Responding to this pressure to use unaged tobacco, the chairman of RJR stated emphatically:
We are refusing to destroy our brand and disappoint the American taste and develop an absolute necessity
of more acute shortage in the future by using green, unusable tobaccos . . . American cigarette taste
demands cigarettes made not out of green tobaccos, but out of cured tobaccos. The important brands of this
country are built on a basis of that taste and that demand . . . it is a sealed fact . . . there is just so much
tobacco that was grown and acquired. It is in the inventories and in the warehouses and there is no way to
increase it.61

In terms of raw materials for cigarette production, the facts are clear. The industry had plenty of
machinery and only a limited quantity of leaf; it was producing as much as possible considering
the imposed cultivation limitations. However, in the process of the hearings, other factors
emerged that further limited cigarette production in 1944.
Labor Relations
Labor supply was a major issue during WWII. To produce the mountain of material and
supplies to support the war effort, America required an incredibly large labor force. Over twelve
million men and women were already in uniform, and the rest of the nation was left to supply the
labor market. Only so many skilled and unskilled workers were available to go around, and this
forced Congress, the War Department, and other federal agencies to work together to develop
schedules of workers considered key and essential at home and exempt from military service.
This tight labor situation generated unique problems within the cigarette enterprise that often
stood in the way of its ability to increase cigarette production in 1944.
First, tobacco growers and associated farm labor was considered key and essential,
because the government deemed that the leaf provided “comfort, solace, and pleasure” to soldier
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and citizen alike—it was an “essential commodity.” However, though the cigarette, as opposed
to the leaf, was the business end of this “comfort, solace, and pleasure” transaction, workers in
the cigarette industry were not considered key and essential. In effect, the farmer was exempt
from military service, but the machine operator in the cigarette factory was not. The industry
wanted both farmer and industry workers designated key and essential so that cigarette
manufacturers could receive more labor allocations.62
Addressing this apparent contradiction, one industry representative opined that “although
the growing of tobacco has been declared essential, the manufacturer of cigarettes . . . is
officially rated non-essential.” He complained the industry was being denied “sufficient
manpower to produce and make available cigarettes,” and it was “inconsistent to designate the
raw material as vital to the Nation’s welfare and yet deny the manufacturers and distributors
sufficient manpower to produce . . . cigarettes.” Enterprise officials were quick to point out that
female workers were already being leveraged in the industry in an effort not to impede war
work—they were “not the type which can be well utilized in the war industries such as heavy
munitions plants.” However, they were emphatic that without a substantial increase in labor
allocation, no additional cigarette production capacity could be achieved.63
Business Week magazine was keen to cover this issue of labor scarcity in the cigarette
industry. Two months before the Truman Committee met to discuss the cigarette shortage, the
magazine reported:
Labor is Scarce—harvesting the crop is the most acute problem confronting Kentucky tobacco growers
who are short on labor. Close to 2,000 German prisoners of war are at work in the fields. Many schools
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postponed opening for a week or two to allow students to help, and one county judge dismissed the
September court term to free jurors and attendants for the tobacco harvest.64

In addition to restrictions placed on cigarette production due to tobacco aging, the industry was
also limited by these labor issues. Though these were enough in themselves to thwart industry
efforts to surge production in 1944, the final limiting factor proved decisive. Despite a demand
curve that appeared to have no ceiling, farmers actually resisted increased production. They were
new farmers with a new deal, and they did not want to tamper with a good thing.
Echoes of the New Deal
Historians have debated the nature of the New Deal for all of the eight decades since
Roosevelt took extreme measures to save America’s sinking ship. The scholarship has generally
focused on three areas: relief, recovery, and reform.65 Relief efforts were intended to meet the
most urgent needs and involved assistance from the government to put money directly in
family’s pockets. As previously mentioned, part of this direct assistance was practical
Keynesianism designed to spur consumption.
The recovery and reform activities were a mixed bag of government programs, initiatives,
and legislative measures intended to stabilize the American economy and address the factors that
drove it into the ground in the first place. The federal government’s involvement in issues like
finance reform, economic stabilization, job creation, price controls, production schedules, and
farm assistance were of primary importance. In short, the New Deal was America’s shift to some
level of planned economy, a move a century in the making that many now call modern economic
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arrangements.66 Several components of the recovery and reform programs installed in the 1930s
form echoes of the New Deal that reached out and directly affected the cigarette industry’s
ability to increase production during the 1940s.
The most substantial echo was the New Deal crop control and allotment programs. These
programs were well received by tobacco growers, the vast majority happy to participate in any
scheme that would rescue them from the dismal Great Depression price free-fall. Implemented as
part of the suite of New Deal recovery and reform programs aimed at stabilizing farm
commodity prices, these programs formed a mountainous barrier that made any real or imagined
cigarette production surge difficult if not impossible. Though industry executives were gushing
over seemingly unlimited demand, declaring that it was “silly” even to envision a ceiling,
tobacco growers had vivid memories of near zero demand just a decade earlier.67 Whether
cotton, tobacco, hogs, or beef, during the Great Depression the market was flooded with
agricultural and farm products that were either not needed, not wanted, or for which there was no
money supply to purchase even if there was want or need. As cotton bales piled up on docks and
tobacco leaves sat idle in warehouses, prices had gone through the floor. In an effort to keep up,
farmers increased production to make up for the loss in price, which drove prices down even
further. This was the death spiral into which the government stepped during the New Deal to
arrest the fall and stave off the collapse of farming in America.68
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One of the first things the government did was pass the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA). In simplistic terms, this act offered some level of government guarantees in exchange for
forced decreases in agricultural production and rationalized shortages. In turn the removal of
surplus and run-away production generated price increases, price stabilization, and confidence in
the market; which encouraged investment, wages, and consumption. Though the AAA was
eventually struck down by the Supreme Court, the crop control and allotment programs were
revived in the Soil Conservation & Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. In the end, these
government compulsory control measures were only part of the maturation of an activist federal
government and long-term reform measures that resulted in wholesale transformation of farming
and a fundamental renegotiation of capitalism in America.69
The measures were extreme in some eyes. For example, at the height of the Great
Depression when many families were starving, across America millions of hogs were destroyed
and left unprocessed, thousands of acres of cotton were plowed under, and farmers were
forbidden to place additional acreage into production. Weary of chasing the business cycle and
farm prices for nearly a century of upturns and downturns, 99.9 percent of tobacco farmers
elected to enroll in the allotment program.70 As a result of this New Deal allotment regime, and
in the face of a demand curve that was increasing at a rate of 15 percent per year during the war,
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tobacco acreage was capped by the government at a seven percent annual growth rate.71
Moreover, rejecting the free market principles of liaissez faire so much a part of their
Jeffersonian roots, growers were more than content to pursue happiness through steadfast
adherence to these government imposed crop size and land use restrictions. These would have
been anathema to Thomas Jefferson; however, they were lifeblood to the modern farmer. The
nature of this allotment program and the growers’ staunch resistance to increased production is
crucial to any final understanding of why cigarette production failed to accelerate during the
waning years of WWII.
Enterprise insiders and tobacco growers drained by the disastrous price fluctuations that
had plagued them for decades repeatedly told the Truman Committee that growers were not in
the least interested in sacrificing crop support programs for increased acreage.72 Some on the
industrial side of cigarette production were pushing for “more manpower and more acreage” in
response to Congressional and War Department demands for “more cigarettes.”73 Yet farmers
were not budging. They were exceedingly happy with the allotment program and government
oversight of the tobacco crop. They voted FDR into office, gave him his planned economy
mandate, and felt they were entitled to the full benefits of the allotment program. They were
content to make a living off of three acres and a government allotment check—and it was not a
bad living. Even if this meant they might miss out on the promising opportunities for growth
represented by the remarkable expansion in cigarette consumption during WWII, they could not
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be budged. Decades of boom and bust had driven them to this determined resistance to the free
market; they were no longer willing to chase demand and trust in the invisible hand. Tobacco
farmers had fallen in love with FDR’s managed economy, and came to rely on crop allotments as
a substantial portion of their annual income.74
The industry, minus a few exceptions, actually took the side of their growers on this
issue.75 It joined the farmers and generally resisted any dramatic plans for increased acreage and
industry leaders were not afraid to testify to as much before the Truman Committee. One
executive stated, “I assuredly would not recommend under present circumstances that all
controls be eliminated. I know nobody who is willing to face again the conditions that we had in
1930–1932 in leaf tobacco . . . when farmers were going all but hungry.”76 Another said that a
situation whereby farmers were once again chasing demand would be considered a “disaster”
and that growers would not permit a situation creating the price fluctuations and unpredictability
they were accustomed to before allotment.77
Moreover, this was not a problem isolated to just the pit of the Great Depression. Grower
and cigarette producer alike were keenly aware that as recently as 1939 farmers had produced the
largest flu-cured tobacco crop on record, of which the industry only bought 53.9 percent. When
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asked what happened to the 46 percent that was not purchased for flu-curing and cigarette
production, enterprise executives shifted the conversation to one of risk assumption. Sure, the
growers could go back to maximum land usage and high levels of production—but who would
assume the risk for over production? Should farmers assume the risk of low prices, or the
manufacturer who over-purchased and risked stocks of aging, low-price tobacco rotting in their
warehouses? Or should the government be on tap for these risks?78
Regarding the government’s ability to assume the risk of unfettered tobacco production,
enterprise experts pointed out the major problem associated with any government-set general
minimum. If the government set a price at which it would guarantee the farmer it would step in
and buy his tobacco if the bottom fell out, the industry would simply wait and buy tobacco from
government auctions at rock bottom prices. This is the nature of a healthy wealth strategy—buy
low and sell high. Tobacco was particularly susceptible to this general minimum scheme because
it could sit in a government warehouse for years and still retain value to the industry, which
would wait patiently and then scoop up leaf pennies to the dollar.79
Thus, the Committee was clearly aware that allotment and crop control was here to stay.
A benefit fiercely guarded by tobacco state politicians, it became a juggernaut political issue of
great importance to generations of Southern legislators. Business Week consistently covered
allotments and farm policy as they were issues near and dear to the American agricultural
community. In July 1944, it reported that even though the industry
can’t meet demand—tobacco growers are theoretically sitting pretty. Ever since the Depression, when
overproduction and foundering prices forced Washington to intervene with acreage and crop control,

78

United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette
Rations,” 12172.
79

United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette
Rations,” 12182.

135
growers have welcomed outside help. The result, however, is that current crops won’t stretch to cover a 50
percent increase in demand.80

Regarding this allotment program loved by farmers who were “sitting pretty” and high on the
hog, Senator Homer S. Ferguson provided a telling explanation of mid-twentieth century
political economy. Ferguson, a conservative, pro-business Republican from Michigan, was quick
to indicate the root of the 1944 shortage was the 1934 New Deal allotment program at the heart
of Roosevelt’s federal expansion. Hamstrung by what he saw as a forced, anti-free market
measure frustrating capitalism’s invisible hand, Ferguson was annoyed at the lost opportunities
to exploit exploding demand; demand largely driven by the soldier-cigarette duo. Sensing the
true nature of the problem, Senator Ferguson sarcastically asked, “Isn’t it true that we paid
growers not to grow tobacco in 1943 . . . and we penalized other growers for growing too much
tobacco . . . which could be used for cigarettes?” Of course the answer was a resounding “yes.”
According to Ferguson, this was the sickening irony of the entire cigarette shortage episode the
committee had met to discuss: the US government paid exorbitantly for the lower production
from 1941 to 1944 that was at the core of the cigarette shortage they were desperately trying to
overcome at this late hour in the middle of a world war.81
Americans were undoubtedly consuming legendary amounts of cigarettes during WWII,
and civilians at home and soldiers at the front were more than willing to walk a mile for a Camel.
Further, there is no doubt that during the Truman Committee’s proceedings, the government and
the enterprise expressed a full understanding of this demand, as well as the importance of
cigarette consumption to a modern, industrial, post-Great Depression US economy. One
enterprise executive was rather frank in his assessment of the cigarette’s link to a fiscally
80
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healthy, if not physically healthy, consumer economy. RJR Chairman S. Clay Williams had
much to say about cigarette consumption in a modern American economy. In addition to his
position at the helm of one of America’s most powerful cigarette companies, Williams had also
acted as the de facto head of FDR’s National Recovery Administration (NRA) as chairman for
industry on the National Labor Board (1933–1934), and was a member of the US Department of
Commerce's Business Advisory Council (1933-1949). Williams said that America’s full
employment concerns were married to consumption, and that enough cigarettes on the market
were needed to ensure “maximum land use, the maximum manpower use, whether it be growing,
or transporting, or warehousing, or manufacturing, or distributing . . . and the maximum volume
of business for everybody’s benefit.”82
Senator Ferguson, already frustrated at his inability to break through allotment schemes
and increase production, added to this cigarette-driven economic policy with his contention that a
substantial portion of America’s thriving consumption economy was linked to the production and
consumption of manufactured cigarettes. He was one of many Republicans and conservative
Democrats of this era who wanted to roll back the production restrictions and government codes
associated with Roosevelt’s New Deal central planning philosophies and let the free market
horses run.83 They reasoned that if Americans wanted billions of cigarettes, then by all means
produce billions of cigarettes. At one point, when asking about the prospects of cigarette
advertising to increase cigarette consumption among soldiers, he posed the question, “If we are
going to have any prosperity at all” aren’t the “boys . . . at the front” and “people all over the
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country” going to have to smoke more? Of course, the enterprise representative receiving this
line of inquiry was happy to respond to Senator Ferguson’s question with a hearty “We hope
so!”84
These were not just the opinions of a lone, pro-business Senator on the Committee or one
of several enterprise executives supplying testimony. In their summary statement after the
Cigarette Shortage hearings were complete in 1944, the entire Truman Committee offered the
most substantial, far-reaching statement acknowledging its beliefs about the vast economic
importance of cigarette consumption in America. In closing, the Committee stated:
It can’t be denied that the successful distribution of cigarettes and other tobacco products is vital to the
successful operation of our economy and the effective prosecution of the war. Any deterrent to the orderly
and efficient distribution of these products serves to make more difficult the task of the government in
85
maintaining morale and confidence.

The Greatest Generation of Smokers: The Goose that Laid the Golden Egg
Despite the challenges presented by the cigarette shortage in America during WWII, the
truth is evident: as a result of cigarette rationing in America and the Army’s focused efforts,
soldiers serving overseas or training stateside saw absolutely no cigarette shortage. In contrast to
their American friends and family, who for the reasons presented above were never able to
receive the fruits of any marked increase in cigarette production, soldiers experienced a cigarette
avalanche. The enterprise, Congress, and the Army worked overtime and with much enthusiasm
to ensure that every soldier who donned the uniform was given at least one pack of cigarettes a
day for the duration of the war, and had access to at least one other pack through PX sales where
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available.86 To say the industry was ecstatic at this business boon is an understatement.
Enterprise executives were pleased to emphasize to the Truman Commission that Army soldiers
were their greatest clients. When asked if the twelve million men drafted into the service were
good for business, the Chairman of RJR said that “according to our observation [they were]…
good smokers, but they became very much better smokers when they went into the Army, and
the folks left at home became very much better smokers when the war broke out.”87 In this way
the enterprise benefitted from a two-for-one deal: the soldiers who left home smoked copious
amounts of cigarettes, and their nervous families back home joined them.
In what would become a habit, the industry was swift to attach much patriotic emotion to
the soldier-cigarette relationship, soon to be the veteran-cigarette relationship. In addition to the
famous advertisement that “Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War with the Soldiers,” the
industry also added other patriotic statements to the record. Regarding the Army’s need to supply
heroic soldiers with a steady stream of cigarettes, one executive testified that “the minute you
begin to supply to the Army—they want a good stock on this side of the ocean to draw from . . .
this is no critical expression, for they have to do it this way—the army can’t take chances with
men who are fighting wars!”88 Another testified, “everyone will agree that our fighting men
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deserve and should have unlimited quantities of smokes.”89 The soldier was the enterprise’s best
friend.
Moreover, in the soldier-cigarette duo, the industry also gained a proven agent for
overseas expansion. Industry leaders testified to the Truman Committee that they were glad that
soldiers were acting as missionaries for the cigarette industry abroad, building up a lucrative
post-war market for American cigarettes. One industry representative testified:
The men in our armed forces—striding audaciously across the global map with their omnipresent
cigarette—unconsciously are doing a super job of selling the rest of the world on the unmatched qualities of
American tobacco. Lend-lease exports of leaf tobacco likewise contribute toward the building up of a
vastly expanded post-war market which the American farmer should be ready to cultivate and supply . . . all
this missionary work of incalculable value, will go for naught if the production of leaf tobacco is not
stepped up sufficiently to allow for a large exportable surplus after the war.90

In subsequent years, cigarettes became a key component of such massive programs as the
Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift; Europe soon came to value American tobacco in ways never
imaged before the war. Considering the regional, national, and global nature of the soldiercigarette relationship, an exchange between Senator Joseph Hurst Ball (R-MN) and RJR
Chairman Williams provides a clear, concise summary of how important the soldier was to the
cigarette enterprise. Ball, like Ferguson, was a conservative, pro-business Republican
vehemently opposed to labor unions and managed economy schemes; he was determined to point
out the fallacy of New Deal limitations on cigarette production. Ball wanted to know if the
demand curve over the last 40 years showed that the age group in the Army was the largest group
of real and potential cigarette consumers. Williams’s response is telling. He replied, “soldiers in
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the active service are the most diligent consumers of cigarettes as a group in the population” of
America.91
Ball was attempting to point out the dangers and incompatibility of overly-managed
economy in America. In a Republic notionally founded upon free market principles, the invisible
hand of the market must follow the business opportunities as they are presented, unfettered by
the visible hand of government.92 These diligent soldier-smokers presented a massive group of
lucrative cigarette-consuming smokers which grew to epic proportions over the remaining
decades of the twentieth century. This growth transformed them into the most profitable, greatest
generation of smokers in American history. Ironically, many of the pro-business, free-market
legislators that criticized the managed economy that limited Americans access to cigarettes were,
or became the intellectual fathers of a generation of elected officials who applauded federally
subsidized smoking in the military and perpetual renewal of government tobacco allotments and
price supports.
The Greatest Generation of Smokers: WWII and Beyond
In Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior and
Swearing in American History, historian John C. Burnham provides detailed analysis of the
enduring impact smoking has had on American culture, society, and economy in the decades
after WWII. The war subjected the Greatest Generation to substantial physical, emotional, and
social pressure; all these translated into smoking pressure. Cigarettes calmed nerves and steadied
hands, and generous amounts were freely given in foxholes, aid stations, chow halls, and USO
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facilities. They were valued items shared in cafeterias, factories, and coffee klatches back home.
Tobacco farmers were exempt from the draft. Women were bombarded with images of Rosie the
Riveter working the pneumatic jack with cigarette in hand. All these cultural, physiological, and
environmental stimulants meant one thing to the Greatest Generation: smoke em’ if you’ve got
em’.93
And smoke they did. As WWII ended and soldiers returned home and life normalized, 80
percent of all American men became or continued smoking. The percentage of women who
smoked doubled during WWII.94 In 1900, cigarettes represented only two percent of the tobacco
market, with chewing tobacco the most prevalent form of intake at 48 percent. By 1952,
cigarettes represented 81percent of this market, with chewing tobacco dropping all the way to
last place at three percent.95 Burnham argues that the enterprise eventually co-opted this massive
groundswell of soldier-veteran cigarette smokers and their American Legion organizing arm as a
powerful voting bloc. Similar to the Democratic Party co-opting Irish-American urban voters
after the Civil War and the Republican Party co-opting the Grand Army of the Republic, the
cigarette enterprise recruited the American Legion after WWII and grafted them into its
campaign to link smoking with freedom.96 This unique connection between the industry and the
veteran would surface time and again in the remainder of the twentieth century as the enterprise
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continued to use soldiers, veterans, patriotism, and liberty overtly and covertly to advance its
interests.97
Money buys influence, and the billions generated through cigarette related transactions
and commerce gave the cigarette enterprise enormous influence over twentieth century American
political economy. This influence was visible in the way government, businesses, and advertisers
bowed in reverence to the powerful cigarette firms in the decades after WWII. The enterprise
generated a rich, renewable source of tax revenue and advertising dollars, a relationship that
Robert Proctor deems a “tax addiction.”98 Politicians from the municipal to the federal level had
to square any anti-cigarette initiative with the fact that taxes and duties directly or indirectly
related to the production and sale of cigarettes underwrote a substantial portion of their agenda.
Like other statistics related to the growth of cigarette smoking in the twentieth century,
the numbers regarding the business case for cigarettes and the “tax addiction” are quite telling.
By 1950, “cigarettes accounted for 1.4 percent of the gross national product and a remarkable 3.5
percent of all consumer spending on nondurable goods . . . tobacco was the fourth largest cash
crop in the nation, and in Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, it ranked first.”99
As Brandt says, “If the cigarette was deeply insinuated into American culture by the middle of
the century, it had also become central to the modern nation’s industrial economy.” The
“triumph” of the cigarette “was complete.”100 For the remainder of the twentieth century,
advertisers and politicians quickly and consistently seized on the triumphant soldier-cigarette
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tandem and linked it to that “undefineable something” the American soldier fought for in all of
America’s wars: the American spirit of independence.101 Yet, how much were Americans and
their elected representatives willing to pay, both monetarily, morally, and health wise, for the
free, independent, iconic soldier-smoker? This dilemma would come to dominate the soldiercigarette discourse for the second half of the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER VI
THE SOLDIER, THE CIGARETTE, AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
The Military, Transition, and the AVF
Monday, June 30, 1973: the end of an era, in more ways than one. On that day, Dwight
Elliot Stone became the last man drafted in America. Stone, a twenty-four-year-old plumber’s
apprentice from Sacramento, California, spent years trying to avoid the draft. He was first
drafted in 1969, but avoided service because of complications from a car wreck. Drafted again in
1970, he tried unsuccessfully to acquire a student deferment. He avoided the local draft officer
for two more years but was eventually indicted for draft evasion. When his name came up again
in late 1972, he decided to stop avoiding his obligation and took steps to join the service. Stone
was delayed for several months while his previous evasion charge was cleared. He eventually
entered the Armed Forces Induction Station in Oakland, California, at two o’clock in the
afternoon on June 30, 1973, raised his right hand, and “took the ritual step forward to signify his
induction” as the newest member of the United States Army.1
Three decades before Dwight Elliot Stone was forced to enter the service, a young lawyer
left his lucrative position in a Florida law firm, where he had been a partner since 1934, and
volunteered for duty as a line private in WWII. The young lawyer was Charles E. Bennett, and
he served as a combat infantryman fighting in the jungles of the Philippines and New Guinea. He
earned the Bronze and Silver Stars in recognition of his valorous service. He also contracted
polio during his time fighting in the Asian jungles, a disease leaving him crippled for the rest of
his life. Undaunted by his physical limitation, he won election as a Florida Democrat to the US
House of Representatives in 1949 and retained his seat for twenty-one straight election
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campaigns. He was known by his colleagues as “Mr. Clean” for his staunch adherence to ethical
standards. He was a prolific legislator, introducing legislation that added In God We Trust to
American currency in 1955 and installed the first Code of Ethics for Government Service in
1958. House records reveal he never missed a Congressional roll call. He was a firm fiscal
conservative and refused to take Congressional pay raises. He insisted on returning his veteran’s
disability pension and Social Security payments to the United States Treasury, exercising
personal responsibility for what he viewed as the nation’s most disturbing liability: the national
debt.2
With this spirit of fiscal and moral responsibility in mind, Congressman Bennett quietly
began questioning the decades old practice of providing at government expense free cigarettes to
soldiers as part of their daily field rations. He was motivated to action after a conversation with
his legislative assistant Roger Hilkert in early March 1973. Hilkert told Bennett of an encounter
with Warrant Officer Kent Miller at the offices of the 1/380th Infantry Battalion at the
Washington, DC, National Guard Armory. Miller was a “heavy, heavy smoker,” and was in the
midst of a coughing spell when Hilkert commented that Miller “wouldn’t have gotten that cough
if there hadn’t been cigarettes in the Individual Combat Rations served in the field.” Hilkert’s
remark to Miller was just a passing comment, but later Hilkert gave the conversation more
thought. He did some checking and came to the conclusion that “it [was] obvious that the
taxpayer was being taken for a ride in two directions at once.” The two different rides refer to the
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taxpayers’ requirement to pay for soldiers’ rationed cigarettes in addition to paying for the
health-related expenses associated with smoking.3
Hilkert subsequently discussed this issue with Congressman Bennett and pressed him to
take action, but cautioned him regarding the “political aspects of the decision.”4 Based on the
events of the next thirty years, there is little doubt about the nature and veracity of the “political
aspects” Hilkert brought to Bennett’s attention. A seasoned congressional liaison, Hilkert was
referencing the opposition Bennett could expect from tobacco state politicians and the cigarette
industry lobby if he decided to attack the cigarette ration. Despite these cautionary warnings,
Bennett, with little if any fanfare, issued a letter to the DoD on March 6, 1973, requesting
information regarding why “C, K, and combat rations included free cigarettes.” As a former
infantry soldier and smoker, Bennett had firsthand experience with the relationship between the
soldier and the cigarette. Bennett argued a young man’s only justifiable reason for obtaining
cigarettes in the field was if he was addicted to the use of tobacco. However even considering
nicotine addiction, Bennett reasoned that the nation was no longer at war, and soldiers had ample
opportunity to buy cigarettes out of their own pockets due to advances in modern battlefield
logistics and the close proximity of supply points. Therefore, there was no reason for the
taxpayer, through the federal government, to continue providing “free cigarettes” to soldiers.5
Interestingly, Bennett’s chief concern in this initial inquiry expressed his desire to “know
what the cost of these [government rationed] cigarettes may be” to the taxpayer, rather than the
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detrimental effects cigarette smoking had on soldiers’ health and combat readiness.6 As a
member of Congress, and in accordance with the US Constitution, Bennett’s job was to exercise
oversight of the federal purse.7 As a public servant, his primary concern with health policy was
grounded in his duty to monitor the expenditure of public funds. However, in addition to
Bennett’s primary fiscal justification for removing cigarettes from field rations, Bennett, like
Lucy Paige Gaston and the Progressives of the early twentieth century, added a moral
justification.
Lucy Paige Gaston was the cigarette industry’s chief opponent before WWI and
established the anti-cigarette league of America in 1899. Her organization swelled to 300,000
members during the years prior to the Great War. She argued cigarettes were hazardous to
health, particularly threatening to the young, and were a springboard to other social ills such as
gambling, alcoholism, prostitution, and crime. Her movement was ultimately unsuccessful as
Progressives lost interest when the Volstead Act was passed (Prohibition). Adding to the demise
of the movement was the popularity of the cigarette among the soldiers in WWI, a popularity
that followed them home and influenced American smoking culture.8 By 1973, Gaston’s
progressive anti-cigarette torch, once bright, was now barely visible. However, Bennett picked
up where Gaston left off with his assertion that the cigarette ration was a moral contradiction. He
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argued it was objectionable to force the “taxpayer to pay for free distribution to soldiers of
something which the Surgeon General has found to be injurious to human health.”9
The end of the cigarette ration came rather quickly. On March 21, 1973, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Major General George J. Hays, responded to Bennett’s
inquiry and confirmed the DoD does indeed still carry the requirement to buy cigarettes for
soldiers. He justified the continuation of this policy, describing it as a program designed to “ease
the logistics burden” on the Army. This rationing program ensured that small packages of
cigarettes were supplied in each individual ration with no concern as to whether the soldier
smoked or not. Additionally General Hays included the cost figure of 2 ½ cents per cigarette.10
Not satisfied with this response from the military, Bennett contacted the Surgeon General’s
office and “pitted [the SG] in the debate against DoD.”11
On April 30, 1973, acting Surgeon General S. Paul Ehrlich responded to Congressman
Bennett’s request, stating he “share[d] your concern about routine indiscriminate distribution of
cigarettes” to soldiers. He agreed with Bennett’s assertion that providing free cigarettes to
soldiers was irresponsible, stating the “evidence of the serious health consequences of smoking
continues to accumulate.” Where Bennett was most concerned with the cost, Ehrlich was most
concerned with “distribution of cigarettes to non-smokers,” stating the current policy was
“certainly undesirable.” Like a true and seasoned bureaucrat, Ehrlich recommended further study
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of the DoD’s cigarette rationing policy. He urged the DoD to weigh any rationing policy against
the “costs of making it easy for non-smokers to begin to develop the habit.”12
Bennett forwarded his March 6 memo, along with General Hays’s and Surgeon General
Ehrlich’s response to Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson on May 2, 1973 and requested
Richardson to provide his “thoughts on the matter.”13 On May 17, 1973, the Secretary of
Defense’s office took action in response to Congressmen Bennett’s inquiry. Assistant Secretary
of Defense Paul H. Riley informed Bennett he did “agree that it is time the Department of
Defense finds a better way to distribute cigarettes to smokers.” Further, he indicated he had
asked each of the armed services to comment on his plan to remove cigarettes from combat meal
rations.
In a memo dated the same day to each of the armed services, Riley laid out his case for
removing the cigarettes. First, he addressed the reason for the congressional inquiry, stating the
cost of the cigarette rationing program, estimated at $682,000 for Fiscal Year 1973, was no
longer an acceptable expense. Addressing the health issue second, along with the Surgeon
General’s concerns regarding nonsmokers, Riley stated that “with our present national effort to
reduce smoking, it is inappropriate for DoD even to appear to be in the position of encouraging
smoking by the indiscriminate distribution of cigarettes to nonsmokers.”14 This statement
regarding nonsmokers, along with Ehrlich’s previous statement, placed substantial weight behind
the argument that the Army, through its nearly 50 year program of supplying cigarettes to non-

12

Ehrlich Memo to Bennett, April 30, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library,
The University of Florida.
13

Bennett Memo to Richardson, May 2, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers
Library, The University of Florida.
14

Riley Memo to Bennett, May 17, 1973 and Riley Memo to armed services and Director, Defense Supply
Agency, May 17, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

150
smoking soldiers, had, without knowing, created a vast number of smokers for the cigarette
industry.
Riley received no substantial objections from the services, and on June 6, 1973, he
informed Congressman Bennett “the requirement for cigarettes [was] deleted from the
specification and from the procurement” of combat rations.15 With that, the nature of the
relationship between the soldier and the cigarette took a sharp turn. The military’s policy of
supplying free, rationed cigarettes to soldiers, established 55 years earlier by General Peyton
March during WWI, came to an end.
In a press release dated June 6, 1973, Congressman Bennett announced the demise of the
rationed cigarette program, permanently altering the relationship between the soldier and the
cigarette. Bennett repeated his reasoning that an end of combat operations in Vietnam and
soldiers’ more than adequate access to cheap cigarettes in their post exchanges signaled the end
of the government’s requirement to provide cigarettes. Bennett insisted it was time to stop
forcing taxpayers to subsidize cigarettes for soldiers, a requirement that had cost them millions
of dollars over the decades since they were first saddled with this fiscal responsibility in WWI.16
The removal of the cigarette ration was largely a quiet affair achieved through a running
conversation between Bennett and mid-level DoD officials. It was never raised as an issue on the
floor of Congress and never put to a debate. In the future, Congressmen seeking to unhinge or
limit the long standing soldier-cigarette relationship even further would find themselves blocked
at every turn by a powerful cigarette enterprise determined to prolong the soldier-cigarette bond.
AVF Sticker Shock
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Post-war defense cuts and the enormous personnel costs associated with plans to replace
draftees with long-service professionals ensured close scrutiny of all military budgets. Many
sought to rein in the profligate spending long the norm during a decade of war. Bennett was a
seasoned legislative veteran and ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee and
was painfully aware of the budget battles looming on the horizon. One of the major reasons why
Congress had voted to continue the draft year after year was because it was relatively
inexpensive. In The Draft, historian George Flynn argues that the draft was advertised as a lowcost alternative to a large, garrisoned, long-service professional Army because it “simply taxed
young men a service time in exchange for the security that had been bought by earlier
generations of males.”17 As America wrestled with ending the draft and replacing it with a
system structured around an AVF, there were grave fiscal concerns.18 Bennett was able to
address some of the fiscal concerns associated with this transition by removing the cigarette
ration. Yet the savings this generated were a mere pittance compared to the enormous cost of
fielding a volunteer force—an endeavor that turned out to require the “outlay of bewildering
sums of money.”19
When Dwight Elliot Stone reported for training at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in July 1973, he
entered a military establishment in transition. The removal of cigarettes from combat rations was
just one of many drastic changes the military faced over the next decade. Principal among these
changes was the implementation of the AVF. In 1969, America took its first earnest steps toward
17

George Q. Flynn, The Draft: 1940-1973 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas,

1993), 8.
18

David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today (Garden City, New York: AnchorDoubleday Press, 1975), 172. Cortright characterizes this shift as “one of the most important developments in the
history of the American military . . . designed to maintain worldwide commitments without the social upheaval
resulting from conscription.” His criticism of the expense of the AVF, though grounded in truth in terms of cost
figures, must be tempered with an understanding that he is an avowed peace activist and a scholar of peace activism.
19

Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt, 180.

152
an AVF. President Richard Nixon appointed Thomas Gates to chair a commission to study the
prospects for ending the draft, as well as the feasibility of a volunteer force. Gates was the
former Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration and was intimately familiar with
the draft as well as calls to end it.
Two driving factors were behind Nixon’s AVF push: politics and class considerations.
Nixon had made a campaign pledge to end the draft, and with the next presidential election just
around the corner, he had to take action.20 At the height of the Vietnam War, many Americans
were increasingly disturbed by the perceived class inequities of the draft system. The deferment
criterion had become large and unwieldy, exempting nearly everyone except for working class
poor and minorities who could not afford to go to college, had no inside connections with state
National Guard units, or could not afford to fund an extended trip to Canada even if they wanted
to dodge the draft.21
In short, the draft was “an unfair tax on young men which could no longer be rationalized
on military, political, or economic grounds.”22 Charles Moskos, the leading scholar and
sociologist of the AVF and the American enlisted force, provides the most concise assessment
that combines both the political and class features of Nixon’s AVF policy. He argues that
America’s move to the AVF was not grounded in military grand strategy “aimed at improving
the nation’s future capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or its clients. Essentially, the decision
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was political: Washington’s response to growing middle-class reaction to Selective Service and
the past burdens of war itself.”23
After years of debate, President Nixon determined to end the draft, effective the first day
of July 1973. However Nixon’s decision was not a slam dunk. There were many who doubted
the move to a volunteer force, and their chief concern was expense. An entire chorus of
government officials argued that a volunteer force was prohibitively expensive. As early as 1966,
Thomas D. Morris, Democrat from New Mexico, argued in Congress it would take an additional
$17 billion and a 280 percent increase in military pay in order to compete with the civilian labor
market and transition to an AVF.24 Other officials began denouncing the entire philosophy
behind an AVF driven by free market economics and vague funding strategies.
The editor of Army Magazine, L. James Bender, led this vocal opposition to the AVF
philosophy, saying it “translated military service into a marketable commodity” and that
assumptions regarding young Americans’ eagerness to enlist in an incentive-ridden, cash-happy
AVF were “hogwash.”25 In 1967, the House Armed Services Committee’s Civilian Advisory
Panel on Military Manpower Procurement advised that an AVF was “exorbitantly expensive”
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and generated fears the defense of the nation would be left up to “mercenaries.”26 The Gates
Commission actively worked to refute these claims regarding the tremendous expense of a
volunteer force. The Commission instead argued a modest increase of $4 billion in defense
appropriations was sufficient.27 They were wildly inaccurate with their predictions.
The Commission derived its cost projection figures from economist Milton Friedman.
Friedman argued the military could meet recruiting quotas by utilizing “traditional market
incentives,” an argument that made him the antithesis to popular New Deal economist John
Maynard Keynes. Keynesian economics ascribes to the hypothesis that free markets are not
structured to provide full employment, and large-scale government intervention in the economy
is required in modern economies. Keynesian thought prevailed after the Great Depression, when
the precedent for large scale and sustained economic intervention by the federal government was
established and then normalized in the decades since.
As time passed, a reformative correction to Keynesian theory was inevitable as well as a
call to return to classic laissez-faire economics. A proponent of Adam Smith’s free market,
Friedman wanted to use a combination of market forces, economic incentives, and young
Americans’ innate sense of patriotism to underpin a volunteer force. Between 1950 and 1980,
when America was in the midst of an intense debate over the Draft and funding a volunteer
force, Friedman was the leading economist calling for a return to classic free market economics,
advocating for a “broad . . . rollback of Keynesian heresy.”28 However, Friedman was not
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immune from criticism. His market-driven recruitment scheme drew fire from many
traditionalists, like Charles Moskos, who were suspicious of Friedman’s business case:
The difficulties of the all-volunteer force do not originate in the death of conscription or in the efforts of
service recruiters. The crucial flaw has been an informal redefinition since 1971 by Congress (informed by
Friedman’s theories) . . . of military service as a function of “supply and demand variables” as a “job” to be
filled through “market incentive” . . . in the final analysis, reliance on the market system is not the way to
recruit or sustain an all-volunteer force, nor is it the way to strengthen the armed services for increasingly
complex and demanding tasks on behalf of the larger society.29

Regardless of such critiques in terms of both theory and expense, Freidman’s market
driven concepts were the guiding light for AVF policy during this period. The central tenet in
Freidman’s economic policy involved “what he considered the uselessness and
counterproductive nature of most government regulation.” Freidman was a firm believer that the
military-industrial complex could run by itself, generating recruits without massive government
intervention or subsidy. He insisted that if “a money tax rather than a physical tax (conscription)
was spread throughout the population, enough money was available to raise military pay to a
level competitive with the private sector.” With conflicting data represented in a myriad of
government studies about America’s ability to “buy an alternative to the draft,” it was left to
Congress to wade through the figures and determine the best course of action.30 In many ways,
Congress’ decision, regardless of the recommendation of the Gates Commission, was determined
before the commission even convened—America, led by President Nixon, was moving to an
AVF no matter what, even if it “bankrupt[ed] the country.”31

29

Moskos, “The All-Volunteer Force,” 140, 142.

30

Moskos, “The All-Volunteer Force,” 140.

31

Flynn, The Draft, 260, 261, 264. Flynn provides copious documentation in this section of the many
government officials that claimed any move to an AVF would be prohibitively expensive and might bankrupt the
country.

156
The Gates Commission’s final report was heavily influenced by Freidman’s economic
theories, projecting a relatively meager $2.7 billion a year in additional appropriations.32 This
estimate is incredible considering the mounting evidence of an enormously expensive AVF. As
many predicted, the report was overly optimistic on many levels, and expenses began
accumulating. Over three decades, the Army had grown used to a steady stream of draftees
filling the ranks; the military enterprise had a seemingly limitless supply of soldiers. Moreover,
drafted soldiers were easy to train and easy to replace.33 Now the Army had to attract recruits in
a post-Vietnam America that harbored negative perceptions about military service. A soldiering
career was often looked down upon, and more extreme elements of American society even
considered such employment criminal.
The repeal of the draft turned the Army’s recruiting operations into a sales pitch fraught
with expenses and newfound challenges. To meet these challenges, a wave of newly minted
Army recruiters armed with bonuses and benefits waded into a hostile environment in an all-out
effort to fill the ranks of the new AVF.34 Some worried about the future of an Army marketed as
a job choice as opposed to a noble act of service. According to historian David R. Segal, the
repeal “dealt a mortal wound to the principle of obligation by explicitly identifying financial
inducements as the major incentive for voluntarism.”35 Americans paid a hefty price to recruit
and retain its service personnel after 1973, and the Army had to rely on expensive monetary
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inducements, bonuses, expanded benefits packages, and costly advertising campaigns to meet
yearly quotas throughout the 1970s.
This resulted in exponential increases to recruiting budgets, a line item the Army was
forced to increase by 600 percent during the 1970s.36 Despite spending billions to recruit quality
volunteers and assumptions by the Gates Commission that longer term enlistments would save
money, it did not work as predicted. Partly due to demographics, societal reaction to the Vietnam
debacle, and the period’s teen culture, all beyond the scope of this study, the military found it
very difficult to attract and retain quality recruits. Compared to pre-Vietnam figures, the
desertion rate doubled during the first decade of the AVF. During the draft, roughly 20 percent of
all draftees failed to complete their first year. By the late 1970s, that number had doubled. An
astounding 600,000 were discharged for misconduct or other various reasons, and over 20
percent of the force admitted to using drugs at least once a month. The Army reported that
16,000 soldiers were admitted to alcohol abuse programs in 1979, and another 24,000 in 1980.
During the same time period, the number of Army soldiers incarcerated increased by 47
percent.37 The Army also had to spend large sums of money and time on remedial courses to
bring vast portions of the AVF recruits up to speed: nearly 25 percent of all Army recruits in
1977 read at or below the sixth grade level.38 Though the long term healthcare savings derived
from smoking cessation would eventually become substantial, in 1979 the million dollars
Bennett saved by removing cigarettes from soldiers’ rations seemed a trivial sum when
compared to the multi-billion dollar price tag of recruiting and retaining the new AVF. And
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recruiting and retention expenses were just beginning to amass. By the end of the decade, a
whole portfolio of additional expenses emerged and continued to grow.
From 1967 to 1975, military pay was increased by 87 percent, with the bulk of the
increase occurring when the draft ended in 1973. Military pay expressed as a percentage of total
defense spending rose from 34 percent in 1964 to 40 percent in 1973. By 1974, the military was
spending 56 percent of its budget on manpower costs alone. In the Army, for example,
manpower costs had increased by 30 percent, despite the size of the force decreasing by 37
percent during the same period. In 1978, the Carter Administration added another 11.7 percent
pay raise to shore up a string of recruiting shortages. Reagan added 11.1 percent in 1981 and 14.3
percent in 1982. These “catch-up raises” were effective (military pay was raised by roughly onethird) but again, were expensive.39 Cortright, a scholar and critic of US defense policy, argues
that the AVF “created an unprecedented crisis in the defense budget and . . . contributed to
severe manpower difficulties . . . fail[ing] to attract a sufficient volume of recruits to maintain
force strengths.”40
The AVF also brought a relatively new conundrum appropriators had to face: In buying
an AVF, the government bought not only the soldier, but his or her dependents as well. The
drafted force was an overwhelmingly single force. During the draft era, social and cultural
patterns dictated that young men completed their obligation of military service and then returned
home to settle down, start a family, and pursue a life in the civilian sector. Though the draft
affected many areas of American social life, to include “the caliber of major league baseball . . .
the survival of liberal arts colleges [and] the rate of procreation of American males,” the
institution of marriage and family were largely left untouched by the draft boards. Due to a
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deferment system reflecting America’s social and cultural values, single men were called first,
and husbands and fathers were given a pass. It was felt that in the “American patriarchal home,”
married men were the “bedrock of the Republic” providing “moral leadership and protection.”41
Friedman had argued a volunteer force would rid the nation once and for all of the class
distinctions and deferment controversies inherent in an armed force that exempted husbands,
fathers, students, and preachers from duty obligations. He posited the draft and associated
deferment inequities were “un-American and wasteful” as they “jam colleges, raise the birth rate
and fuel the divorce courts.”42 He was sure the AVF would attract quality recruits and give lower
classes a chance for social uplift, an assumption that proved correct over time. However, this
quality volunteer force emerged as an overwhelmingly married force with expensive healthcare
needs, which was yet another expense associated with the AVF.
Gates and Freidman considered a quality recruit as someone looking for a “career” and
envisioned a new Army comprised of long-term professionals.43 However career men were
married men that came with a hefty bill in the form of dependents and long-term health care
liabilities. These cost factors were not significant in the drafted force, as it was largely comprised
of short-service, single males. From a rate of near zero during WWII, the marriage rate had
increased to 33 percent in 1953. The numbers steadily increased throughout the transition to the
AVF, and by the late 1970s, 60 percent of all military members were married and had families.44
With the shift from a drafted to a volunteer force, as with any major policy change of this
magnitude, these unanticipated second- and third-order effects were sure to materialize. However
41

Flynn, The Draft, 271, 279, 20, 30.

42

Flynn, The Draft, 265.

43

Flynn, The Draft, 268.

44

Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, 84.

160
the drastic increase in dependents was a substantial development with manifold policy
implications. Moskos comments, “One unanticipated consequence of the shift to an all-volunteer
force—and higher pay—has been a marked increase in marriage among the junior enlisted
ranks.”45 These married AVF soldiers came with dependents, or quickly produced dependents
while in the service, and dependents required care at the government’s expense. By 1979, the
Army had to account for the evacuation of 160,000 wives and children in case of a Soviet attack
in West Germany. Moskos cites personal experience in his comment that the orderly room
“babysitter” was a common sight throughout his tours of Army units in Germany during this
period.46 The costs associated with dependent care, especially as it relates to the healthcare of a
cigarette smoking AVF, became an increasingly expensive endeavor in the future. This issue is
discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.
In addition to these possibly more obvious expenses associated with fielding a
professional volunteer Army, there were also the not-so-obvious. One rather substantial example
is the proliferation of civilian contractors in the post-draft Army. Since professional soldiers
were no longer required to do the menial work associated with service in the drafted force, the
Army had to add expanded contracting services to its budget requirement. Soldier-led kitchen
patrol, latrine duty, and grounds maintenance tasks were a thing of the past. The pickle suit
potato peeler was replaced with a kitchen services technician; the latrine private was swapped
for the sanitary engineer. Professional soldiers who volunteered for service, the rationale went,
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needed to spend time in more efficient ways by training to do their jobs and learning how to
operate the new, expensive weapons of war—not peeling potatoes or scrubbing toilet bowls.47
As a result of all these additional expenses, elected officials experienced sticker shock.
Congressmen weary of the AVF’s price tag talked openly about “unacceptable cuts in the
Defense program” to fund the AVF. They feared the AVF was impossible without “causing a big
deficit or higher taxes.” In short, they argued the Gates Commission had “seriously
miscalculated” the cost of the AVF.48 And they were right. In 1978, the Government Accounting
Office (GAO) reported the AVF cost the government $18 billion more than a drafted force of the
same size would have cost.49
When combined, the issues of pay, bonuses, incentive money, dependent obligations,
recruiting budgets, contractors, advertising expenses, desertion wastage, and a myriad of other
expenses created formidable challenges for appropriators tasked with funding America’s military
enterprise.50 Yet astonishingly, despite the billions of dollars they carved out to fund the force,
the Army was still missing recruiting goals. An Army recruiter in Massachusetts offered a
$1,500 bonus for each enlistment contract. Even with the local paper misprinting the
advertisement as a $15,000 bonus, not a single recruit darkened the door.51 In 1974, the Army

47

Bailey, America’s Army, 57,62.

48

Flynn, The Draft, 270.

49

Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, 69.

50

Moskos, “The All-Volunteer Force,” 138. Moskos comments that “post-entry disillusionment relates
directly to the extremely high rate of attritions (wastage) in the all-volunteer force. Since 1973, more than one in
three recruits have failed to complete their initial enlistments: they were discharged for disciplinary reasons,
personality disorders, or job inaptitude.” Further, “the desertion rate in the all-volunteer force is twice as high as that
in the pre-Vietnam period—17.8 [percent] per thousand enlisted personnel in 1977 compared to 7.9 percent in 1964.
What makes the current desertion figures especially troublesome, of course, is that they occur on top of the high
attrition rates.”
51

Flynn, The Draft, 271.

162
was short again despite spending an additional $68 million, a price tag that produced only 63
percent of their recruiting goal.52 Even more shocking, despite the billions spent during the 1970s
on the AVF, in 1979 Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer dropped a bombshell when
he informed Congress that the force it had bought was not the professional, quality force
Congressmen thought they were getting—to the contrary, it was a “hollow” force.53
In Prodigal Soldiers, a book describing the difficulties of the post-Vietnam military,
author James Kitfield offers a telling account of Army Chief of Staff’s admission to the Armed
Service Committee that the Army was a broken force. General Meyer described how the Army
could not meet its mission requirement to have ten reinforcing divisions deployed to Europe
within fourteen days. He told the President that the Army could barely muster four divisions to
support this requirement. Meyer also informed the President of failures to successfully
incorporate the Reserves and National Guard into the active Army (Total Force concept), the
chronic drug and alcohol problems in the Army, as well as the low numbers of high school
graduates entering the force. Kitfield describes the dramatic close to General Myers’s testimony.
“Mr. President,” Meyer summarized after glancing in the direction of Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown, “what we have is a hollow Army.”54 The bloated military budgets associated with
the hollow force of the early-to-mid 1970s were unique in American history because, “for the
first time military spending increased at the conclusion of a major war.”55 This was an
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unparalleled occurrence that bewildered many; the AVF, as opposed to Gates’ modest
predictions, was an “immensely expensive proposition” with mounting costs.56 And one must not
forget that as America was coming to grips with the proposition of buying an AVF, it was still
footing the bill for the Republic of Vietnam’s Army to the tune of a billion dollars between 1971
and 1972.57 As the costs associated with a professional volunteer force tasked to police the world
and contain Communism spiraled out of control, Congress took notice. Many showed signs of
buyer’s remorse and regretted purchasing an expensive Army where only 64 percent of its
recruits made it through their initial enlistment.58 In 1979, Senator Sam Nunn summed it up best
when he commented that the AVF was “a luxury the United States could no longer afford.”59
Despite the talk of a professional force recruited from the best and brightest and paid “luxury”
wages commiserate with civilian professionals, the Army was in near-crisis mode. As the Army
started to comprehend the cost of recruiting the AVF and the short-term costs of meeting its
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manpower goals, it also began to consider the long-term cost of the AVF. Many of these soldiers
volunteered under the assumption, and indeed were encouraged, to make the military their
profession and stay around for retirement. Unlike the drafted force, who did their hitch and then
returned home to start families and take civilian jobs, the new Army was made up of career men.
When the country transitioned from the draft to the AVF, the government bought, and now
owned, several million young men and women, along with their families, their hopes, and their
futures. Similar to real estate, extensive costs are associated with ownership, and America’s
experience with the AVF proved that notion. As contentious as the AVF expenses were,
ownership of a smoking AVF, along with the nature of the health care promise made to late
draft-era and AVF soldiers, the majority of whom were smokers, was even more controversial.
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CHAPTER VII
SOLDIER STARTERS
Can the Industry Afford Losing “Starters”?
Congress’s concerns about the costs associated with an AVF grew and soon
included anxiety over the specter of a smoking, then retiring AVF; in North Carolina and
other key tobacco states, the cigarette industry faced a related crisis. If the AVF was a
luxury the nation could not afford, failing to recruit a steady stream of smoking starters,
many of whom traditionally resided in the ranks of the Army, was a situation the cigarette
industry could not afford. As a result of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Warning and
subsequent efforts by the FTC to place warnings on cigarette packages, the industry was
aware its acceptability margin was beginning to slip once again. The data was in: 1970
saw the first ever drop reported in total manufactured cigarettes smoked by Americans.1
Adding to the burgeoning crisis, while Congress was debating the merits versus
the mounting cost of an AVF, Congressman Bennett had slipped in measures to remove
the cigarette from soldier rations. Industry executives were concerned the cigarette
enterprise was locked in an uphill battle against negative public opinion over the
scientific data connecting cigarettes to various health hazards and diseases. If measures
were not taken soon, movement up that hill would stall, and like an airplane that runs out
of airspeed and altitude at the exact same moment, the industry would crash and burn.
Four industry and advertising executives, or the firms they founded, played a key role in
efforts to stabilize the cigarette industry’s position in America during this period: Burns
Roper, Ted Bates, Fred Panzer, and Horace Kornegay.
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Burns Roper was a decorated WWII veteran who piloted B-17 bomber aircraft
over Germany during the Combined Bomber Offensive, racking up a total of thirty-five
combat missions.2 After a particularly dangerous mission, he received an air medal for
landing his heavily damaged aircraft operating on just one engine, back at his home base
in England. After leaving the service, he returned home to Massachusetts and joined his
father’s marketing research firm. The Roper Marketing Research Agency established an
extensive affiliation with the cigarette industry. It conducted a total of eight separate
survey-based studies over a thirty-year period to help the industry understand Americans’
smoking behaviors, lifestyle choices, and perceptions regarding smoking-related health
hazards.3 The industry depended on marketing research from agencies like Roper &
Associates to inform its long-term strategic assessments on which millions of dollars in
advertising expenditures, as well as billions in profits, relied.
Ted Bates was also an influential cigarette industry advertiser and is a member of
the Advertising Hall of Fame. After graduating from Yale in 1924, Bates worked in the
banking industry before forming his own ad agency in 1940. With initial clients like
Colgate-Palmolive and Continental Baking, Bates was a leader in advertising innovation
during the 1940s and 1950s. One of his groundbreaking advertising concepts involved
development of a Unique Selling Position (USP) for each of the product brands the firm
represented. A USP is used to identify a “unique feature of each product and connect it in
the minds of consumers with the brand name.” When Ted Bates & Co., contracted with
the cigarette industry to provide marketing research and advertising guidance, his firm
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supplied a USP-based marketing plan to help the industry attract teens to smoking. This
plan became a central piece in one of the industry’s most controversial and litigious
marketing strategies.4
Fred Panzer was the vice president of the Tobacco Institute from 1972–1980.
Panzer played an important role in steering the cigarette industry through a time of
increased pressure from anti-smoking groups both in government and the private sector.
Characterized as eager, “highly intelligent,” and possibly a bit “insecure,” Panzer started
out as a staff writer preparing tobacco histories in booklet form for each state that grew
the golden leaves.5 These booklets stressed the historical importance of tobacco in
America, as well as tobacco’s impact on the American economy. Both of these were key
talking points for the tobacco industry and tobacco state politicians throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, and Panzer was at the center of this public relations strategy. Panzer soon
expressed interest in legislative work and was promoted to liaison. In this capacity, he
continued as a staunch promoter of tobacco interests on the floor of Congress. A bright
and savvy power broker, Panzer was elevated to vice president of the Tobacco Institute in
1972 and become one of the tobacco industry’s chief lobbyists. To the delight of many
trial lawyers, Panzer also authored some of the industry’s most damning documents
linking confidential and controversial industry marketing strategies to a wide cigarette
industry audience.
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Finally, Horace Kornegay was also heavily involved in the tobacco lobby and was
the colorful and engaging president of the Tobacco Institute from 1970 to 1981, and the
Chairman from 1981 to 1987. He interrupted his law school education at Wake Forest in
1942 to enlist in the Army, served as a machine gunner in France, and was awarded the
Purple Heart. He was elected as a North Carolina Democrat to Congress in 1961, and
represented his district’s tobacco farmers for four consecutive terms. After leaving
Congress, he joined the Tobacco Institute as legal counsel in 1969 and became president
of that organization in 1970.6 Kornegay was an ardent supporter of tobacco farmers and
used his contacts in Congress to ensure the cigarette industry was well represented in the
halls of government during his tenure as president of the institute.
The controversial plans and strategies these advertising and cigarette industry
executives developed to address public perception issues and the starter crises were
grounded in extensive market research and expert observations by industry insiders. Their
ideas, research, and marketing strategies eventually made their way into fundamental
cigarette industry documents. These documents were part of an enterprise-wide strategy
to orient marketing efforts on the three things the cigarette industry must create if it was
to survive the crisis: notions of smokers’ rights, doubt, and new starters.
Smokers’ Rights and Doubt
For years, industry advertising had focused on the pleasure, and even the health
benefits derived from smoking cigarettes. In the 1930s, government-funded researchers
began to dismantle these myths with early experiments showing inhaled smoke and
cigarette tar caused cancer in and on mice and rabbits. During this period, Adolph Hitler
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was actually a leading proponent of cigarette research owing to his interest in propagating
a healthy master race. Smoking in Nazi Germany, at least according to Hitler and his
sycophants, was “a violation of National Socialist ethics . . . one’s ‘duty [was] to be
healthy’ and to serve the nation and its Fuhrer.”7 In America, the Medical College of
Virginia was an early leader in tobacco experimentation but acted largely as an organ for
the tobacco industry. Proctor comments their collaboration with the industry was “so
deep, and so all-encompassing, that it is sometimes hard even to find a clear line dividing
the work of the college from the business of defending cigarettes.”8
However, the landmark year for definitive scientific data that linked cigarette
smoking with lung cancer was 1950, the year Ernst Wynder concluded research that
made the lethal connection. Wynder’s research was published in the Journal of American
Medicine, and once his research was socialized among the public health, medical, and
scientific communities, it led to a reassessment of the relationship between cigarette
smoke and disease. As a result, a host of agencies, including the American Cancer
Society, the British Medical Research Council, the American Heart Association, and a
litany of leading medical schools, all came to understand and support the conclusions of
Wynder’s groundbreaking study—smoking is deadly.9
The industry was no longer able to simply look the other way or quietly deflect
attention away from harmful scientific evidence. Their initial response to these reports
was to dig in and deny. Moreover, to present a façade of concern and customer
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stewardship, the industry encouraged objective scientific inquiry into environmental
hazards that could plausibly cause the problems scientists were now connecting to
smoking. Accordingly, in a bold move to gain control of the conversation, the industry
contracted with public relations firm Hill & Knowlton (H&K) to fight back. In what
Robert Proctor describes as the “magna carta of the American [cigarette] industry’s
conspiracy to deny any evidence of tobacco harms” and the “most widely publicized—
and expensive—advertisement . . . in human history,” the cigarette enterprise began its
earnest campaign to foment doubt and spread the discourse of personal choice.10
The “Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” appeared in 448 major newspapers
on January 4, 1954, and “sought to establish the industry as reliable, responsible, and
fully committed to the public’s interest . . . reassure[ing] smokers by promising them that
the industry was absolutely committed to their good health.”11 The Frank Statement
strategy was guided by the industry’s new research arm and mouthpiece—the Tobacco
Industry Research Council (TIRC).12 Though the TIRC was initially seen by the industry
as a temporary measure, by 1958 it was apparent the enterprise was in for what would
become a sustained effort to monitor and control cigarette messaging, research, and
negative press. The enterprise soon discovered the TIRC was not sufficient to manage
both the scientific research and public relations aspects of this now long-term, industrywide campaign.
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This revelation resulted in the formation of the Tobacco Institute in 1958. The
Institute assumed the industry’s public relations and lobbying functions, and the TIRC
was reformed as the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR).13 The CTR, now under the
umbrella of the Tobacco Institute, continued the TIRC’s core mission to provide funding
for scientific research.14 The TIRC, and then the Tobacco Institute, was relatively
successful in overcoming the initial flurry of negative anti-smoking press. Throughout the
1950s and 1960s, one out of two Americans chose to continue smoking cigarettes.
Despite the data arrayed against it, these statistics tell the story of an enterprise that
mastered the narrative and dodged negative press unfriendly to the cigarette agenda.15
However, in the wake of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report warning Americans about
the dangers of cigarette smoking, the enterprise swung into action. By the late 60s, they
were once again in a fight to control negative press and stave off efforts by the FTC to
regulate the industry.
In a memo between highly placed executives within cigarette firm Brown &
Williamson (B&W) dated August 21, 1969, the industry acknowledged its continued
commitment to a doubt strategy. Generated in the aftermath of renewed negative
perceptions about cigarettes, smoking, and the industry, the memo relayed the bleak
reality:
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Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the body of fact that exists in the
mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing that there is a controversy. If we,
B&W, are successful in establishing a controversy at the public level, then there is an opportunity
to put across the real facts about smoking.16

This basic doubt scheme was integral to the Tobacco Institute’s core mission and
by 1970, some cigarette industry executives began to feel the institute, especially its
research arm, needed extra prodding to focus efforts on this mission to reassure smokers
and create doubt. Helmut Wakeham, Vice President and Director of Research and
Development for Philip Morris, suggested that the Tobacco Institute needed reminding
that “the industry publicly and frequently denied what others find as ‘truth.’” He went on
to warn the industry and anyone lobbying or researching on their behalf need to “face it,
we are interested in evidence which we believe denies the allegation that cigarette
smoking causes disease.” The industry, through membership fees, was paying the
Tobacco Institute and its CTR research arm handsomely to prove the safety of cigarette
smoking, or at least create enough doubt that such research would yield the same result: a
continuation of cigarette smoking in America. Wakeham suggested that if the CTR could
not deliver on this “truth” regarding the industry’s interests, they should be “terminated”
and denied any more funds from industry giants like Phillip Morris.17
As a result, the Tobacco Institute renewed efforts to advance the industry’s
interests in an environment apparently growing steadily averse to cigarette consumption.
All of this was occurring during the pivotal years when America was tinkering with the
way it recruited and retained soldiers in its armed service. Subsequent efforts to retain
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smokers and starters in the AVF were essentially a continuation of a much larger program
to keep America smoking. This program was initiated back in 1954 with the Frank
Statement and continued through 1958 with the formation of the TI. Evidence of the
program to create doubt, retain smokers, and recruit starters, is found in documents such
as B&W’s 1969 Doubt is Our Product memo, and PM’s 1970 Let’s Face It memo. To
these, the industry would add the 1972 Roper Proposal and the 1975 Bates Memo. Both
of these documents, and the on-going, industry-wide strategy they represented, had a
direct impact on the military smoking market and guided strategies the enterprise pursued
in the 1980s as elements within the DoD and Congress attempted to unhinge the soldiercigarette relationship.
With this foundation in place, Kornegay and Panzer developed several new
initiatives to address the core elements of the crisis surrounding smokers’ rights and
doubt between 1972 and 1975. Roper & Associates’ April 1970 Study 53-0414 played a
key role during this period. 18 Study 53-0414, a groundbreaking marketing research
project, uncovered several useful attitudinal aspects involved in cigarette consumption
and starter decisions. Grounded in this study’s findings, the TI initiated an enhanced
doubt and smokers’ rights program. Set forth in a memo from Panzer to Kornegay dated
May 1, 1972 (The Roper Proposal), Panzer argued the industry was losing the war for
public opinion and had to make substantial changes to address the key issues of smokers’
rights and doubt. Panzer frankly admitted the industry’s long-standing commitment to the
doubt and smokers’ rights scheme and that they had worked “brilliantly.” However, he
opined that these schemes were only part of what amounted to a holding strategy. Panzer
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reasoned that the time was right to develop a plan for victory in the “twenty year war
against the tobacco industry.” 19
Despite the two decades of turbulent struggle between the industry, anti-smoking
groups, and unfriendly elements on Capitol Hill, Panzer expressed that lobbying efforts
linking cigarettes to the American values of rights, liberty, and freedom of choice were
achieving results. After all, during this period roughly half of all American men and one
out of every three women were still smokers.20 He was supportive of the industry’s
consistent message regarding objective research, and was quick to juxtapose the
industry’s enlightened concern for their customers’ health and their rights against the
government’s subjective un-scientific research and intrusive policies.21 Panzer advised
that this responsible research and rights smoke screen should continue as planned, and
were even subject to expansion.
However, in the area of “create[ing] doubt about the health charge without
actually denying it,” Panzer posited there was room for improvement. He argued that
despite the statistical success in terms of profits and cigarette consumption during the two
decades since the Frank Statement, the industry was still employing a holding strategy
that could not last forever. Similar to military strategy, the industry dug in and was
positioned to hold ground, but it was not actively engaging in measures to take new
ground. In such an attrition oriented strategy, Panzer reasoned the industry could never
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win. He argued for new plans to move the industry from a status quo holding position to a
winning one.22
Using a Vietnam War example to provide additional clarity, Panzer observed that
America’s Vietnam experience proved it was not possible to hold US public opinion on a
middle course for any length of time. Just as President Johnson found it increasingly
difficult to pursue a holding strategy to maintain public approval for the Vietnam War
after 1968, Panzer reasoned the industry could not count on public favor much longer if
adjustments were not made to enhance the enterprise’s public image. Panzer argued that
an increasing number of Americans were no longer willing to look the other way when
confronted with the overwhelming scientific data linking cigarette smoking to health
problems. He felt it was crucial to influence the public to an even greater extent than
previous decades when branding and product differentiation were the main focus, not
issues involving the acceptability of smoking and moral perceptions about a consumer
product that appeared to cause bodily harm. Panzer was concerned that the public not
only represented potential smokers, it represented a potential jurors. In this frank
observation, Panzer saw the writing on the wall: the industry must prepare for war in the
courts.
Panzer argued that up to that point, and despite its success, the existing doubt
strategies still lacked a necessary focus and grounding in a modern understanding of
marketing and consumption psychology. It provided smokers with “too little in the way
of ready-made credible alternatives” that would “sustain their opinions that smoking may

22

Panzer, Roper Proposal, 1; Brandt, Cigarette Century, 5–6.

176
not be the causal factor” in smoking related illness.23 (Italics mine.) These were not the
same smokers who four decades earlier had made brand decisions based on the kind of
cigarettes their doctors smoked. This was an informed public increasingly looking to the
federal government for research, statistics, welfare, and well-being. The old rules were
gone. However Panzer advised there was still opportunity to capitalize on smokers’
lingering reservations regarding smoking. The enterprise now had to go about this
mission in a smarter manner.
Against all odds, the data appeared to support Panzer and Kornegay’s plan to
capitalize on the public’s still enduring doubt regarding the hazards of smoking. Despite
decades of scholarship to the contrary, Roper’s April 1970 survey based Study 53-5414
showed that doubt lingered. It found that “a majority (52 percent) believed that cigarettes
are only one of the many causes of smokers having more illness.” Further, half of those
surveyed believed smokers were somehow genetically different than non-smokers and
that “heredity” could largely explain lung cancer and other health issues.24 The enterprise
only needed to continue to feed smokers the alternatives they needed to help justify their
smoking habit. As opposed to the stable of blunt tactics the industry had employed for
decades (including categorical denial and general doubt tactics), it needed credible
alternatives that were sharp and addressed the information-rich environment in which
consumers lived. In 1975, Ted Bates & Co., supplied the industry with the razor sharp
plan it needed to give the industry the edge it sought. The Bates Memo helped the
enterprise articulate a plan to keep veteran smokers smoking and attract new smokers by
positing:
23
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Smoking is, in a way, a very strange human activity, a very strange habit. This is one of the very
few things that people who do it are fully aware of its negative value, are not really happy with it,
not really proud of it, do not see much good in it, perhaps even hate it—but still do it . . . [smokers
are] very stupid. . . illogical, irrational people [that] find it hard to go throughout life with such
25
negative presentation and evaluation of self . . . [their] saviors are rationalization and repression.

The industry aimed to provide just enough of this rationalization and repression
for the smokers to continue to indulge in what it labeled a “stupid” habit which made the
industry billions. Bates also encouraged the enterprise to remember “smokers don't like to
be reminded of the fact that they are illogical and irrational . . . they don't want to be
reminded by either direct or indirect manner.” Certainly the enterprise had to act;
however it had to creatively find ways to attract smokers through advertising without
reminding them constantly of their “illogical” habit. Under the auspices of this new and
improved doubt strategy, the alternatives offered were packaged as the Constitutional and
Multi-factorial Hypotheses.26
The Constitutional Hypothesis gave voice to controversial data supporting a
“constitutional makeup” alternative linking smoking illness with genetics. This portion of
the new doubt strategy never gained much traction, and was kept quietly tucked away.
However, the Multi-factorial Hypothesis was proudly rolled out for the entire world to
see. This theory suggested smokers and non-smokers alike should consider the cigarette
industry’s position that “as science advances, more and more factors come under
suspicion as contributing to illness for which smoking is blamed—air pollution, viruses,
food additives, occupational hazards, stresses,” as well as industrial work conditions, air
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conditioning units, and asbestos.27 Bringing the Roper Proposal from 1972 full circle,
Panzer advised the enterprise to redouble efforts to provide “objective scientific research”
to support the Multi-factorial Hypothesis. Panzer frankly postulated that “best of all, it
[the objective scientific research] would only have to be seen—not read—to be
believed.”28 The industry only needed to develop, coordinate, and execute an enhanced
doubt strategy loosely based on science that provided smokers with a small measure of
reassurance. In the end, if the enterprise wanted to survive, it had to help existing
smokers comfortably rationalize their choice to continue smoking.
Armed with this bold new plan to win tobacco’s image war, the enterprise rapidly
adopted the smokers’ rights and renewed doubt strategies in its public statements. The
cigarette enterprise soon thereafter began offering a series of strategically targeted
propositions to the consumer public. These messages were designed to stir up the
smoking and non-smoking public’s angst against the intrusive federal government big
brothers whom the cigarette enterprise claimed was watching their every move. In
statements often transmitted through tobacco state politicians on the floor of Congress,
the enterprise asked Americans if they needed the federal government to intrude in their
personal lives. Executing the core tenets of the Roper-Bates enhanced doubt strategy,
politicians asked if they need the government to make smoking decisions for them—
especially considering the subjective nature of the government’s “faulty scientific data.”
Did Americans need a “brass nanny” to watch over them and dictate what was or was not
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healthy?29 If the government banned cigarettes, what was next—air conditioning,
industrial factories, fiberglass insulation, and French fry grease? Was not smoking a
matter of personal choice?
Appealing to emotion and patriotism, they asked the American public if this is
what their forefathers intended—a state denying its citizens individual freedom and the
right to pursue happiness.30 These messages were powerful and effective, capitalized on
long-standing doubt strategies, and enabled the cigarette enterprise to develop a culture of
smokers’ rights. It provided reasonable alternatives to government science linking
cigarettes to disease. Moreover, the enterprise firmly linked smoking to freedom. This
part of the strategy directly informed industry efforts to latch on to soldiers as cigarette
puffing freedom fighters, a maneuver it had perfected during previous wars. This angle
required perfection again if the enterprise was to retain the solder-cigarette relationship so
vital to the industry’s bottom line. However, in order to address the long-term survival of
the cigarette enterprise, the enterprise had to address a much larger issue as well: starters.
Starters
In addition to providing the industry with Study 53-0414 in 1970 which was
instrumental in helping Panzer and Kornegay develop the enhanced doubt campaign,
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Roper & Associates also supplied Philip Morris with the 1970 Benchmark Study. This
study, similar to Study 53-0414, focused on smokers’ attitudes towards brands and
smoking in general. However, PM was not completely satisfied with the marketing
research presented in this rather extensive report. They were concerned the data upon
which they were basing important and far-reaching advertising and investment decisions
was missing one key element: the teenage starter.
The industry was keenly aware that smoking and brand decisions were made by
the age of eighteen. During the 1970s and 80s, the issue of attracting and retaining brandloyal young adult smokers was a major, if veiled, component of industry marketing
strategies. For example, a management summary created by industry leader R.J.
Reynolds to guide development of marketing campaigns directly addressed this crucial,
industry-wide issue:
Younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major
brand and company over the last 50 years. They will continue to be just as important to brands in
the future for [the] simple reason . . . The renewal of the market stems almost entirely from 18year-old smokers. No more than 5 percent of smokers start after age 24 . . . Younger adult smokers
are critical to RJR’s long-term performance and profitability. Therefore, RJR should make a
substantial long term commitment of manpower and money dedicated to younger adult smoker
programs. An unusually strong commitment from Executive Management will be necessary
31
[because] younger adult smokers are the only source of replacement smokers.

With so many brands from which to choose, and the American public increasingly aware
of the dangers of smoking, the industry had to take decisive action to address teen
smokers, a segment of the population it referred to as starters. If the industry was to
survive, much less achieve market differentiation among the brands, cigarette companies
needed to know how to attract and retain teen smokers. With these issues in mind, PM,
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makers of the popular Marlboro brand, queried Roper about the prospects of successfully
addressing this gap in the marketing research.
Sensing PM’s desire to move quickly on this issue, Roper & Associates wasted no
time in responding to PM’s query regarding young teen smokers. Roper suggested a
wide-ranging effort that leveraged Roper’s access to three key markets: college students,
early-teens, and young military members. Regarding college students, Roper opined that
PM should wait until the fall to start doing conclusive survey work on campus since
summer students were not a good sample. However, he did provide some optimism with
his suggestion that his firm could “take some immediate steps that will provide some
fairly good indications” of the success of PM products on campus by positioning Roper
agents at tobacco outlets near campus to do initial marketing interviews.32
In terms of the early-teen market, Roper voiced a shocking revelation that became
a bane for the industry and a boon for litigators. Roper advised PM to give careful and
sustained attention to market “share among 14–17-year-old teenagers not covered” in the
original Roper study. In a humorous yet damning exchange, Roper recommends a
strategy to access the 14–17 year old market by:
interviewing young people at summer recreation centers (at beaches, public schools, lakes, etc.).
This will provide a projectable sample of people in this age group, and it has several advantages.
The low at-homeness of this group combined with their incidence in households would make
house-to-house interviewing quite expensive. In addition, true answers on smoking habits might
be difficult to elicit in the presence of parents . . . we suggest having interviewers obtain
interviews with those who appear to be between the ages of 14 and 21 . . . we would have
interviewers ask the age of the respondent, but if she disagrees or thinks the reported age is too
high, we would have her record her guess as to correct age.33
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In addition to gaining access to college kids and young teens, Roper planned to obtain
data from the military by “stationing interviewers near high traffic areas for military
personnel near military bases (bus stations, airports, etc.) [at] places where large military
bases are located.”34
These statements regarding starters and many more comprise a body of
documents linking the industry to teen and young adult smoking. The industry’s military
and teen programs in general, and the young teen agenda specifically, indicate the drastic
measures taken to ensure the survival of the highly profitable cigarette business and
smoking in America. Since the military was largely comprised of the teens and young
adults the industry so desperately needed, the soldier-cigarette relationship would play a
key role in this survival strategy.
Soldiers Starters
By the mid-1970s, the Marlboro Man had become an icon of the cigarette
industry. Ironically, Marlboro cigarettes were positioned as a cigarette for women in the
years leading up to 1955 when the Marlboro Man was introduced to the world. Before the
Marlboro Man, the Marlboro was marketed as “mild as May” and capped with “ivory tips
to protect the lips.” The Marlboro Man was something completely different—an image
that appealed to young men and soldiers. Whereas Winston Salem’s wildly successful Joe
Camel campaign of the late 1980s was directed toward young men seeking to appear
“urban, easy, funny, wild, partying, and non-threatening,” Phillip Morris’ Marlboro Man
dominated the market during the 50s, 60s, and 70s with a completely different set of
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images.35 Marlboro Men were “hard, serious, outdoors, the best—only a select few,
handsome, respect[ed], long lasting, and married.” If the Joe Camel image was
represented by “Mickey Rourke, Dana Carvey, . . . and Mick Jagger,” the Marlboro Man
ideal was found in characters like “John Wayne, Charles Bronson, Clint Eastwood,
Chuck Norris, and Steven Segal.”36 With the Marlboro Man cult leading the way, PM’s
Marlboro cigarette experienced “the most spectacular rise of a single brand in cigarette
history” from 1965 to 1976. On the back of the Marlboro Man, Marlboro brand cigarettes
had surpassed Winston by 1976 to become America’s “most popular cigarette” and soon
vaulted to top position as the world’s “number one brand.”37
It is not important to this study the brand of cigarettes that soldiers chose, or the
fact that during the period when America was fielding a volunteer force, Marlboro
became the world’s top selling cigarette brand. There is no relation between these two
events. What is important is the perception of smoking and masculinity in America
during this period, a period when young men were choosing to join a volunteer Army
with thoughts of staying, and smoking, for a career. Both of these choices, staying and
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smoking, were expensive endeavors individually. However, as discussed in the next
chapter, when combined they are exponentially more expensive.
The imagery represented by the iconic, horse-bound, leathery Marlboro Man did
much to drive home the message of rugged independence and carefree virility that were
hallmarks of the young adult market and smoking in general. What would Charles
Bronson or John Wayne do? They would join the volunteer Army and smoke cigarettes.
Therefore, this Marlboro Man message supplemented the familiar figure of the cigarettewielding American soldier that had existed in American culture for decades. Together,
these images had immense influence on the young soldiers who formed a significant
portion of the industry’s client base during this period—a base the industry fought to
retain.
The industry was ready and willing to exploit this young military client base, and
the images to which they were attracted. The nature of this exploitation, and to what
extent it directly targeted young Americans whether soldiers or civilians, is a
controversial issue at the center of countless lawsuits and public policy debates. In the
early 1980s, journalists, trial lawyers, and public health officials began to put the pieces
together: the industry was courting young starters. In an investigative report by staff
writer Mike King, a journalist with Louisville, Kentucky’s Courier Journal, King posed
the question, “Is the industry aiming its message at teens?” After examining evidence
pertaining to the industry’s marketing practices, King was intrigued that, despite the
plethora of negative information available about the dangers of cigarette smoke, teen
smoking rates had begun to increase again after a marked decline in the mid-1970s.
Though it was difficult to find an airtight smoking gun at the time, King had a hunch that,
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despite the industry’s protestations to the contrary, somehow it was behind this marked
increase in teen starters. Historical data and industry archives reveal King was right in his
speculation.38
Smoking, Machismo, and the AVF
According to data maintained by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, if young
people do not make their decision to start smoking by 18, they will likely never begin
smoking. Additionally, the likelihood of an adult choosing to smoke after the age of 25 is
near zero. Therefore marketing researchers argued the window to influence the smoking
decision was the 17–19-year-old age group. If teens fail to choose smoking by 18, then
the industry faced the grim reality of a dwindling market as the current smoker group
aged out and died.39 The cigarette industry was keenly aware of this statistic and had
initiated research to confirm the smoking decision window and develop strategies to
influence young smokers to start smoking. As seen in Roper’s study proposal for PM in
June 1970, they were not afraid to go as low as 14 to influence this decision.
In 1975, cigarette manufacturer Brown & Williamson (B&W), maker of popular
brands Lucky Strike and Kool menthol cigarettes, joined PM and confidently waded into
the young adult and teen research markets as well. They contracted with Ted Bates &
Co., to provide youth marketing strategies for the launch of the firm’s Viceroy brand. In a
March 1975 document referred to as the Bates Memo among litigation circles, Ted Bates
presented B&W with a marketing strategy to reach new smokers.40 B&W subsequently
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used this information to create marketing concepts for their Viceroy line of cigarettes.
Continuing with the overall assessment laid out in the Roper Proposal, the marketing
plans outlined in the Bates Memo ceded that the industry was fighting a “losing war” in
the battle against negative public perception.41 Just as the Roper Proposal had, the Bates
Memo advised the industry to take greater, more aggressive measures to reach the young
smoking market, and more importantly, create new smokers.
The Bates Memo insisted the industry had to implement a plan to attract these
new smokers in spite of and in response to the growing anti-smoking environment
gripping the nation. A marketing strategy moving young people from the non-smoker to
“starter” category was of greatest necessity.42 Citing well-known industry and
government data, as well as proprietary industry research, the Bates team reasoned the
choice of whether to smoke or not happened at the same time a young person attempted
to make a declaratory statement about independence and self-identity. This activity
happened when a young person was transitioning from teen to adult. With this in mind,
Bates suggested a four-part strategy.
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First, advertisers should present smoking as one of the few initiations into the
adult world. The industry countered charges that it was marketing to minors by claiming
it only used adults in their commercials; this is exactly what the Bates strategy
encouraged the industry to do. Young teens who see glamorous, sexy, confident adults
smoking will indeed see smoking as a gateway to adulthood. Bates challenged the
industry to ask the philosophical, age-old question: what makes a man a man—or a
woman a woman? If it could connect industry products with the answer to this age-old
question, it could unlock the young adult market.
Second, the industry must connect smoking with maturity and success. Again, this
form of advertising forced industry officials to think deeply about the youth of America
and the generation coming of age in the late 70s and early 80s. If the industry could
decipher what teens wanted and experiences they valued, it could design advertising
strategies to address these needs. Bates envisioned a strategy that accounted for: how
young American adults felt about the world around them, their place in that world, their
status in society, and how they signaled their status in American society. In short, Bates
wanted to access and address teen mentalité.
Third, Bates told B&W executives if they wanted “starters” to buy Viceroys, or
non-smokers to become “starters,” they needed to relate their products to other perceived
adult activities like sex and drinking alcohol, thus reinforcing the first part of the strategy.
Finally, in conformance with tenants of the Roper Proposal, Bates suggested the industry
not try to fight the “cigarettes are bad for you” argument, because it was a “losing war.”
Similar to Roper’s suggestion to create doubt about anti-smoking data without ever
actually denying it, Bates told the industry to “skirt the issue” by providing other positive
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reasons for smoking such as “social acceptance, positive self-image, and maturity.” In
fact, Bates suggested the industry must completely and deliberately avoid any reference
to health or health-related activities. Essentially, and in line with prevailing cultural
attitudes of the time, Bates suggested a self-gratification campaign projecting the
message: if it feels good, do it.43
Enterprise strategies presented in Roper and Bates’ confidential industry
documents and marketing studies make it clear the industry was aware the youthful
American soldiers of the AVF were prime starter candidates. In a memorandum from
Lorillard, an American cigarette company, its marketing team highlights the importance
of the military market. Lorillard produced the Newport brand and their marketing team
insisted that targeting the soldier market was required because:
. . . the plums are here to be plucked. The military approximates the size of New York, yet our
marketing effort in the military is only a fraction of what we put behind the Brand in Region #2.
Our cost per thousand cigarettes, and our cost per thousand targets reached in the “Military City”
has got to be dramatically lower than any other market in the country. And there isn’t a market in
44
the country that has the sales potential for Newport like the military market.

In a capitalistic business world focused on the bottom line, this statement provides a
concise assessment of the calculus behind the industry’s attraction to the AVF: easy and
cheap access to a young soldier market where there is unmatched bang for the buck.
This was not rocket science. The manufactured cigarette already had a rich,
established relationship with the American soldier dating to the trenches of the Western
Front during WWI. This heritage was reinforced by images of the Marlboro Man and the
43
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grizzled, chain-smoking veteran. American soldiers entering the AVF met the prime
profile for the starter category. On average they were 17–19 years old and leaving home
for the first time. They were looking to define themselves in the world as they
transitioned from teen to adult. Young soldiers were extremely susceptible to the peer
pressures associated with barracks life and time in the field with the boys. Bates
recognized the power of the cult and argued that “with only very few exceptions, young
people start to smoke because of their peer group . . . almost every young smoker started
his smoking life by bumming cigarettes from friends prior to starting to buy his/her
own.”45
Further, a young soldier wanted his peers to think of him as rugged and selfsufficient. In a military environment where Army recruits were subjected to social
leveling, forced removal of personal identity, and a culture of strict adherence to orders,
soldiers sought small ways to exercise agency and display their macho identity. In the
Marlboro Man’s cigarette, they found this agency and macho identity. If the
manufactured cigarette was primarily comfort and solace to the trench-dwelling
Doughboy of WWI, it was macho status and cult acceptance to the modern volunteer
soldier.46
Long aware of this connection between smoking cigarettes and soldierly
masculinity, the industry developed extensive marketing programs and promotions to
continue attracting the military market and further entrench the soldier with the cigarette.
45
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As previously stated however, smoking as primary group, cult behavior has formed a substantial
aspect of starter motivation throughout the relationship between the American soldier and the manufactured
cigarette. The difference here is that smoking and vice during the 1970s and beyond had a much greater
cultural and masculine meaning than it did to the WWI soldier and the early generation of smokers. One
must remember that before WWI, the preponderance of American men considered cigarettes as effeminate
and a vice associated with sissies.
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However, since cigarettes were removed from field rations in 1973, and the smoking
culture in general had come under renewed attack during this period, the industry had to
redouble its efforts to initiate soldiers to smoking. The enterprise had to find ways to turn
soldiers from green horns into starters who would hopefully become the chain smoking,
grizzled non-commissioned officers (NCOs) the industry coveted. These experienced
soldier-smokers not only formed a substantial customer base for the industry, as primary
group leaders wielding considerable influence, they also propagated the military smoking
culture.
It is abundantly clear from confidential industry documents that the starter
campaigns during this period placed great reliance on youth smokers, and by extension,
the young soldiers that comprised the AVF. For decades, the soldier market had provided
the industry with a steady stream of fresh recruits and potential starters who were
profoundly influenced by the masculinity, independence, and freedom represented in
manufactured cigarettes. The cigarette enterprise was dogged in its determination to hang
on to this lucrative market, initiate starters in the military, and preserve the culture of
doubt in America. This commitment would have profound political, economic, and health
related implications and play a decisive role in debates over cigarette consumption in the
AVF.47
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Both sides of the cigarette debate were soon engaged in a running fight that
eventually spilled over onto the floors of Congress. Just as they had to confront the
potential dangers of an American public averse to cigarette smoking, politicians were
beginning to deal with the expense of the AVF, and more specific to this study, a
smoking AVF. In order to pay for the technologically advanced equipment entering the
military arsenal in the decades after Vietnam and the professional long-service volunteers
required to operate and maintain it, Congress took a hard look at military spending and
engaged in contentious cost-cutting measures.48 When Congressmen and DoD officials
mounted efforts to sever the expensive relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and
expensive government health care liabilities, the enterprise assumed battle stations in a
last ditch, all-out effort to sustain its most reliable source for cigarette starters.

smoking enterprise, and despite the dogged determination of the cigarette enterprise, the consumption rate
dropped by 300 billion over the next two decades. As of 2010, the per capita consumption dropped back to
numbers commiserate with what they were in the decade after WWI (1,500).
48
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CHAPTER VIII
HEALTH CARE AND THE AVF
In 1980, soldier health care expenses, once a sacred cow, were uncovered as
debatable policy issues. No longer considered off-limits in budget drills, it was only a
matter of time before certain Congressmen and federal officials linked cigarette smoking
among the AVF with significant physical and fiscal liabilities. When the cost of a chainsmoking AVF ran up against the interests of the cigarette enterprise, a legendary
Congressional struggled ensued, revealing the true nature of an American political
economy grounded in corporatocracy.
Before discussing this unique political economy as it pertains to the soldier and
the cigarette, the scope of the health care promise made to late-draft era and AVF military
professionals must be addressed. This health care pledge was and is a hotly debated issue
and is crucial to understanding the soldier-cigarette saga because it sheds light on the
mentalité of fiscally conservative Congressmen concerned with the cost liabilities
represented by a cigarette-smoking AVF. In the early 1980s, several elected officials
added the fiscal millstone represented by an AVF hooked on manufactured cigarettes to a
list of variables contributing to rising military health care costs. Even the most
elementary of actuarial drills informed their argument that the costs of an unhealthy AVF,
both in the short-term as active-duty soldiers and the long-term as they transitioned to
military retiree status, were unsustainable. Moreover, this cost liability was not just the
smoking habit of the member, but his or her dependents as well.
Though the cigarette ration was removed in 1973, the Army was doing little to
discourage the cigarette smoking culture or prevent industry access to young soldiers.
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Furthering entrenchment, Congress continued subsidizing cigarettes in the PX and
commissary as part of the military compensation package. This program enabled soldiers
to conveniently obtain cigarettes in bulk at half the cost. To comprehend the liabilities
presented by the specter of a chain-smoking AVF, one must access several debates
regarding the modern military health care system. As was the case with the Doughboys’
rejection of the Y Man in WWI, the truth regarding the size, scope, and nature of
Congress’ health care commitment to the modern soldier, dependent, and retiree is buried
somewhere between fact, fiction, and grim reality. Further, the truth is frequently
wrapped in an emotional myth regarding veterans’ rights, and well-intentioned, but often
ill-informed rhetoric. An understanding of this debate informs the current discussion on
the potential health care and financial liabilities associated with a smoking AVF.
Moreover, it also enlightens subsequent discussions about the cigarette enterprise’s
strategy to manipulate patriotic sentiment and veterans issues in response to Army
programs implemented to unhinge the soldier-cigarette relationship during the decade of
the 1980s.
Soaring AVF Health Care Costs & Problems with the Delivery of Benefits
By 1985, Congress and the DoD had maintained a near-constant 30-year-long
conversation regarding strategies to “contain . . . costs” associated with the military
health care program, as well as the best way to deliver benefits. The tone of this
conversation ranged from legislators gently encouraging to aggressively directing the
DoD to take action on soaring health care costs and an apparent breakdown in delivery of
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benefits.1 During the 1980s, the cost of American health care in general increased across
the board, not just in the military health care system.2
However, Congress and military appropriators began to perceive a “dramatic
increase” in medical budgets over and above this general, across-the-board increase.
Modern military readiness is costly in terms of equipment and personnel. In 1985, the
DoD asked for Congress for over $9.6 billion for “military medical operations” which
represented a “sizeable increase over previous years.”3 The hefty defense bills associated
with the transition to the AVF in the 70s and Reagan’s massive defense build-up in the
80s had once again given Congress sticker shock. As the full extent of the Reagan’s
proliferation was digested, many gasped at the seemingly endless spiral of deficit
spending and sought solutions to contain costs. The medical readiness price tag was
particularly alarming—a price tag the DoD referred to as “an impressive sum of money.”4
For example, Congress was asked to absorb a 25 percent increase in the military’s
medical readiness and personnel accounts, and stomach a medical operation and
maintenance budget that doubled during this period. The DoD asked Congress for an
1
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additional $500 million in medical readiness funding in 1985 and was forced that same
year to pull $2 billion from other programs to support medical readiness shortfalls
projected through 1990.5
Further, the runaway costs were not just a result of fielding and servicing a
credible, capable active force; a substantial portion of military health care costs were
shifting to retirees and dependents. These costs increased by 150 percent, and by the end
of the decade, costs associated with retirees and dependents consumed half of all the
military’s medical expenditures.6 In his closing statement to the Investigations
Subcommittee, the Honorable William Mayer, M.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health Affairs) provided even further bad news regarding not only the military dual
mission of readiness and benefits, but also the growing expense of the contract care
initiatives. Despite the additional appropriations to defense in general and to military
medical readiness specifically through 1985, Mayer concluded the DoD and the services
were still struggling to meet the dual nature of the military health care mission:
One thing that has become clear to me is that our reliance on our direct care system [MTF] to
accomplish both our wartime readiness and our mandated peacetime benefit mission has placed
significant strains on our ability to accomplish either one of those missions effectively. Pressed by
a demand to provide comprehensive health care to some 10 million beneficiaries, we have not
been able to assure top priority to wartime readiness . . . and . . . our civilian care services, such as
7
CHAMPUS, are too costly.

In addition to the soaring costs, Congressmen were also alarmed at what they
perceived as a rapid deterioration in the quality, competency, and availability of military
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health care.8 Even more dreadful, this deterioration had a tremendous price tag and
several in Congress were exasperated about what the bloated military health care budget
had actually bought them. From 1974 to 1986, Congressmen, government officials, and
concerned citizens flocked to hearings to express frustration, anger, fear, and resentment
over the perceived and real failures in military health care.9 Congressmen read letters
from veterans and retirees deprived of medical treatment, stripped of dignity, or told they
did not qualify for the benefits they felt they had earned. Military spouses and retired
officers relayed horror stories involving long lines, broken promises, diminished access,
and increased costs. It certainly appeared something was gravely wrong with the whole
system.
In these hearings, statements by concerned legislators and citizens contained a
variety of words and statements to describe the apparent “breakdown.” Representative
Charles Rose from North Carolina complained that he had retirees in his district who
were “slowly and surely [being] cut off from military medical attention” and that he
feared “an impending breakdown of military medical care.” Rose was so perplexed that
he was ready to institute a draft for good doctors since the system was in such a “mess.”10
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To a great extent, the discourse of discontent centered on a running dialogue regarding
“broken promises” and “breach of trust.”11 Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina even
called the Reagan Administration “first class liars” for failing to provide the health
benefits soldiers, veterans, and their dependents were promised.12 One retired Lieutenant
Colonel expressed the feelings of many when he voiced his desire to:
go on record as one who feels that . . . promises have been broken . . . promises were made. I think
the most important one was the promise of medical care for that member and his family as long as
he lived . . . I stayed in the service for one reason: medical care for my family and myself. The
Armed Forces constantly tell us about the benefits of making a career in the service . . . the
medical care is paramount in their campaign to keep people in the service, in the all-voluntary
service. I think it behooves the Congress and the President to live up to these promises and
13
expectations.

Congressmen were quick to pick up on the emotional “broken promise” theme in the
discourse. Regarding the nature of the “promise” made to soldiers and their families,
Representative H. Martin Lancaster of North Carolina stated that military health care
was:
taken for granted for so long as part of the bargain they made when they decided to devote their
lives to serve the United States of America. Some 45 years ago there were names like Normandy,
Anzio, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Midway. Young men in their early 20s scrambled into the surf
from landing barges, squeezed into cramped, tail gunner nests of bombers, advanced at the wave
of a hand into lethal machine gun fire. They left their homes and families to defend this nation
knowing full well that a large part of their number would never return at all. These brave fighting
men, plus many more who served with distinction in Korea and Vietnam, are now being turned
away . . . along with their dependents, and the dependents of those who serve on active duty . . .
When you ask a young man to step from a landing barge into the face of enemy fire, to stick to his
guns when his ship has taken a hit, to build a bridge with mosquitoes and dive bombers vying for
14
his attention, or even to be a clerk in some lonely, cheerless foreign place, a debt is incurred.
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Lancaster added that this seemingly pathetic situation had “generated . . . pain and
bewilderment” beyond comprehension.15 Representative Arthur Ravenel, Jr., of South
Carolina used his personal experience as a Marine grunt in WWII to add to the emotional
debate:
Well . . . all of us old Marines were told that when you join the Service, the health care needs of
you and your family are going to be met. After you retire, if you put in the required number of
years, you will be taken care of until you go to your reward in the sky, and also the dependents
16
who survive you.

To a casual observer, it appeared the American taxpayers were taken for a ride
and sold an expensive military health care system that was inefficient, broke, bleeding
out, and robbing soldiers, veterans, and dependents of dignity. However one must dig
deeper in order to access truth and gain an appreciation for the problems inherent in a
modern military health care system. Especially a system that had experienced nearly
exponential growth in terms of size, complexity, and cost since it was first conceived in
the waning years of WWII.
The History of Veterans Benefits and Modern Military Health Care
American historiography contains rich literature on the topic of veterans, their
relationship to the federal government, and benefits. Several historians connect the
growth of federal government during the twentieth century to the expansion of veterans’
benefits after the Civil War. In This Republic of Suffering, Drew Gilpin Faust argues the
seeds of federal expansion are found in the government’s response to death and
dismemberment during and after the Civil War. The government entered the Civil War
with no plan to respond to the thousands of dead bodies strewn across the broken
15
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landscape of battlefields, nor the families they represented. Awakened by the news of
haphazard burial details and devastation wrought by the loss of thousands of fathers,
husbands, and sons, the federal apparatus eventually swung into action. By the end of the
war, the government had created various commissions and agencies to spend
appropriated money to gather bodies, build mass cemeteries, purchase prosthetic limbs,
fund pensions, and build memorials. As the federal government made provisions for the
thousands of families affected by death, disease, dislocation, and dismemberment caused
by the war, the bureaucratic scaffolding of a modern federal government was erected.17
In Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in
United States, Theda Skokpol discusses this theme of federal expansion and looks at the
exponential growth in Union pensions in the decades after the Civil War. Veterans’
groups such as the Grand Army of the Republic were extremely influential during this
period. At one point late in the nineteenth century, pension payments consumed greater
than 40 percent of all federal receipts, demonstrating the size and impact of such groups.
Skokpol argues the greatly expanded pension program was the foundation of a social
welfare state in America that predated the New Deal and Europe’s embrace of federal
social welfare by decades. Progressives and muckrakers weary of government pension
and patronage corruption eventually put an end to what had become a corrupt, freewheeling veterans’ pension racket in some areas of government. 18 Regardless, the
foundation for federal government expansion was already in place. To a great extent, its
cornerstone was comprised of the war veterans, the interests they represented, and the
17
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debts accrued to them when they served the Republic as uniformed members of the
armed service.
In Doughboys: the Great War and the Remaking of America, historian Jennifer
Keene argues that the millions of conscripted soldiers who served the Republic during
WWI continued this tradition and created a massive, vocal, national constituency, the
likes of which the nation had never seen. Legislators took notice of this large group of
voters and accommodated veterans’ interest groups with expansionist federal programs, a
Bonus Bill, and the continuation of taxpayer funded pensions.19 Most significantly,
Keene shows how a generation of WWI soldiers paved the way for the GI Bill and made
the WWII generation the most privileged veteran generation in American history. The
WWI generation laid the foundation for the modern US Army, a service increasingly
concerned with soldier welfare and morale in addition to the core mission of combat
effectiveness.
Thus a close reading of Faust, Skokpol, Keene, and many other scholars of
modern US history reveals that many of the social welfare institutions and federal
programs associated with the modern American Republic are rooted in expansive
veterans’ benefits programs.20 These health care benefits grew to become a substantial
and costly component of Congress’ funding requirements after WWII. Whereas the
pension debate dominated the veterans’ discourse between the Civil War and WWII, the
health care debate dominated in post-WWII America.
19
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Comprehensive health care for soldiers, dependents, and retirees as a benefit of
uniformed service to the Republic is a relatively modern occurrence. Older than the
nation itself, the Army Medical Corps was conceived during the Revolutionary War and
was rather limited in scope.21 Whether on or off the battlefield, regimental surgeons cared
for soldiers assigned to their units, offering limited, organic services, comprising the
extent of soldiers’ health care benefits during America’s first century. In 1884, as part of
legislative appropriations funding Army operations, Congress mandated “the medical
officers of the Army and contract surgeons shall whenever practicable attend the families
of the officers and soldiers free of charge.”22 This was the general extent of guidance
Congress provided to the Services on soldier and dependent health care and remained the
accepted interpretation for decades.
WWII changed the nature and scope of this relationship. Even before the war
ended, Congress had already addressed issues regarding the health and welfare of the
returning soldiers by passing the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944. Easing the
transition from soldier to civilian, the act formed a baseline philosophical relationship
21
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between the modern soldier and the state, establishing the “principle that entitlement to
benefits could be achieved through service to the nation, not merely through cash
contributions.”23 After an initial drawdown at the close of WWII, the Truman
Administration, followed by the Eisenhower Administration, steadily grew the size and
capabilities of the military in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. As the
draft and massive defense budgets increased the size of the Army, the responsibilities of
Congress to provide for the health, welfare, readiness, and morale of the force, in addition
to the well-being of dependents and retirees, experienced parallel growth.
The baseline size, scope, and nature of Congressional responsibilities to soldiers,
veterans, retirees, and dependents emerged as a hot topic during the AVF transition
period. This discussion was of utmost importance to many legislators weary of the high
price tag of the AVF, Reagan’s defense build-up, runaway costs associated with soldier
health care, and the apparent breakdown in delivery services. In 1979, a panel of experts
convened on Capitol Hill and attempted to push through the emotion and drama that had
come to characterize the acidic discourse on fiscal issues associated with the AVF.
According to this panel, the health care benefit proved an especially sensitive issue. Their
mission was to arrive at an understanding of what the baseline health benefit actually was
so Congress and DoD officials could engage in discussion about fiscal stewardship rooted
in fact rather than emotionally charged distractions.24
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In general, Chapter 55, Title 10, USC, Sections 1071–1087 states that Congress
shall establish a military health care system with the purpose to “maintain high morale
. . . by providing medical care for members and certain former members of . . . services,
and their dependents.”25 The statute is clear; however, the details of implementation
proved difficult to say the least. The first statute since 1884 to specifically address
dependent and retiree health benefits did not come until 1956. As big business boomed in
post-WWII America, major American firms started offering comprehensive health care
plans for employees and dependents in order to attract quality talent. In accordance with
this trend, the military followed suit as it too sought to attract the best and brightest. The
Dependent Medical Care Act of 1956 was Congress’s initial attempt to close the gap
between the health care benefits available to service members as compared to their
civilian counterparts.26 This act was crucial to deciphering the true costs associated with
military health care since, for the first time, Congress had provided statutory, specific,
funded guidance regarding dependent and retiree health benefits.
Based upon existing Army regulations and customs circa 1956, as well as this
Dependent Medical Care Act, the 1979 Congressional panel was able to establish a
baseline understanding of eligibility for this long-standing, often misunderstood

management issues.” In addition to the military health care system, the DRMS also looked at resource
allocation as part of the budget decision process, weapon system acquisition, logistics, and enlisted military
careers in the AVF.
25
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“promise” in the benefits discourse: 1) Active duty soldiers; 2) The spouse or child of an
active duty member, or a Reservist on 30 day orders; 3) Retirees of the uniformed service
and their living spouse or child, and 4) The survivor(s) of a person who died on active
duty or was a retiree of uniformed service. For purposes of continuity, this group (1
through 4) was collectively referred to as the “beneficiaries.”27
The initial baseline excluded nonmilitary male spouses of servicewomen who
could not prove that they were at least 50 percent dependent on their spouse for support.
Initially, no provision was made for divorce; if a female spouse divorced her male active
duty service member husband, she did not receive any accrued health care benefits,
regardless of how long they were married.28 Also of note, the initial baseline only
included provisions for care at the on-post Military Treatment Facility (MTF) for all
beneficiaries, with uniform members receiving priority and the rest given access to care
on a Space Available (Space-A) basis. Finally, the baseline included off-post, contract
civilian care for uniformed members only on a very limited and needs-specific basis, and
included no such provision for dependents and retirees.
After sifting through thousands of documents, reports, studies, and sworn
testimony, the panel concluded that the only real guarantee ever made to retirees and
dependents was access to care.29 The promise of “free health care for life” was never
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made for any of the beneficiary groups listed above—there was no “broken promise.”30
The fact that the health care benefit was initially structured around access to the MTF
was often the source of the “broken promise” narrative that emerged along with the AVF.
When soldiers and retirees first started taking advantage of the provisions of the 1956 act,
they and their family members received care on post nearly 100 percent of the time. It
was generally not a problem to acquire Space-A appointments in those days. The
perception of a “lifetime access” guarantee to free MTF health care services was not a de
facto guarantee based in federal law; it was instead a de jure proposition based in
practice.31 Senator Floyd V. Hicks, in testimony given just a year after the
implementation of the AVF, commented that “while it may not be legally accurate, all
retirees . . . are absolutely convinced that they were promised as a benefit for serving in
the military until retirement age, medical care at military installations . . . the promises
offered them as inducements to serve are being whittled away.”32
He is correct in stating that many of the aspects of the promise myth were not
grounded in legal accuracy. If anything, they were rooted in long-established Army
custom and the fact that in the late 1950s, the population of actual Army retirees and
dependents was quite small. In a November 1957 report given to conferees at the
American Public Health Association at the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting, Army Major
General Paul I. Robinson, Executive Director of the Army’s Dependents' Medical Care
Program, reported that after a year’s experience with the new 1956 provisions, there were
30
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only 800,000 eligible dependents and retirees from all Services in the program.33 With a
pool of this size, giving everyone who needed health care benefits access to free MTF
services was quite feasible, subject of course to stipulations and coverage categories in
the 1956 legislation. However this was never a guaranteed service. That beneficiaries
could access free MTF coverage was merely a product of demographics, the nature of the
draft, and the fact that many did not stay around for retirement. The nature of the draft
was particularly important because, as discussed, the drafted force consisted of single
males who did not stay long and had few, if any, dependents.
As the list of services, treatment options, and the pool of eligible beneficiaries
grew exponentially over the next two decades, the military health care system was
eventually overwhelmed. The MTF system simply could not keep up with demand. Due
to this proliferation of beneficiaries and services, followed by diminished access to care
on post, beneficiaries in and out of uniform began to perceive an “erosion of benefits”
and a “breaking of faith.”34 In reality, they were stuck in a system that was unable to keep
up with exponential growth.
Beneficiary, Services, and Cost Creep (1956-1986)
After the 1956 baseline was established, the pool of eligible beneficiaries had
grown steadily throughout the 1960s and 70s. By the late 1980s, the pool had ballooned
from the initial 800,000 Major General Robinson had identified to 9 million eligible
beneficiaries!35 Several reasons existed for this remarkable growth. First, as the military
33
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transitioned from a drafted force to a long-service volunteer force, more soldiers made a
career out of the military—a career that typically involved marriage and children as
previously discussed. Adding to this demographic phenomenon was that in general,
people were living longer. Whereas average life expectancy for white males was 61 in
1935 when the old-age insurance program was established, by 1985 that number had
increased to 75 for the male, female, white, and black beneficiaries in the military health
care system.36 The net effect was predictable: more long-term service members, with
more dependents, who became retirees with dependents, and were all living longer,
equaled a drastic increase in the beneficiary pool.
In addition to growth of this nature, the extent of services offered grew as well.
Before Vietnam, the major concern in the military health care system was trauma and
wounds on the battlefield, as well as sickness and disease among the force. Essentially,
surgeons and the medical staff were concerned more about soldiers fighting on the
battlefield, in maneuvers, or bivouacking than with servicing their families’ needs. The
dependent beneficiary mission was a distant secondary mission. With the experience of
Vietnam and the subsequent creation of the AVF, the scope of the health care mission
expanded considerably. For example, the requirements grew to include Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder, drug and alcohol addiction (of both active duty and dependents), family
practices services associated with the married volunteer soldier, unique female health
care services, HIV/AIDS, and other treatment and service options.37
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Ironically, whereas the Army was concerned with soldiers’ underweight condition
and supplying them with cigarettes during WWII, in the post-Vietnam AVF they became
increasingly alarmed with the overweight condition of soldiers as well as the adverse
effects of excessive cigarette smoking. If a soldier was slightly soft upon arrival at basic
training during WWII, a rare occurrence, it was assumed his training experience would
get him in shape. No body weight standard for basic training even existed until 1960 and
no weight standard for retention until 1976.38 However with the AVF, issues of weight
and health were much more important than they were with the WWII conscripts or the
Cold War draftees. As the Army settled in with the AVF, they were deprived of the “use
and discard” options they exercised with draft era soldiers.39 The modern volunteer force
presented a much greater challenge in terms of health and readiness: they required
treatment, longevity, and a quick returned to service in the field.
As the WWII generation grew in maturity and influence, both in Congress and
among the electorate, and as the nation grappled with the political challenges of the
Vietnam War, the door was flung wide open to a much more expansive and inclusive
military health care system. The most dramatic example of this growth is found in the
Military Medical Benefits Amendments of 1966. This act was an extension of the 1956
legislation and brought the entire military health care system under the umbrella of a
program called the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS). After the 1956 legislation, the CHAMPUS legislation represents the next
major step in the growth of the military health care system. As with other issues
regarding the military health benefit, the CHAMPUS program, and its TRICARE follow38
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on, is the subject of much scrutiny, conjecture, confusion, and misunderstanding. One
report described CHAMPUS as a “Rosetta Stone” of complexity. It was intricate in
language and scope, but also offered government administrators who could master the
language a prism that might finally translate the complex military health conundrum into
a workable benefit system:
Much controversy exists regarding the intent of CHAMPUS legislation—whether it is a
supplement to or a substitute for the direct military health care system . . . [finding the truth] seems
akin to the discovery and application of the meaning of the Rosetta Stone. It is presumed that
when the fundamental truths are understood they will be the key to determining the ‘one best way’
40
of administering CHAMPUS.

Despite the confusion, CHAMPUS’s initial mandate is rather basic and can be
discerned through a close reading of the initial legislation. Simply stated, the 1966
CHAMPUS expansion “broadened the authority of the military services to contract with
civilian providers to supplement MTF health care [and] expanded the military health care
benefit both in terms of eligibility and covered services.”41 Though it structurally
recognized the MTF as the basic building block and delivery platform of the military
health care system, the CHAMPUS expansion opened the door for beneficiaries,
including retirees, to access a large network of civilian providers subject to a copay
system. This copay device, designed initially to force beneficiaries to rely on the MTF
and cut costs, eventually became the root of many cost overruns in the program. When
the MTF was no longer able to handle the size of the beneficiary pool, the government
was forced to rely on the contract feature of CHAMPUS and pay for beneficiary care offpost. The copay system emerged as the go-to feature of the CHAMPUS benefit, and was
also the root of the broken promise discourse. Copays and civilian contract care directly
40

Baker, “Supporting Papers: Military Health Care,” 135.

41

Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, “The Evolution of the Military Health Care System,” 17.

210
conflicted with many retirees’ understanding of a free health care promise. However, the
initial legislation clearly states that copays and contract care were organic to the
CHAMPUS benefit from the start; they were “access” features—not “free health care”
features.42
Since 1966, Congress has amended the explanation of services covered by
CHAMPUS on many occasions. These changes have “tended to expand rather than limit
the level of services covered.” Examples of this expansion between 1966 and 1986
include inpatient care for all beneficiary categories, outpatient hospital-based services,
acute care physician services, obstetrics, mental health, diagnostic tests and services,
ambulance services, durable medical equipment such as oxygen therapy, medically
necessary dental care, physical exams, pharmacy benefits, family planning, and elective
reconstructive surgery.43
If the details and nuance regarding coverage, copays, intent, and broken promises
are debated, the fact that CHAMPUS greatly influenced the size and cost of the military
health benefit is not debated. One major study of the military health care program
concluded that the greatest source of expense in the entire history of the military health
program was the extension of CHAMPUS coverage to retirees in 1966. By the 1980s, this
42
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extension in coverage was consuming upwards of two-thirds of the entire CHAMPUS bill
charged to Congress every year.44 In order to further understand the mentalité of
Congressmen as they addressed smoking-related expenses associated with the AVF in the
1980s, a deeper understanding of the nature of this CHAMPUS bill is required.
The CHAMPUS Bill
Congress became painfully aware of CHAMPUS’s immense growth in terms of
size and cost in 1976. The next 25 years saw near constant hearings on Capitol Hill in an
ongoing effort to control spiraling CHAMPUS expenditures and budget requests.45 In
1979, then-Congressman from California and future Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
said retirees were forced onto CHAMPUS due to lack of space in the MTF had a
“tremendous cost” to the taxpayer and the government.46 Other Congressmen lamented
the “very high cost” of the CHAMPUS program; they were largely responding to the
reports showing that the “largest percentage of growth” in Defense-related health care
costs “has occurred in CHAMPUS.”47 Making matters worse, Congressmen realized that
the cause of this proliferation was not just the 1966 CHAMPUS expansion or the growth
of the retirement population in general. In addition to these, it was also the product of an
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expanded AVF and their dependents crowding MTFs after 1973.48 This combined growth
presented Congress and the Army with a difficult, multifaceted problem.
An example of the difficulty military officials faced in controlling CHAMPUS
costs after just a decade with the AVF is found in what military health professionals
described as the “CHAMPUS Opportunity Cost” conundrum.49 Responding to growing
costs, by the mid-1980s Congress had taken responsibility for CHAMPUS away from the
DoD and placed it squarely in the lap of the services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force
(Marines depend on the Navy for their medical services). This move was informed by the
bureaucratic dictum stating that an organization forced to pay for a program with funds
organic to that organization is more likely to control and monitor their program costs. If
the source of funds is external to the organization, like the DoD, organizations tend to
exercise much looser cost control measures. This is known as the OPM concept: other
people’s money.
After Congress implemented these cost control measures, services were forced to
take CHAMPUS cost overruns out of hide. This meant that the Army would have to shift
money from other funding streams or accounting lines to cover unbudgeted cost overruns
associated with dependent and retiree non-MTF medical bills. It was quite possible that
48
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an Army appropriator would have to choose between elements of operational mission
readiness (such as fuel and bullets) and funding CHAMPUS cost overruns. By the mid80s, these out of hide charges had grown so large, the services could no longer simply
shift money or absorb them without seriously affecting mission accomplishment and
combat readiness. With bills from unbudgeted cost overruns running as high as $525
million in some years, Congress grew alarmed at the unfunded liability bills the military
services were presenting in the form of unpaid, unbudgeted CHAMPUS cost overruns.50
This was the nature of the CHAMPUS cost.
However, the CHAMPUS opportunity cost resulted from the blowback. Congress,
weary of these out-of-budget bills, pushed back on the Services and forced them to
develop allocation schemes that gave rise to an opportunity cost mechanism. For
example, the Army’s primary medical mission is the readiness of the active duty soldier,
with the benefits mission running a close second.51 In order to give Army medics and
doctors relevant experience to enhance and enable the primary mission, the Army
Medical Corps needed to move doctors, or deploy them from time to time, to give them
exposure to the field conditions, wounds, and operations tempo they could expect in a
combat zone. However, the benefits of such operational experiences had to be weighed
against the monetary costs in terms of CHAMPUS assignments. If an Army doctor was
not available at the MTF (i.e., he was in the field or training), the CHAMPUS beneficiary
(dependents, retirees, etc.) received care off-post, resulting in a charge to the CHAMPUS
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budget. In the end these enhancement missions associated with combat and medical
readiness were often sacrificed for the secondary mission of beneficiary services in
efforts to avoid CHAMPUS “opportunity costs.” 52
Ironically, retaining good Army doctors in an environment where they were
denied relevant field experience became very difficult. As many doctors left the service
after their mandatory terms, they still drove up the CHAMPUS opportunity cost, as their
absence forced a mountain of CHAMPUS assignments. Many reasoned they would rather
make better money in the civilian sector than as managed care providers in uniform. Thus
the gaping hole at the MTF created the CHAMPUS opportunity cost after all. In addition
to this, by 1979 Congress was forced to enact very expensive measures to keep doctors in
the service through bonus money and other programs. In another bit of irony, Congress
ultimately had to spend money in order to avoid losing money to the potential budget
draining CHAMPUS opportunity cost scenario. One wonders if it was really a wash in
the end.53
The Reality of a Smoking AVF
By the early 1980s, Congress was acutely aware of the mounting bills associated
with AVF health care and the CHAMPUS program. The air was thick with cost-cutting
schemes. This cost-averse, budget-sensitive environment influenced the mindset of
military and government appropriators as they addressed the reality of rising military
health care costs in general, and health-related expenses associated with a cigarette
52

53

Stanley and Blair, Challenges in Military Health Care, 149.

Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military
Compensation Committee, 1-12 (opening statements for the hearings); Stanley and Blair, Challenges in
Military Health Care, 149. The subject of how to recruit and retain high quality doctors was the major
theme of the 1979 hearings regarding the military health care system and the bill then being debated in
committee—H.R. 5195.

215
smoking AVF specifically. The proposition of a cigarette smoking AVF was a
particularly grim reality that made their task all the more daunting. Once legislators
parsed fact from fiction in terms of the baseline health care requirement for military
beneficiaries, reality emerged: this was a large, growing, and expensive pool that was
guaranteed access to a great variety of services and benefits both on- and off-post.54
Additionally, many were aware the typical smoke-and-mirror games involving
slick accounting schemes and bureaucratic efficiencies would not work in this case. The
1978 Finneran Study had informed them the administration of CHAMPUS was as good
as it would ever be; there simply were no administrative fixes, fat-trimming exercises, or
operational maneuvers that could stop the bleeding or yield substantial cost savings. If the
CHAMPUS program was expensive, it was due to a glaring reality: the growth in
throughput and eligible beneficiaries had outpaced Congressional efforts to keep up with
demand.55
As a result, Congress was faced with a bleak proposition: if the health care bill of
the AVF and the retiree force of the mid 1980s appeared unsustainable, how much more
so would they be in the mid-1990s when the first wave of the AVF started to retire? Even
more daunting, they had to consider the fact that if nothing changed, at minimum 52
percent of these future Army retirees would be smokers who spent the majority of their
career smoking cigarettes subsidized by Congress, sold in bulk at half-price or less on
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post, or given to them free of charge in ration packs or at military hospitals.56 If this
beneficiary pool created a $525 million cost overrun during the mid-1980s, how would
the overrun look in the mid-1990s when a massive group of chain smoking military
retirees entered the CHAMPUS system? Leon Panetta saw this conundrum when he said
in 1979 that the retiree population was outgrowing the capabilities of the military health
care system.57 Panetta was soon joined by a cabal of fiscal conservatives concerned about
spiraling costs, and more specifically, a host of costs associated with the problem of a
smoking, soon retiring AVF.
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CHAPTER IX
CAP, JOE, AND THE JESSE HELMS CREW GO TO WAR
If Rome was not built in a day, neither was the soldier-cigarette bond that
produced the AVF starters and chain smokers of such great concern for Carter-Reagan
Era legislators and defense appropriators. The entrenchment of the soldier and the
cigarette occurred over six decades within a military-industrial-political culture that
nursed the manly, rugged, financially lucrative, and politically expedient connection
between soldiering and smoking. The cigarette enterprise’s extended battle to keep
Americans, and by extension soldier-starters, hinged to smoking and the federal
bureaucracy’s efforts to unhinge these bonds eventually came into direct conflict. What
had started as low-level wrangling grew into small scale skirmishes and further escalated:
by the mid-1970s, the battle over cigarettes in America ballooned to full-scale war.
Like all wars, the cigarette wars had battle lines, strategic plans, and battlefield
commanders. The battlefield was the Beltway, the strategic plans were developed by
lobbyists and politicians on both sides of the cigarette debate, and the great commanders
were Casper “Cap” Weinberger, Jesse Helms, and Joe Califano. The story of these great
captains of the cigarette war not only sets up a final discussion of the demise of the
soldier-cigarette bond, it further exposes an American corporatocracy linking highly
placed government and industrial officials with powerful special interests.
When Casper Weinberger stood for nomination as Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) in 1981, he was a veteran infantryman, a cost-cutting budgeter, a seasoned
bureaucrat, a big business “ladle,” and a powerful corporate lawyer all in one.1 All his
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varied experiences informed his leadership of the DoD and the way he approached the
problems associated with chain smoking soldiers during the 1980s. Weinberger
considered himself a soldier’s soldier. Four decades before he assumed the helm at DoD,
Weinberger had finished Harvard Law School and promptly enlisted in the Army as an
infantryman. Later in life, he commented: “The infantry was, in my mind, the most
honorable way to serve, a sentiment which I suppose came particularly from my mother’s
New England heritage and the ethic that only the most difficult, disagreeable path was
morally right and that anything enjoyable must be wrong.2”
Weinberger was proud that he knew the life of the grunt, how to look after the
men under his charge, and that he had served in his generation’s great war. Once when
listening to President Reagan quote from a WWI infantryman’s journal during a speech,
Weinberger said that he “knew again that kinship I always felt for the infantry and the
pride I had served in it so long ago.”3 He knew the distinction of being an infantryman;
however, he also knew the hardships associated with the infantryman’s troglodyte
existence. Reporting to Camp Roberts, California, for basic training during WWII, he,
along with a group of college and graduate degree recruits, were given their first military
assignment: “digging sewers under the main parade ground.” Weinberger commented
that in the mud, muck, and ditches of Camp Roberts, he first learned how vital morale
was to the enlisted man, commenting he “got a good idea of what is important to enlisted
a widely publicized debate between Ted Kennedy and Cap on March 14, 1986, Senator Kennedy gave Cap
the moniker Cap the Ladle: “Are arms buildup and arms control compatible . . . A trillion dollars spent but
nothing done in arms control. We’ve heard of the welfare cheat and now we have the procurement cheat
. . . Cap the Knife has become Cap the Ladle.”
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men and their morale,” knowledge he felt proved “invaluable when I became Secretary of
Defense.”4 As SECDEF, he would find out how important cigarettes were to the morale
of the force and the enterprise’s bottom line.
Weinberger’s life as an infantryman was a valuable and rewarding experience, but
not his life’s work. Instead, he lived a life of service in high-placed positions in and out
of government—not digging slit trenches, directing enfilading fire, or performing the
monotonous duties of an Army staff officer. Though not in the trench, whether serving at
the state, federal, or corporate level, Weinberger was always in the arena. After cutting
his teeth as a lawyer and serving as California’s state finance and budget director,
Weinberger saw his first federal posting when elevated as the Commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1969. According to President Nixon, he wanted
Weinberger “to clean [the FTC] up.”5 When appointed, newspapers reported the “FTC
was buffeted and embattled when President Nixon appointed California’s aggressive and
knowledgeable Cap Weinberger to take charge and straighten things out.”6 What needed
cleaning, and why did the FTC feel “buffeted” by Cap’s arrival? As Weinberger soon
discovered, the cigarette enterprise had much to say about these questions.
At the FTC, Weinberger spent much of his time in direct confrontation with the
enterprise. He found that the “heavy criticism the agency was receiving” was to a great
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degree generated from the propagandists and pundits associated with the cigarette
enterprise. The industry was livid over the FTC’s cigarette warning labels and
interference with Americans’ smoking behaviors.7 FTC interference started in 1964 in
response to the Surgeon General’s Warning, and continued through 1969 with
Congressional and FTC mandated restrictions on cigarette advertising, as well as
mandatory labeling regulations.8 Subsequently, the enterprise proved extremely interested
in and committed to getting the federal government out of the smoking regulation
business.
To some extent, the developing cigarette controversy in the Beltway and the
immense power of the enterprise took Weinberger by surprise. Leaving California, he
commented, “Reporters’ questions in Sacramento showed genuine interest in government
and in establishing facts about a policy.” However, by the time he entered Washington,
DC, he found the questions changed. Questions about general policy turned to “questions
. . . designed to elicit controversy” and were questions “particularly interested in my
views on smoking and tobacco policy.”9 Many on both sides of the smoking issue were
interested in his views on cigarettes and health. During Senate Commerce Committee
confirmation hearings, Weinberger was consistently grilled about his position on
cigarettes. One particular Senator came right to the point, asking Weinberger whether or
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not he would “strive diligently to protect the American people against hazards of
cigarette smoking.” Weinberger responded:
Yes Senator . . . once it is established that there are, for example, health hazards involved in
cigarette smoking . . . it seems to me entirely appropriate that a label that states that be included, as
it is at the present time . . . this is again a simple matter of basically truth in labeling and truth in
advertising. This is the way I feel about it.10

With this statement, Weinberger made one of his earliest official statements
regarding his position on smoking in America. His statement was and should be
interpreted as exposing his core belief that smoking was a habit requiring regulation, to
some degree or another, by the federal government. Considering his controversial stance
on smoking, it was not surprising for Weinberger to discover that some in the media
“appeared to be quite gleeful when I said I did not smoke.”11 The press knew there was a
Beltway bonanza of juicy news in the making when a California-based, non-smoking,
bourgeoisie moderate ran up against the conservative, Southern-based good ol’ boy
tobacco coalition. Given time and enough baiting questions, the stories would practically
write themselves.
Thus, when Cap Weinberger took the reins at the FTC, he became the chief target
of a force relentless in its efforts to undermine the regulatory power of the federal
apparatus in relation to cigarette smoking. The FTC was established in 1914 as the
“capstone of over thirty years of progressive government” during a period which saw the
enactment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890 and the emergence of Progressive Era
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lightning rod Teddy Roosevelt in 1901.12 The enterprise had largely avoided the
meddling hand of the FTC during the Commission’s first 50 years; this string of success
came to an end after the 1964 Surgeon General’s Warning. When the industry and others
interested in rolling back the power of the FTC fought back, they quickly noted the FTC
was historically a waste dump of lawyers, “the little old lady of Pennsylvania Avenue.”13
When Weinberger took over in 1969, the FTC had over 400 lawyers on its payroll who
litigated a mere 23 cases the previous year. The cigarette enterprise used the perception
of waste and unwarranted brass nanny meddling as a rallying cry against Weinberger’s
FTC. For the next two decades, Weinberger was destined to develop intimate familiarity
with this brass nanny rallying cry during subsequent postings at the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and DoD.
To some degree however, Weinberger sympathized with those critical of the FTC.
As a veteran budget cutter from California, where he was instrumental in pushing through
Governor Reagan’s austerity measures, he felt that the FTC budget was a bit bloated. He
recalled, “I fully agreed that our budget was much too big and should be cut.” He added
that this confused many of the Beltway insiders and “caused quite a stir . . . Congress had
never had anyone ask for a budget reduction.”14 Weinberger trimming budgets and asking
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for spending reductions would prove incredibly ironic for a man who, as SECDEF, drove
defense spending to a stratosphere many had never fathomed.15
Further, he felt some of the FTC programs were slightly intrusive or badly
botched. For example, he lamented the Commission had spent “about seven years to
determine whether Listerine really freshened your breath and whether the advertising was
truthful.” Additionally, he poked fun at the FTC directed label “do not wash on one side,
and do not dry clean on the other.”16 However, austere budgets, good breath, and silly
garment labels were one thing; smoking dangers and lung cancer were another.
Throughout his time at the FTC and other postings leading to his appointment as
SECDEF, Weinberger consistently believed the public required warning about potentially
dangerous, unhealthy behaviors so “they could make more informed decisions.”17
As an executive in the federal government, Weinberger strove to place cigarette
production and consumption under the all-seeing eye of big government. Particularly
striking about Weinberger’s odyssey into anti-smoking zealotry was his determination to
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make it an overtly personal odyssey. Regarding the personal nature of this foray,
Weinberger commented:
I personally was convinced of the need to protect the public from the perils of smoking, but my
opinion had been formed long before and was based on much less erudite reasoning. When I was
four years old, I had found a half-smoked, still burning cigar on the street near our home in San
Francisco, and naturally I tried to smoke it as I had seen others do. I still remember how ill it made
me, and I never touched tobacco again. More important, I felt the dangers of smoking were an
important consumer issue.18

Stridently opposed to the enterprise, he took the rather controversial stance that the FTC
should implement and orchestrate all forms of cigarette warning, including advertising
and media, and not just recently approved FTC package labels.19 He wanted to
substantially strengthen warnings on cigarette packs and advertisements to include,
ironically, a frank statement warning consumers about what he felt were scientifically
proven dangers inherent in smoking.20 He also wanted to address the dangers of
secondhand smoke, an issue that was just beginning to rear its head in the 1970s.21
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Regarding these aggressive anti-smoking policies, Weinberger reasoned the
enterprise and associated advertisers had comfortably survived the tranche of labeling
requirements and advertising restrictions that came into effect in the 1960s. As a man
who would grow comfortable navigating the waters between industry and government,
board and bureaucracy, Weinberger felt cigarette production should continue as a very
profitable private venture, albeit with some responsible government oversight. However,
he personally hoped “many American people survive too, thanks to the dangers of
smoking” which the federal government had endeavored to make clear to them. These
comments and policy positions were infuriating to an enterprise increasingly alarmed by
the maverick anti-smoking bureaucrat from the West Coast.22
After a stint at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) where he again
angered Beltway bureaucrats with his penchant for impounding appropriated funds and
trimming budgets to unsustainable levels, President Nixon elevated Weinberger to the
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helm of the HEW.23 From a position with moderate impact on smoking and cigarette
policies at FTC, at HEW Weinberger was placed in the center of the ring. As Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, Weinberger would directly influence everything from
the funding of smoking-related health research, to anti-smoking education initiatives, to a
myriad of health and welfare issues as they pertained to an American population that
included millions of dedicated cigarette smokers.
Consistent with his time at FTC, at HEW Weinberger went out of his way to
highlight his personal aversion to cigarette smoking and the importance of federal
intervention. In a radio interview given during this period, when asked about his desire to
ban high-tar cigarettes, Weinberger responded:
Well, it is a personal suggestion and recommendation that I have made to the Congress [regarding]
the effects of smoking on the nonsmoker who breathes in the smoke . . . We have found . . . that
this is a very major public health hazard and that it has a high toll in illness and premature deaths,
and it’s totally needless and it’s preventable. And we suggested that the—I did—suggested that
the Congress should regulate the levels of the tar and nicotine and these hazardous ingredients that
are in cigarettes.24

When asked if he felt this demand for a ban on high-tar cigarettes would lead to an
across-the-board ban on the manufacture of cigarettes in America, Weinberger responded
that he did not “think that there’s any suggestion of that at this point . . .”25 Words are
important, and the fact that Weinberger had consistently supported a ban on high-tar
cigarettes and was against a total ban of cigarettes, but only “at this point,” were not
23
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words missed by powerful forces in the cigarette enterprise. Indeed they were interpreted
as an existential threat to the entire American cigarette enterprise.
Jesse Helms to the breech!
As tensions mounted between pro and anti-cigarette factions in and out of
government, it was only a matter of time before the key elements of the enterprise’s
strategy to make war on anti-smoking zealots appeared on the floors of Congress.26 As
previously demonstrated, this strategy was tethered to a program of denial, deflection,
smokers’ rights, and doubt. As an end state, the enterprise’s grand plan was oriented on
three mutually supporting outcomes. First, it would position the industry to degrade the
federal government’s ability to legislate against smoking. Second, the plan would allow
the industry to attract new smokers—many of whom were soldiers, and nearly all voters.
Third, it would aid in the retention of committed, experienced smokers (also voters) by
giving them a measure of confidence in their choice to continue enjoying cigarettes.
Influential tobacco state politicians were deeply involved in executing plans associated
with these outcomes. They stood to benefit economically if government efforts to
regulate cigarette smoking were obstructed, and politically if they were seen as guarding
smoker-voter rights.
However before Jesse Helms entered the breech to join the enterprise’s battle
against anti-smoking zealotry, Senator Marlow W. Cook laid a strong foundation,
masterfully employing enterprise strategies in the halls of Congress. Cook was a senator
from Kentucky and a vociferous defender of tobaccoland America. He was also a
distinguished military veteran who entered the United States Navy at 17 and served in the
26
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submarine fleet during WWII. After graduating from the University of Louisville Law
School in 1950, Cook practiced law and worked his way up through the Kentucky State
House of Representatives, eventually winning election to the US Senate as a Republican
in 1968.27 On February 7, 1973, Cook stepped to the podium on the Senate floor and
waged a verbal war against the anti-smoking elements who, in his opinion, were invading
the halls of Congress and the many corridors of the federal government.28 By this date,
Weinberger had already accrued his anti-smoking bona fides during his posts at FTC and
OMB and had made anti-smoking waves during his confirmation hearings for his new
posting at HEW. The occasion for Cook’s tirade was the sixth annual release of HEW’s
report alerting Congress to the health risks associated with smoking. Cook’s timing was
not by chance; he wanted to welcome the incoming HEW secretary with a penchant for
meddling in America’s smoking habits with a shot across the bow.
In a speech replete with martial overtones, Cook began by lamenting that the
nation had recently extracted itself from an unpopular and costly insurgent war in
Southeast Asia, only to find the homeland under attack by elements of the federal
government. This “winter offensive” against the fifty million American citizens who
chose to smoke was, in Cook’s estimation, preceded by a “bombardment” campaign
masquerading itself as “scientific data.” Cook claimed the propaganda and deception
27
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strategies of the Viet Cong were leveraged by the US government in a program to employ
false data and unsupported accusations aimed at social engineering and mind control.
While real soldiers fought in jungles and rice paddies, federal bureaucrats, like
Weinberger, were “entrenched in the dark nooks and crannies of the federal
establishment” cranking out propaganda in their ongoing war against the cigarette
industry. Cook labeled the anti-smoking elements of the HEW office as “closed-minded
crusaders” plotting a sneak attack against smoking in a disgusting war against the
American tobacco farmer. Cook concluded his emotional speech in support of the
cigarette industry and smokers’ rights with a quote from a recent Supreme Court ruling:
“Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.”29
Cook’s oration displayed nearly every aspect of the enterprise’s Roper strategy.
He brilliantly combined the plan’s key tenets as he invoked language regarding rights,
freedom, federal cronyism, questionable scientific data, and patriotic fervor. Cook ended
with a warning to Cap Weinberger: rein in the “smoke fighters” and entrenched
government bureaucrats at the HEW.30 He demanded that Weinberger instead steer the
Department toward fair and objective reporting about the supposed health risks
associated with smoking. Weinberger took office less than a week later on February 12,
1973; however, only time would tell if the new HEW Secretary, and future Defense
Secretary, was listening.
29
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If Weinberger was not listening to Cook, a newly elected senator from North
Carolina was determined to make sure Weinberger paid attention to him. Senator Jesse
Helms appeared in full armor on the Beltway battlefield in 1973. Helms soon thereafter
responded in force at various and sundry times over the next two decades to any threat to
the cigarette enterprise. HEW Secretary Weinberger, with his prolonged, zealous, and in
Helm’s eyes, malicious actions against the cigarette enterprise, was made a key target of
Helm’s counterassault. Hailing from North Carolina, Helms was the first Republican
Senator from that state since the end of Reconstruction. He gained popularity among
North Carolina’s grassroots tobacco community as a radio personality and conservative
editorialist on the Tobacco Radio Network, a conglomeration of AM and FM stations that
served as the conservative voice of rural Carolina.
To say Helms was a staunch supporter of the cigarette enterprise is an
understatement; he was at once foot soldier, field commander, and grand strategist. In
short, Helms was the cigarette industry’s best friend in Congress and Weinberger’s worst
enemy.31 Both Helms and Weinberger, and the interest groups they represented, were
soon engaged in a high-visibility war. Despite the tradition that freshmen Senators were
31
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to be seen and not heard, Helms had quickly joined the fight. Helms lasted only eight
days under this restrictive tradition before he rose to make an impassioned speech in
defense of tobacco price supports.32 By 1975, he had grown in confidence and was a
regular on the Senate floor exuberantly defending enterprise interests. If Cook welcomed
Weinberger to his post at HEW in 1973, Helms delivered Weinberger a parting shot
when Cap left office in August 1975 to return to the corporate arena. Similar to Cook,
Helms took to the Senate floor on the occasion of the HEW’s annual release of their
report to Congress on the dangers of cigarette smoking. In a report “financed by
taxpayers,” Helms declared Casper Weinberger had “done it again,” exposing the rest of
the world to his annual “tizzy” over smoking and providing Congress with unproven,
debatable “science” regarding the supposed dangers of cigarette smoking.
Though much of Helms’ vitriol and rhetoric tracked closely with the key points of
the Roper Proposal, the conservative tobacco state politician tended not to concern
himself with status quo. Helms wanted to take the discourse to an entirely new level.
Rather than continuing with his own words as Cook had done, Helms chose to insert the
words of Tobacco Institute President, close personal friend, and former North Carolina
Congressman Horace Kornegay into the official Senate transcript. If Cook’s words were
a subtle yet stern warning against government interference in the cigarette industry,
Kornegay’s speech, defiantly placed by Helms in the official Senate transcript, was an
outright battle cry.
The words Helms co-opted were originally spoken by Kornegay at the annual
Tobacco Growers Convention in Wilmington, North Carolina, two months earlier on
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June 16, 1975. He conjured up military terms and rhetoric long associated with the Civil
War’s Lost Cause and Dunning Schools of interpretation. 33 He also skillfully capitalized
on the fact that he was speaking at the Blockade Runner Hotel to a crowd of Southern
sympathizers. Seizing the emotion of the moment, and the regionally divided political
environment in America at that time, Kornegay raged against the anti-cigarette forces
amassed in opposition to the industry:
As a son of North Carolina, and a soldier in what can properly be called “The Twenty-Year War
of Anti-Tobacco Aggression,” I feel it is especially fitting to speak to you tonight . . . for it is no
exaggeration to say that our industry is under siege . . . we are sustaining a blockade by an enemy
bound and determined to cut the right of the American people who smoke . . . we are determined
to break that blockade . . . [and] express the pursuit of happiness through the simple pleasure of
smoking tobacco. 34

In referencing the “Twenty Year War,” Kornegay dated the tobacco war to the
release of Ernst Wynder’s definitive 1950 study forcefully linking cigarette smoking with
lung cancer. By referring to the “War of Anti-Tobacco Aggression,” he alluded to the
controversial name for the Civil War more familiar to his audience: The War of Northern
Aggression. By evoking this aggression imagery, Kornegay expressed the sentiments of
many tobacco growers and smokers across the nation, and certainly the South: smoking
was under attack by fanatic, anti-smoking abolitionists.
Bruce Schulman, historian of the “rise of the Sun Belt and the reddening of
America,” describes how, during the 1970s, the South, as well as the Southwest, arose
and became a formidable region in Republican Party politics—a party that was fast
33
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becoming the home of white, former Democrats. No longer the sleepy, backwards South,
politicians and party bosses were forced to look to the Sun Belt if they wanted to gain
electoral office in the Executive Branch. This paradigm shift formed the heart of Nixon’s
Southern Strategy and was instrumental in returning the Republicans to office in 1972.
When Kornegay made this speech pitting Southern “Rednecks” against DC
“abolitionists,” his defiance was not fringe or seen as a voice in the wilderness. Indeed, as
Schulman argues, it was to the contrary: “by the mid-1970s . . . a number of Northern
leaders awoke to this alliance between government action and Sunbelt boosterism and
began worrying about increasing Southern power in national affairs. Their fears were
well founded.”35 In the end, as inflammatory and divisive as Kornegay’s words were, he
knew he was speaking from a position of power, fueled by the will of the people
represented by those in his audience.
Kornegay adhered to the key aspects of the Roper doubt strategy and discussed
the environmental factors that cause poor health. He argued these factors were much
more likely to cause lung cancer than cigarette smoke. He suggested Americans could not
be tricked anymore into blaming cigarettes for poor lung health over more plausible
causes like coal dust, asbestos, chemicals, air pollution, genetics, and even certain dietary
habits. He postulated smoking was an easy target for (Yankee) industrialists who wanted
to divert attention from the real causes of illness. This line of argumentation was soaked
in the Dunning School approach to the New South, an interpretation that placed the
South’s problems squarely in the lap of evil, money-grubbing Northern industrialists.
Kornegay cited supposed government reports showing that death and disease were higher
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in industrial counties, as opposed to suburban counties void of pollution generating
factories. He reasoned that an average person with “eyes, and ears, and brains” could
easily determine it was not tobacco smoke causing illness. Referring to the simmering
debate over secondhand smoke, Kornegay opined that areas drawing their drinking water
from polluted rivers and life-sustaining oxygen from air contaminated by auto emissions
knew better than to blame their health problems on “someone smoking in a restaurant.”36
In this speech, Kornegay introduced yet another aspect of the tobacco industry
defense strategy: taxes. Cigarette industry apologists had long argued the benefits of
tobacco and cigarette sales as a lucrative tax source for federal and state governments. In
the same vein, they also railed against federal government waste represented by what
they saw as excessive kowtowing to the anti-cigarette lobby. Government at all levels
took in over $5.7 billion in tobacco-related tax revenue in 1975 alone. This fact by itself
supported the industry’s assertion that it was a lavish contributor to the federal purse.37
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Additionally, Kornegay took a swipe at federal government waste with his
accusation that American’s hard-earned tax dollars were funding what he considered
phony research and exorbitant anti-smoking conventions. He chastised the HEW for its
sponsorship of the American Cancer Society and other anti-smoking agencies. At
taxpayer expense, Kornegay accused these phony organizations of convening at various
cushy locations to discuss the elimination of every American’s right to enjoy a good
cigarette. A prime example was the World Conference on Smoking and Health, which
had recently gathered at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. Kornegay lamented that
anti-smoking zealots from all over the world were bankrolled by the American taxpayers
in this extravagant conference. His agenda was quite clear: if the government could not
be trusted with tax dollars, how could it be trusted to provide accurate, objective
scientific data regarding the dangers of smoking?
However in the interest of full disclosure, Kornegay failed to mention the $23
million a year the federal government provided in tobacco crop subsidies and price
supports during this period.38 Nor did he mention the $400 million a year the industry
spent on advertising, as opposed to the $1 million the HEW budgeted for direct anticigarette promotions. The $23 million price support figure is particularly ironic
considering the budget for the HEW Office on Smoking Health was exactly $23 million
as well.39 In a story rife with paradoxes, this is one of many: the government was paying
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tobacco farmers $23 million to support prices with one hand and then paying various
HEW sponsored groups $23 million to stop Americans from smoking with the other.40
Helms and Kornegay’s opponents viewed the price support program, a hallmark
of FDR’s New Deal legislative agenda, as an even greater example of irresponsible
federal spending. The issues of price supports and federal government largess in the form
of massive federal farm bill legislation were constant problems for Helms. They allowed
his opponents and anti-smoking groups to paint him as a walking, flame-throwing
contradiction. On one hand, Helms was one of the most vocal and determined opponents
of the federal food stamp program. However, as a Senator from North Carolina and the
Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, Helms was one of the most determined and
vocal proponents of the tobacco support program. Many of his critics felt crop supports
were nothing more than food stamps for tobacco farmers in the form of millions in cash
payments. His position on federal price supports for tobacco also flew in the face of his
staunch belief that “government should stay out of relations between the private
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entrepreneur and the free market.” Additionally, his tobacco policies were at odds with
his position on government waste and the need for conservative fiscal policies.41
In James C. Cobb’s classic work on Southern identity, The Most Southern Place
on Earth, he paints a clear picture of this paradox. Cobb describes the irony of Southern
planter inconsistency: they register “objections to ‘wasteful’ and ‘unnecessary’
antipoverty efforts” and then eagerly accept “huge federal subsidy checks.” Cobb
excoriates Mississippi’s Congressman Whitten, who would play a significant role in the
struggle over cigarette subsidies in the 1980s while he was Chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee. Cobb points out how Whitten bristled at the food stamp
program, arguing that “when you start giving people something for nothing . . . I wonder
if you don’t destroy character more than you might improve nutrition.” However, Cobb
also notes that Whitten “expressed no such concerns . . . about the effects of government
farm payments on the character of their already well-heeled recipients.” Cobb reserves
the final word on this Southern “paradoxical phenomenon” to Walker Percy, who said
that over the span of thirty years, “planters who were going broke on ten cent cotton
41

Furguson, Hard Right, 154–158; “Califano and Smoking,” Kokomo Tribune, January 23, 1978,
accessed January 29, 2015, http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nnhd0045; Michael T.
Craig, “Response to Editor of Kokomo Tribune,” March 3, 1978, accessed January 29, 2015,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/gzc10g00. A Kokomo Tribune article from January 1978 describes
Califano’s aggressive policies against the cigarette industry and expansion of programs and money to fund
anti-smoking education; it criticizes the government for funding anti-smoking on one hand, while at the
same time providing millions in tobacco subsidies to prop up tobacco farmers. This is just one of many
stories emphasizing the contradictory behavior of the Federal Government: increasing funds for antismoking campaigns while at same time subsidizing cigarette sales in commissaries PXs on military bases.
This issue of price supports, allotments, and subsidies is a complex issue; there are no black and white
answers, only shades. Some parts of the farm bill program are simply guaranteed loans; others are cash
advances that are repaid by farmers with interest after he brings his product to market; and others involve
checks sent to farmers to induce them not to place land under the plow. These programs range from good
business practice to sophisticated price manipulation schemes to ag-welfare-largesse. To make things even
more complicated, Califano said that if these programs were not in place, the price of cigarettes would be
even cheaper than they were, encouraging even more people to smoke, “I do not believe that anyone
smokes or doesn't smoke or decides to begin or continue or stops smoking because of the tobacco
subsidy...I think if we didn't have the subsidy...the price (of cigarettes) would go down.”

238
voted for Roosevelt, took federal money, got rich, lived to hate Kennedy and Johnson and
vote for Goldwater–while still taking federal money.”42
In reality, Weinberger, Helms, Whitten, and a majority of the characters
associated with the story of the soldier and the cigarette are paradoxical figures
representing the warp and woof of a modern federal corporatocracy which attempts to
weave together various, oft opposing interests. Weinberger first exemplified this with his
pernicious budget slashing on one hand, only to become a legendary ladle for the defense
and international construction industry on the other. Jesse Helms fell right in line with his
tirades against government assistance on one hand, and his dogged support of tobacco
price supports and allotments on the other. Both present a classic case study in
contradiction. In Smoking and Politics, Fritschler and Hoefler explain the often
“perfidious” behavior of Helms and other tobacco state politicians:
The beneficiaries of the multibillion-dollar tobacco industry work hard to discourage reductions in
the tobacco regulatory programs which benefit the industry, while arguing forcefully against big
government and government intervention in the economy. The only possible explanation for this
perfidious behavior was offered by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina). Reacting to proposals
to eliminate the tobacco program . . . the Senator said, “In North Carolina, tobacco isn’t a
commodity, it’s a religion.”43
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Historian Joseph Ellis, in his biography of Thomas Jefferson, the hero of classic
liberals like Helms and Kornegay, notes contradictory behavior was something the great
Jefferson bequeathed to his nation. Ellis concludes his biography by stating Jefferson was
“America’s Everyman” and that his great gift to America was “an American political
culture . . . based on the capacity to rest comfortably with contradictions.”44 However, as
Kornegay concluded his speech, he called upon Jefferson’s memory as an agrarian
populist and ardent defender of the “pursuits of happiness” as opposed to Jefferson’s
apparent penchant for contradiction. He closed with the standard patriotic plea that surely
jolted the farmers to their feet:
All these scarce government funds to blend foreign zealotry with the domestic variety in a frantic
effort to destroy the product that saved the Jamestown colony . . . that financed the war that freed
us from the British Empire . . . and without which there may have been no reason to have a
Bicentennial, much less celebrate one.45

These strong words contained an interesting Populist reinterpretation of American
history. In essence, Kornegay and Helms argue that America would not exist as a free
nation if it was not for agrarian interests and hardworking tobacco farmers. Americans
are not wrong to appreciate the place of agriculture in the nation’s history; well into the
twentieth century America was still a rural, agricultural nation. However, Kornegay was
on shaky grounds with such straight line, ahistoric logic. These accusations and apparent
contradictions aside, Helms was more than happy to insert Kornegay’s speech into the
official Senate Record in order to reinforce his position regarding the cigarette enterprise.
Their rhetoric forcefully asserted the enterprise argument that federal meddling in an
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American pastime that generated billions of dollars in tax receipts and sustained
thousands of farm families, industry jobs, and subsidiary commerce, was not in the best
interest of the American people.
When Helms yielded his time on the Senate floor that day, August 1, 1975, he
hoped his words traveled further than the wood-paneled halls of Congress.46 He wanted
the entire federal government to notice he was speaking on behalf of millions of
American smokers, of whom large portions were American military personnel. By the
mid-1970s, 54 million Americans were still avid cigarette smokers who generated the
industry $14 billion a year in profits.47 The vast majority of all soldiers then in uniform
were smokers. The industry was still several years from reaching its nadir in terms of
production and sales. Helms and tobaccoland politicians represented a politically active
constituency of smokers that included soldiers, retirees, veterans, and tobaccoland
farmers who would play a major role in the smoking debate. Armed with the power
represented in these, the sublime smokers, and the cash-happy cigarette industry, Helms
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had risen to defend freedom of choice, personal responsibility, freedom of commerce,
and their Jeffersonian rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”48
However, Weinberger seemed to have rained on Helm’s parade. Did Weinberger
not have the last laugh? His last official act at HEW, and his parting shot against Helms,
was, after all, the issuance of the annual report that Helms was so incensed about in the
first place. Yet on the other hand, Weinberger may not have had the last laugh after all.
Before Weinberger had even finished his post-Beltway vacation, Helms and the
enterprise displayed their power over and access to the very top echelons of the federal
government. When President Ford discovered Weinberger’s anti-smoking swan song, he
quickly jotted a personal note to Helms regarding the personal nature of Weinberger’s
comments:
As you know, Secretary Weinberger sent to Congress the 1975 Annual Report on the Health
Consequences of Smoking which recommended legislation to provide authority to set maximum
permissible levels of hazardous ingredients in cigarettes. As the Secretary has indicated, the views
expressed in the transmittal letter are his own. They are not intended to represent the
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Administration's views on federal regulation of cigarettes. The Administration has not proposed
legislation on this subject.49

With these words, President Ford essentially threw Secretary Weinberger, and the
entire anti-smoking establishment, under the bus and reset the clock back to the status
quo situation that had welcomed Weinberger to the HEW in 1973.50 The letter also
displayed another stark reality: a first-term Senator with only two years’ experience
commands much respect when he is backed by the powerful, enormously wealthy
cigarette enterprise. When Weinberger did finish his vacation, he reported to San
Francisco where he had been lavishly recruited as legal counsel and Vice President of
Bechtel Corporation. He was more than happy to leave behind Helms and the imbroglio
that saw Nixon fall and Ford ascend. If he only knew the future, he might not have
written off the vexatious Helms or the problems of the Republican Party so quickly.
Weinberger was subsequently replaced at HEW by President Ford’s man, Forrest
David Matthews. When Ford lost the election to Jimmy Carter in 1976, Carter called on
long time Democratic operative and LBJ Great Society man Joseph Califano to serve as
the new HEW chief. Califano, like Weinberger, was a seasoned bureaucrat with extensive
experience in Beltway politics, big business, and high-powered DC legal firms, who also
49
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had an anti-smoking pedigree. Like Weinberger, he quickly came under the wrath of
Helms. However, as opposed to Weinberger, Califano had been an avid smoker for most
of his adult life. Like many before and after, Califano was challenged to set aside his
many connections with big business and his personal vices as he pursued his public duties
at HEW.
When Joseph Califano was sworn in as the twelfth Secretary of the HEW in
January 1977, he brought with him extensive experience as a Democratic Party operative,
federal executive, Defense Department insider, and Beltway lawyer. Helms and the
Southern Conservatives had grave concerns about his liberal policies and what they felt
was a dangerous fascination with social welfare; after all, he was the architect and
executor of LBJ’s Great Society. However, even more disconcerting to them was
Califano’s comfort with the anti-smoking agenda and his apparent desire to expand
federal regulatory powers. If his smoking habit and background as a big-business
Beltway lawyer (a vice and an occupation many in the enterprise were personally familiar
with) made some cautiously optimistic, by the middle of his stay at HEW the enterprise
had abandoned any veiled optimism, instead digging in for another round of trench
warfare.
In Califano, an anti-enterprise HEW chief with extensive connections in big
business and big money who was himself struggling to quit smoking, one finds yet
another paradoxical character in the tale of the soldier and the cigarette. Like Weinberger,
Califano was a Harvard Law School graduate that donned the uniform immediately after
graduation. He was exempted from the Korean War due to his status as a student but was
eligible for the draft in 1955. Like many young American men in this predicament, he
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chose to control his own destiny and signed up for Navy Officer Candidate School
(OCS). After a May graduation from Harvard, he took and passed the New York State
Bar exam on July 1, was married on July 4, and left for Navy Officers Candidate School
on July 11, 1955. For a man of Califano’s energy and drive, this was all in a week’s
work. Offering evidence of his future talent as a litigator, his most notable experience
during his time in uniform was suing the Navy. Using hair splitting legal maneuvering,
Califano received credit for his time in law school as part of his military service. He was
subsequently granted remedy through a step in rank and an award of $1,700. It is ironic
that Califano, one who would make a career out of either serving as a federal bureaucrat
or as a lawyer representing clients who thrived on federal largesse, started his
professional career by bringing suit against the federal government.51
After honorably separating from the service, Califano eventually joined Secretary
Robert McNamara’s Whiz Kids at the Pentagon. His most notable achievement in
McNamara’s inner circle was his work to secure legal support to justify McNamara’s
program of expanding DoD powers over the armed services.52 After success in the
highest levels of the Pentagon bureaucracy, his talents were recognized and rewarded
when he was hand-picked by President Johnson as his Domestic Policy Advisor.
Essentially, Califano became Johnson’s Great Society ramrod. Not only was he tasked
with crafting social welfare legislation, he had to find ways to ensure said legislation
passed in Congress.53
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It was in this capacity that Califano first came in contact with tobaccoland
politicians, the power of the enterprise, and the electoral and political perils of any antismoking agenda. During the 1966 midterm elections, President Johnson was furious that
key Southern states had reacted to his Great Society anti-segregation and shared-wealth
programs by electing anti-administration Republicans.54 He subsequently called a
meeting of Southern governors at his ranch in Texas. When recalling this meeting,
Califano said Johnson was extremely aggravated that these men thought they could come
into his ranch fomenting rhetoric laced with “Niggah! Niggah! Niggah!” especially
considering the pork-barrel politics Johnson had leveraged to prop up the solid South.55
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He felt these men and their constituents had turned their back on him, which in effect is
exactly what they had done.56
In an attempt to focus the President on his domestic policy agenda for the coming
legislative season, Califano, possibly underestimating the immense power of the
enterprise, suggested that the President confront the Southern caucus and speak to them
about FTC cigarette labeling initiatives. As it turns out, this was the last thing Johnson
wanted to do considering the situation. Califano reasoned that in response to the 1964
Surgeon General’s report on smoking, the President should focus on labeling as a key
domestic policy initiative during the second half of his term. He expected the President
would see the wisdom of a labeling regimen as Johnson had suffered a near fatal heart
attack and was forced to quit smoking under doctor’s orders in 1955, a feat Califano
himself struggled to achieve. Johnson, aware of Califano’s four-pack-a-day habit, told
him that he would send his bill to Congress when Califano quit. Johnson knew Califano
could never quit, especially considering the pressure he was under as his domestic policy
advisor, so he was comfortable making such a wager.
In a frankness for which Johnson is legendary, he also told Califano that he’d
rather have his “pecker cut off” than completely quit smoking, adding that he would
resume smoking the day he left the White House.57 This (resuming smoking) was a
promise he fulfilled aboard Air Force One on January 20, 1969, on his way to retirement
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at his Texas ranch.58 Personal addictions aside, Johnson quickly dispatched with
Califano’s anti-smoking policy agenda and reoriented him on the true issue at hand.
Johnson said these “Niggah” shouting governors of the South proved once again the
administration was “at war with the old Confederacy over desegregation,” and since he
was determined to move aggressively on civil rights, “he would not further alienate
Senators and Representatives from states like Virginia, North Carolina, and Kentucky”
with anti-smoking rhetoric or policies. Further, and most telling, Johnson did not want to
risk “driving all the tobacco money to the side of the segregationists and against civil
rights.”
The power of the enterprise and tobacco money, as already demonstrated, was a
major factor for which politicians and anti-smoking activists would have to account
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Recognizing the nature of this ongoing battle, Johnson concluded that “the public battle against smoking was for another
president and another day.” Califano had “no idea that a decade later” it would become
his battle.59
However before Califano could go head to head with the enterprise under another
president on another day, his career directed him down other paths. Similar to
Weinberger, Califano moved freely in and out of federal service. After his time as
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domestic policy advisor to Johnson, Califano was recruited to work for the powerful
Washington law firm of Arnold and Porter. Unable to completely leave politics behind,
Califano was happy when he was retained as the General Counsel to the Democratic
National Committee. Further demonstrating that enterprise executives like Horace
Kornegay and other former government appointed and elected officials were not the only
ones that could represent powerful industrial interests (e.g., big tobacco), Califano as well
became known for his talents in the realm of industrial-government relations, also known
as lobbying. Califano said that despite his intentions to devote his time to litigating after
leaving the federal government, he “soon learned that corporate clients were more
interested in my ability to negotiate the treacherous rapids of Capitol Hill than in my
largely untested courtroom talents.”60
This pattern, right or wrong, is very often the way of the modern federal
corporatocracy. Officials, whether Kornegay, Califano, or Weinberger, generally leave
federal service for lucrative jobs utilizing their extensive contacts and perks to attract
government business, or as in the case of the enterprise, thwart government oversight.
Califano’s post-federal government career included, among other ventures, work for the
large pharmaceutical firm Hoffman-La Roche in the highly profitable business of
marketing anti-anxiety drugs, to work advising manufacturing interests including the
Chrysler Corporation, to lobbying for the oil industry.61 These big-business endeavors
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and the work he performed for industry giants required strong inside rapport with key
government oversight agencies and congressional appropriators—rapport Califano had
and rapport many were willing to pay for.
However, the grittiness of lobbying for big business and the plutocratic nature of
such endeavors soon began to wear on Califano. Though he was lavishly compensated
and “enjoy[ed] the excitement and rewards of being a Washington lawyer . . . prowling
the corridors of power,” he said the “pressures to use skills honed in public service to
lobby for private interests—and the need to bend my personal views to a large
partnership” combined to encourage a return to federal service.62 That opportunity soon
came when Democrats took back the office of President and newly-elected Jimmy Carter
nominated Califano as his Secretary of the HEW. It had been almost exactly ten years to
the day since Johnson had predicted that the cigarette fight was for another president and
another day. The President was Carter, the ramrod was Califano, and the day had indeed
arrived.
The Washington Post was quick to point out that Califano “will now have to run
programs that he had much to do with creating when he was President Lyndon Johnson’s
top man for domestic affairs.”63 As it was during his time with Johnson a decade earlier,
the programs and issues involving federal regulation of the cigarette enterprise continued
Hoffman wrote a piece critical of Califano’s lucrative connections with the energy sector while Califano
was a powerful Beltway lawyer after leaving the Johnson Administration. “His most successful coup as a
cute-deal cutter was in 1975 when he played Pal Joey to an informal consortium of oil companies and, by
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as contentious and hotly debated aspects of Califano’s time at HEW where smoking
policy and other health issues were foremost on his slate. If there was irony in Califano’s
mandate to implement many of the programs he had created a decade earlier, the
enterprise was alas denied the irony of an active chain smoking HEW chief. What it
acquired was a recovering chain smoker.
After years of dealing with stress in and out of federal service through a
vociferous habit of nicotine relief, Califano had finally quit smoking just one year prior to
his installation at HEW. On October 27, 1975, upon the request of his 11-year-old son
who wanted him to quit as a birthday present, Califano had smoked his last cigarette.64
Though he said he didn’t think much about kicking the habit at the time, if he thought he
had seen the last of the cigarette, either personally or professionally, he found he was
greatly mistaken. The cigarette issue would come to define his time as HEW Chief. If
Califano was Johnson’s Great Society ramrod, he became known to the enterprise as
Carter’s Great Smoke-Out ramrod. Yet it remained to be seen if Carter, who hailed from
the tobacco and peanut country in the plains of Georgia, and Califano, with his
background in corporate capitalism, could hold fast against the powerful cigarette
enterprise.
Califano did not waste any time in going after the enterprise once installed at
HEW. Based on HEW survey data which revealed “virtually every addicted adult smoker
first lit up and was hooked as a teen, well before reaching the age of twenty-one, and that
most had tried to quit in the last year,” Califano announced his multi-million dollar anti-
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cigarette campaign in January 1978.65 He even initiated plans to install an additional tax
on cigarettes to encourage smokers to stop smoking, a practice that became the standard
in many states. He enraged Helms and the enterprise by calling cigarettes “America’s
most important public health enemy” and “public health enemy No. 1.” Helms responded
by calling Califano and his smoking program “absurd.” He described Califano as a
“bureaucratic monster” and called for him to resign.66
Helms’ war against Califano was by no means a small affair. He was joined by a
host of Congressional colleagues, grassroots tobaccoland constituents, cigarette state
legislatures, and enterprise executives. RJR Chief Executive Officer William D. Hobbs
compared Califano to an out-of-control carnival ringmaster playing to the emotions of
those in the cheap bleacher seats—the media in this case.67 Thousands of Southerners
affixed “Califano is dangerous for your health” bumper stickers to their vehicles. The
Kentucky State Legislature called for Califano’s impeachment. Leveraging the discourse
of the Iranian crisis, a situation that would eventually lead to the Iran hostage crisis, the
enterprise dubbed Califano “Ayatollah Califano.” One journalist even dubbed him
“Smokey Joe Califano: The Political Hustler as Imperial Secretary.”68
On the electoral front, the enterprise warned Carter that he could not win any
tobacco states in 1980 if he did not control his HEW chief; embarrassing the South on
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racial issues was one thing, crushing its cigarette economy was another. In one of the
more dramatic episodes of this story, powerful Massachusetts Congressman and Speaker
of the House Tip O’Neal warned Califano that if he did not back down, the industry was
“capable of hiring a hit man to kill” him. Besides Califano’s life being in danger, the
ambitious Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy also pointed out what the enterprise
already knew—Califano’s anti-smoking campaign was going to destroy Carter’s chances
for reelection.69
Carter eventually caved. Under pressure from Southerners, Conservatives,
tobaccoland politicians, and voters unhappy with the ailing Carter Administration, Carter
relieved Califano of his duties at HEW in July 1979. The entire event was quickly passed
off by Carter aides and staffers as the proverbial “someone had to go” scenario, and not
much more was said. Califano felt that in respect to his anti-smoking campaign, he was
muzzled by Carter’s “politically driven staffers . . . who tried to stop [him] from acting.”
With this in mind, Califano speculated that he had brought his firing upon himself
because of his stance on issues like smoking—issues that did not sit well with the
tobaccoland powers that had put Carter in office. Though he could not substantiate it at
the time, Califano was sure that his speaking out on issues like his anti-smoking
campaign ensured he would not be around for “the final 18 months of [Carter’s] term.”70
However, years later Carter had the final say on the whole affair. The next time Califano
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saw Carter over a decade later at a dinner gala, Carter pulled Califano aside, shook his
hand, and said “Joe, about smoking. You were right and I was wrong.”71
Califano left his job at HEW with a profound and tragic appreciation of “the
growing power of special interests” and a thorough understanding of “how locked into
special interests the Democratic congressmen and Democratic Party were.” He further
said he was “disturbed by the power of special interests, especially those with big
political bucks . . . who exact undue control over congressional committees and
subcommittees.”72 Chief among these was the cigarette enterprise, a special interest that
would play an even more direct role in the soldier-cigarette debate in the following
decade as it struggled against DoD and Congressional efforts to curb smoking among the
enterprise’s most loyal source for starters.
Jesse Helms was the face of the cigarette juggernaut. After just six years in
Congress, Helms had made a blistering impression. Senator Alan Cranston from
California said Helms’s war against anti-smoking federal bureaucrats during this period
was so vitriolic that there was a “meanness in the Senate now that I don’t think has been
seen since the days of Joe McCarthy.”73 If Red Scare communism was the issue fueling
McCarthy’s great terror, the debate over cigarettes and federal oversight were the issues
fueling Helms’s.
At this point, the Weinberger-Califano-Helms cigarette war spilled over into the
1980s. The battle had become a back-and-forth affair; both sides had taken ground and
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then lost it, retreating back to their respective trench lines. Weinberger had made waves
at the FTC and the HEW, and then had retreated and left in disgust. Califano came to
power and implemented the most aggressive federal anti-smoking program to date, only
to be fired in disgrace by a president weary of the electoral power of the tobaccoland and
the enterprise. It seemed Helms held the field as the decade of the 70s ended. However,
Weinberger and Califano would soon return to the field of battle, and the soldier-cigarette
relationship, mounting health care costs, and the cost of a chain-smoking AVF would
finally motivate powerful anti-smoking fiscal conservatives and concerned DoD officials
to action.
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CHAPTER X
THE CIGARETTE SNOWBALL
If Leon Panetta and other fiscally conservative legislators were concerned about
skyrocketing health care costs in America, a great source of that concern stemmed from
the smoking habits of the 1980s era active duty and retired military forces. After multiple
panels, Congressional investigators and military health care teams published their results
and the facts became quite clear: the mixture of soldiering, smoking, and subsidized
cigarettes were not policy positions, nor habits, conducive to the health of the soldier or
the defense medical budget. Congress had bought and paid for an AVF. To ensure its
success, soldiers required higher pay and increased benefits in an effort to motivate them
to career-length service. The majority of soldiers, dependents, and retirees were smokers
and together created a tobacco-stained health care snowball growing to epic proportions.
Yet a solution remained unclear for this massive unfunded liability. However, by the
mid-1980s, a powerful anti-smoking lobby emerged. As much as the enterprise said about
smoking and freedom, this resurgent anti-smoking lobby matched it at every turn. And
when it did, this lobby had much to declare regarding the solution to the fiscal liabilities
inherent in a career-oriented volunteer force hooked on smoking cheap, governmentsubsidized cigarettes.
The year 1980 was the apex of American cigarette consumption. In that year
alone, Americans consumed a record-breaking 632 billion cigarettes.1 The men and
women in uniform were doing their part to contribute to this smoking record. In terms of
demographics, the data is revealing. Researchers reported that during this period, 52.2
percent of uniformed personnel under age 20 smoked compared to 21.2 percent of high
1
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school seniors.2 In the Army, 63 percent of non-commissioned officers smoked, and 57
percent of junior enlisted soldiers were avid smokers.3 The polling data proved out the
veracity of the old cultural symbol: soldiers were, and continued as, Marlboro Men, and
women now, in green.
The number of cigarettes soldiers bought at subsidized prices in the early 1980s
matched this level of smoking found in the demographic polling data. In 1982 uniformed
service personnel, retirees, and dependents purchased “127 million cartons of cigarettes
costing $572 million from military commissaries, post exchanges, and clubs.”4 Not
including cartons purchased off-base, these figures equate to 25.4 billion cigarettes
purchased in the singular year 1982 on military instillations and presumably smoked.
Comprising ten percent of all purchases at military commissaries and exchanges, these
consumption levels represented a significant sales figure for the military resale system. In
addition to sales volume, these purchases also denote a noteworthy investment of
discretionary income by service members and retirees. With such a substantial
investment, these soldier-smokers were understandably attracted to the boon of on-base
cigarette purchases. In addition to the convenience, the government subsidies allowed
them to save as much as 76 percent off per carton when compared to off-base prices.5
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However, to fully grasp the high number of soldier-smokers for whom the
government was responsible for health care during this period, one must also account for
the number of military retirees who smoked. Given those in the retirement system in the
1980s entered military service during the 1950s and 60s when a majority of adult males
in America smoked, finding that these retirees smoked was unsurprising. A team of
researchers conducting surveys at VA clinics reported at the Denver, Colorado, clinic the
smoking rate among veterans in 1986 was 64 percent. Their research also showed that
smoking prevalence among inpatient veterans was twice that of the American population
as a whole. 6
Another similar study of the VA clinic in New Orleans from 1974 to 1978 found
that 70 percent of veteran inpatients were smokers. The results of one 26-year study
found that smoking-related malignant lung cancers were the most common malignancy
among veterans during the period after 1970. This mountain of data allowed the
researchers to conclude the “high prevalence of smoking among veterans places a large
disease burden on the VA health system.”7 The majority of these smokers were on fixed
incomes, and they enjoyed cheap cigarettes available through the military resale system.
In reality they relied on these subsidized cigarettes as a function of monthly budget
planning and allocation of their scarce resources.8
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All of these statistics, whether quantity of cigarettes purchased through the
military resale system or percentages of active and retired members who were avid
smokers, only have meaning when connected to costs. In this case, the old adage proves
correct: money talks. In 1985, the Coalition on Smoking or Health made it clear to
Congress their position that “smoking prevalence data and reports from medical
personnel indicate that the costs [of soldier-smokers] are substantial.”9 Indeed it was hard
for anyone to miss their message regarding smoking, soldiering, and health—they
announced their campaign from Capitol Hill with 1984 American League MVP and
future Baseball Hall of Fame member Cal Ripken as their guest speaker!
When the DoD eventually released the Report on Smoking and Health in the
Military in 1986, the financial impact of Americans’ consumption of cigarettes on health
care costs were described as much more than just substantial. The report estimated the
financial impact of smoking-related diseases in America was $20.3 billion in 1975 and
$42.2 billion in 1980. The report also cited data showing smokers cost employers
between $400 and $800 in “excess cost” when compared to non-smoking employees, and
that these same smokers had “33 percent to 45 percent excess absenteeism compared to
their nonsmoking counterparts.”10
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The facts and data presented in this report made their way into speeches presented
in Congress from legislators angry over the high costs associated with military smokers.
Though the report estimated the bill for military smoking was $209.9 million, a number
that had already made its way to the floor of Congress, an Army Times writer reported
that one doctor saw the figure as much higher: closer to $2 billion in 1984 alone! If this
number was correct, then it represented a substantial part of the overall $7.5 billion
defense medical budget in 1985. This same reporter also relayed that the VA estimated it
paid $180 million a year to 42,000 veterans with smoking-related illness.11
This expensive, smoke-filled room was the venue Casper Weinberger and Joe
Califano chose for their reappearance in the cigarette war. With careers spanning three
decades, Weinberger and Califano proved they were comfortable challenging the
cigarette enterprise, as well as moving in and out of various bureaucratic assignments in
defense, health and welfare, budgeting, and domestic policy.12 They also spent
considerable time in powerful firms representing everything from oil barons to mega
military-industrial contractors to powerful pharmaceuticals. From their first days as
public servants, both were outspoken in their criticism of and activism against cigarette
smoking. Their powerful blend of executive experience in the federal government as well
as their skills as cunning litigators, corporate counselors, and anti-smoking activists,
11
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made them formidable foes for powerful tobaccoland boosters like Jesse Helms,
Congressman Dan Daniel from Virginia, and a host of other tobacco state politicians.
In the early 1980s, Weinberger and Califano emerged as the de facto faces of the
federal government’s efforts to curb smoking in America. They were soon joined by a
group of anti-smoking executives and elected officials including Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop and United States Senators including Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), David Boren
(D-Oklahoma), and Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico).13 Together, these captains of the
cigarette war, along with a throng of characters from the DoD and other federal agencies,
were an interesting mix of corporate-bureaucrats, capitalists, lobbyists, government
executives, and legislators locked in a struggle over the most successful, highlyengineered consumer product ever. Within the framework of modern economic
arrangements, these groups blended issues of conscience, commerce, and personal
freedom, with the needs of big business, taxpayers, industry, and the military-industrial
complex. It was within this framework that the soldier and cigarette bond met its final
demise in 1986.
In retrospect, however, the demise in 1986 can be traced back to two seemingly
random events in 1981. In 1981, both Weinberger and Califano, in a strange twist of fate,
found themselves back in a familiar place: the forefront of the cigarette war. Weinberger
returned to federal service as Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, and Califano, having left
government work, emerged in Lee Iacocca’s Chrysler boardroom. When they entered
their respective posts in the war room and the boardroom, these two powerful bureaucrats
struggled to hold fast against a cigarette enterprise which had grown to hate them.
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Weinberger’s Senate confirmation as candidate for Secretary of Defense in January 1981
and Califano’s interview and appointment to Iacocca’s Chrysler board as chief health
care expert in June 1981 together were key events in the unfolding saga. Their actions at
these posts proved instrumental in guiding the government’s case for decreasing, if not
eliminating, smoking rates among soldiers, and once again, placed them on a trajectory
for conflict with the cigarette enterprise.
SECDEF Confirmation Hearings
Students of United States diplomatic and political history will readily recall the
strange events of Weinberger’s 1981 Senate confirmation hearing. President Reagan
recently won a national election in a landslide against Democratic opponent Jimmy
Carter. The Reagan Revolution was in full swing, and the Republicans were recipients of
a clear mandate: bring America back! With this groundswell of support and a powerful
mandate, President-elect Reagan began forming a cabinet. For Secretary of Defense, he
nominated his old California friend and fellow conservative Republican Casper
Weinberger. As stated, Cap was a seasoned executive with extensive experience in Belt
Way bureaucratics, big business, and budgeting. He appeared the right man for the job,
and nearly all agreed, except two Senators from the tobacco state of North Carolina.
When Weinberger came before the Senate for full confirmation, many were struck
by the fact he only received two nay votes in his 97-2 confirmation, and these were from
conservative members of his own party: North Carolina Senators Jesse Helms and John
Porter East. In the aftermath, Helms’s and East’s rationale (which Weinberger believed)
was that he “would not sufficiently pursue a hard line against the USSR and would not
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spend enough on defense.”14 However, considering Weinberger’s high profile history
with the tobacco enterprise, these statements require closer scrutiny.
Regarding Weinberger’s rejection by the entire North Carolina Senate delegation,
several points are in order. As Weinberger stood for confirmation, he had a proven track
record as one simultaneously committed to national defense, reducing cigarette
consumption in America, and controlling exploding health care costs. First, and most
relevant to his confirmation as Secretary of Defense, he had a strong, proven, verifiable
reputation supporting national defense and defense spending going back to OMB days.
At a speech he made to the conservative American Enterprise Institute as budget director
under Nixon in October 1972, he said, “if our defense budget is inadequate, nothing else
will be of much moment, and we will only know when it is too late.”15 In this speech, he
also said:
The sad fact is that there are still many points of contention between nations of the world. Many
governments, including particularly the Soviet Union and China, maintain large and increasingly
effective forces which they have shown a willingness to use when the occasion suits. For the
foreseeable future, I do not anticipate the world situation or human nature changing so radically
that we could plan on substantially reduced force structure.16
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Regarding the cost of funding a volunteer Army, his personal experience as
budget director made him more than adequately aware of the fact the AVF was
exceedingly expensive, yet absolutely required. Regarding the expense of the AVF, he
was faced with the conundrum of overcoming inflation while simultaneously increasing
military wages to meet the needs of the volunteer Army. The calculus he was forced to
apply ended up consuming the entire peace dividend from the Vietnam War drawdown.17
With so much spent on combating inflation and dramatic expansion of military benefits,
it was only a matter of time, and only logical according to many, that post-war budgets
would see some reductions in certain defense programs and new weapon systems.
However as a whole, defense spending expanded after a major war for the first time in
American history.18
Further, regarding the expense of the AVF, Weinberger recalls that he was
opposed to going back to the draft, and that “the crucial element in this recovery of
strength was our people . . . our most urgent task would be to address the needs of our
uniformed men and women and to improve morale, thereby strengthening the volunteer
system, which was failing badly.” He was also practical and realized that many elected
officials, including Jesse Helms, would recoil when confronted with the levels of
spending required to field a strong national defense capable of deterring the Soviet Union
in 1981. Weinberger said, “dealing with Congress was, unfortunately, often
contentious—especially because having a credible deterrent and the capability of
17
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defending American interests around the world is expensive, and military spending in a
democracy is never popular.”19
If Helms and East were casting their votes against Weinberger because they
thought he would be a miserly, weak spendthrift in regard to the Soviet Union and its
brand of communism, it proved one of the most incorrect assertions in modern American
history. A boon to the military-industrial complex, Weinberger was famous for his
declaration that cost would not be a consideration in his plans for a defense build-up. He
saw cost aversion as akin to a form of moral weakness. To be an effective military
commander or planner under his leadership, Weinberger required dispatching with both
thrift and timidity. He felt fears over cost or sticker shock would corrupt the “military
judgment of the effectiveness of the armed forces,” according to Weinberger scholar
Robert Howard Wieland.20
With this budget-busting determinism, Weinberger subsequently presided over
the most prolific peacetime military build-up in American history.21 From the very start,
budget planning for FY 82 involved dramatic increases in spending. Outgoing Secretary
of Defense Harold Brown had already expanded defense spending for 1982 by $26.4
billion during his last five days in office. Weinberger then requested an additional $32.6
billion on top of Brown’s submission. Ultimately, Weinberger requested and received a
colossal $237.3 billion defense budget for 1982, with only a billion cut away by a cost-
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conscious Congress. By 1985 the defense budget had exploded to a figure incredible for
its time: $297 billion.22
Weinberger, in another story rife with irony, was himself faced with a Congress
that eventually proved happy to engage in his old budget trick: impounding of
appropriated funds. Some on Capitol Hill balked at what they felt was an egregious price
tag to bring America back. These fiscal conservatives came under the ire of Weinberger
and other defense hawks. The Washington Post was swift to cover this paradoxical story,
noting how Weinberger the impounder from OMB days played the hypocrite by telling a
Congress determined to cut off the spigot to “forget about the overall ceiling and pump
out the money the Pentagon wants.” He was lampooned by the post for urging them to
“ignore the ceiling and avoid any reductions in Reagan’s defense hike.”23 This had no
effect on Weinberger, and during his first five years at the helm of the Pentagon’s
unprecedented military build-up, he presided over a 12 percent increase in military
budgets that translated to an astounding $1.46 trillion in defense spending. David
Stockman, Reagan’s OMB director and Weinberger’s successor by a decade, commented
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that these numbers left the military-industrial complex “squealing with delight.”24 If the
complex was squealing with delight, the cigarette enterprise would soon howl in pain as a
result of Weinberger’s forthcoming measures to staunch the smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em
culture in the military.
Thus, here lay the real reason why Senators Helms and East cast their lone,
dissenting votes against Casper Weinberger. It was not for any real or perceived fear that
Weinberger would be a miser-like weakling on Communism. Their dissenting votes were
informed by their tortured awareness of his background in opposition to the cigarette
enterprise. Further, they knew he would be an activist for the anti-smoking agenda,
committed to controlling spiraling military health care costs, and a proponent of
preventative health care measures. These were all policy positions the enterprise knew
threatened its continued existence, much less profitability. Marlow Cook had given HEW
Secretary Weinberger the opening shot in 1973, with Helms delivering what he thought
was the coup de grâce in 1975. However, Weinberger was before them once again. To
the two hardcore tobacco men from North Carolina, a shot across the bow seemed an
appropriate way to welcome their old foe back to the cigarette war.
Califano Arrives in a Chrysler
After his abrupt firing as Carter’s HEW chief, largely as a result of his
controversial opposition to the cigarette enterprise, Califano was once again a hot
commodity and he quickly offered his services to corporate America. Before long, one of
this period’s most bold corporate executives called: Lido Anthony Iacocca. Lee Iacocca
was a career man at Ford, known for leading the rollout of the ever-popular Mustang line
of cars. Over a career spanning 32 years, he worked his way to the top of the company
24
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and had arrived as President of the Ford Motor Company in 1978. However, ironically,
nearly a year to the day before Califano was fired by Carter, Iacocca was fired by Henry
Ford II, on July 13, 1978, after years of infighting with the obstinate patriarch of the Ford
family.25 Ford’s reasons for firing Iacocca were just as murky as Carter’s for firing
Califano. The only explanation Ford gave was that “sometimes you just don’t like
someone.”26 Within a year, Iacocca was snapped up by the ailing, nearly bankrupt
Chrysler Corporation, who named him their president in 1979.
As soon as Iacocca took over, he faced seemingly insurmountable problems
involving debt, pathetic sales informed by equally pathetic automobile products, and
daunting labor problems. In Iacocca’s eyes, all were dangerous, and failure in any one
area would lead to the end of the Chrysler Corporation. Regarding the third problem,
labor, Iacocca identified skyrocketing health care costs as an issue that would drive
Chrysler to insolvency if not contained. He described the health care situation in his
company, and in America, as a “mess” for which he and other industry executives were
responsible.27 He lamented that auto industry executives were getting “killed” because of
the dreadful mistake of promising “cradle to grave” medical and fringe benefits.28
According to Iacocca, Blue Cross and Blue Shield was “billing us more than our
suppliers of steel and rubber.” Further, “Chrysler, Ford, and GM were paying $3 billion a
year just for hospital, medical, surgical, and dental, plus all pharmaceutical bills.” Iacocca
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explained that at Chrysler, these benefits cost the company “$600 million or about $600
per car” for a grand total of about “$1 million a day.” When Chrysler was finally able to
secure a bailout from the government totaling $1.5 billion, the first of its kind in
American history, Iacocca had to immediately allocate cash to pay off a massive benefits
backlog that included $311 million to Prudential and Aetna for pensions, and $50 million
to Blue Cross and Blue Shield to cover overdue health care premiums and medical bills.29
Similar to the military medical benefits package that had grown steadily from an
obscure line in a 1884 Congressional appropriations bill to the all-encompassing active
duty-retiree-dependent stem-to-stern benefit Congress was struggling to fund at that very
moment, Iacocca described Chrysler’s health care benefit package as a creeping monster:
“Like every other benefit that management provides to labor, the medical plans began
modestly. But over the years we’ve gone from paying no medical bills to the point where
the company now pays for everything you can think of: dermatology, psychiatry,
orthodontics—even eyeglasses.30” Not only was health care costing Chrysler more than
half-a-billion dollars a year, Iacocca was exasperated that over $200 million of Chrysler’s
payments to its suppliers were going to “cover their [the suppliers’] employees’ health
insurance premiums.”31
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With these problems in mind, in 1981 Iacocca called on former HEW Secretary
Joe Califano. When Iacocca was fired by Henry Ford II, Califano reached out to
encourage him that the firing may be “one of the best things that ever happened to you.”32
When Carter fired Califano, Iacocca reached out to him and returned the favor, telling
him that “you told me that being fired by Henry Ford could turn out to be one of the best
things that ever happened to me. Well, let me tell you this. Getting fired by this guy
Carter is the best thing that ever happened to you.”33
Califano was a known expert in matters involving labor, health care, and
government relations, and Iacocca was determined to have him on the new Chrysler
board. While Weinberger was struggling through his confirmation hearings and his first
months at Defense, Califano slipped away to a lunch meeting with Iacocca in his Waldorf
Towers suite on March 23, 1981. Iacocca informed Califano he was recruiting him to
help the company address their skyrocketing health care costs. Califano said of the
meeting that Iacocca was “aghast at Chrysler’s health care costs” and that he was
struggling to pay back the $1.5 billion debt load the company had taken from Carter to
keep them afloat. While at HEW, Califano commented that he worked tirelessly to “alert
American businesses to the dangers of rising health care costs,” but his admonitions were
nothing more than “twigs snapping in an abandoned forest.” At this lunch meeting, he
soon found out that “the [snapping] noise was deafening to Iacocca.”34
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During their discussions, Iacocca told Califano that his Great Society policies,
along with United Auto Workers President Doug Fraser’s aggressive union demands, had
both done more than anyone or anything to create the health care benefits mess that was
driving Chrysler to bankruptcy. Now, in an unprecedented move that raised eyebrows in
and out of the auto industry, Iacocca, in a stroke of genius, invited the fox into the
henhouse. He offered both Califano and Fraser an opportunity to join the Chrysler Board.
Both accepted, and Califano was soon hard at work trying to solve Chrysler’s health care
conundrum, and Fraser took on the not-so-popular job of convincing union labor to live
with reduced benefits.
As Califano assumed his duties at Chrysler headquarters in Detroit, he too was
just as shocked as Iacocca to find that the company was “paying more for health care than
for steel.”35 Like the DoD officials, Congressional investigators, and other research
scientists who looked into skyrocketing military health care costs in the late 1970s,
Califano also found that a major portion of Chrysler’s health care woes were attributable
to cigarette-thumping employees and retirees. After studying the problem in depth,
Califano determined that health care costs for Chrysler employees and retirees who
smoked were on average “75 percent higher than for non-smokers.”36 In addition to other
health care related cost-cutting measures, Califano immediately took the unprecedented
act of launching a corporation-wide anti-smoking and smoking cessation campaign. It
was one of the largest companywide smoke-outs in American history. However, Califano
was soon topped in sheer size and audacity when Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and
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Secretary of Defense Weinberger subsequently shook the cigarette enterprise to its core
with their anti-cigarette vision. Califano attempted to stamp out smoking at one of the
Big Three auto makers; Koop and Weinberger had a much bigger prize in mind: the
entire nation and its uniformed, retired, and dependent military members.37
Koop’s Campaign: SFA2000
Before looking at Weinberger’s unprecedented measures to curb smoking in the
military, a key event in 1984 requires discussion, as it substantially influenced his DoD
health care policies. That event was a speech given by Reagan’s Surgeon General, C.
Everett Koop, at a gathering of the American Lung Association in Miami, Florida, in
May 1984. Koop used this occasion to launch his 1984 anti-smoking crusade. Koop’s
crusade speech against smoking was the strongest statement a federal government official
ever made against cigarette smoking in American history.
The anti-cigarette movement experienced fits and starts ever since Dr. Luther
Terry, Koop’s predecessor by two decades, had published the nation’s first definitive
statement on the dangers of smoking back in 1964. If there were any starts, they were
hastily stopped by fits from the enterprise and its powerful Congressional allies.
However, health care policies regarding cigarettes and cigarette smoke, and the national
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will to accept them, were changing. At the same time, leaders like Weinberger, Koop,
and Califano were emerging as executives committed to preventative health care at the
corporate and federal level, and they assumed highly influential positions both in and out
of government during this period. With such polices and leaders in place, the industry had
hard work to do if it was to continue thriving in America.
Even before his speech, Koop had already been marked by the industry after his
first official act as Surgeon General: issuing the 1982 Surgeon General's Report on
Smoking and Health. After Califano was ousted from the Carter Administration, Helms
and the cigarette enterprise held command of the field, and they were cautiously
optimistic, especially considering the record number of cigarettes smoked in 1980.
However with Koop’s 1982 report, the most authoritative statement to date on the links
between smoking and cancer of the lung, oral cavity, larynx, esophagus, stomach,
bladder, pancreas, and kidneys, the pendulum began to swing.
Later in 1982, Koop made more waves when he testified before Congress he was
strongly in favor of continuing and even strengthening a series of rotating labels warning
against the specific dangers of smoking. With this background, it seemed fitting for Koop
to choose the year 1984 as the occasion to announce his major smoking news. Koop had
specifically chosen 1984, the twentieth anniversary of US Surgeon General Luther L.
Terry's Report on Smoking and Health, as the appropriate time to make a major
announcement regarding the future of cigarette smoking in America.38
In his May 1984 speech, Koop announced his new campaign entitled SFA2000.
The campaign’s goal was a smoke-free American society by the year 2000. In addition to
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a challenge to end smoking in America, Koop also advanced a host of other supporting
objectives. He was critical of the industry’s expenditure of $4,000 on advertising for
every one the government spent on warnings. He called for more resources dedicated to
anti-smoking messages. He called for a ban on all tobacco advertising. He called for all
physicians to demand their patients stop smoking, and for all children to insist their
parents stop. He challenged all the youth of America and the YMCA (ironically) to
mobilize against smoking. Like Califano at Chrysler, he also called for all employers to
encourage employees to stop smoking and to give them access to the resources to do so.
Moreover, in a call that directly affected subsequent DoD and Congressional
actions to curb smoking in the military and contain smoking-related health care costs,
Koop also demanded that all military bases cease providing low-cost, subsidized
cigarettes to soldiers. And he called for all military hospitals and VA clinics to provide
doctors and programs to help soldiers and veterans quit smoking. Regarding soldiersmokers, he said “I don’t care what war you fought in—Vietnam or Spanish-American—
if you smoke, you should stop and you’ll be better for it.”39
Additionally, similar to the efforts of Califano at the Chrysler Corporation, he
related cigarette smoking to the dramatic increase in health care expenditures in America:
The increasing cost for a pack of cigarettes has certainly had an effect on cigarette consumption.
But also of great significance is the realization among consumers, insurers, and employers that
cigarette smoking adds greatly to the health care costs of the individual and the nation. The effects
of cigarette smoking are all too often manifested in long hospital stays and extended outpatient
care for a variety of chronic problems that could have been avoided.40
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Seeking to add to his cost argument, Koop quoted from a speech President Reagan
previously made to the Health Insurance Association of America when Reagan offered a
similar economic and financial justification for curbing smoking in America, “The illness
resulting from smoking is costly both to the smoker and his or her boss. A helping hand
to assist employees to break the habit might be a wise investment.”41
For Koop, this was an all or nothing campaign; he was serious in his desire to end
smoking in America. He chose to end his speech, which largely focused on the health
hazards of smoking, with a plea to see cigarette smoking in America as a national
economic issue:
There is much for you and me to do. Let us do it together and make a smoke-free society by the
year 2000 a reality that will eliminate a tremendous number of deaths . . . a great deal of suffering
and disability . . . and an economic burden we can no longer bear.42

These words from America’s top doctor regarding the expense of smoking, both
physically and monetarily, became guiding principles for government appropriators,
fiscally conservative congressmen, and DoD bean counters in the days, months, and years
to come as they sought ways to reduce massive unfunded liabilities pertaining to the
military health care system.
When Koop finished his speech, he fundamentally changed the nature and scope
of the cigarette war. Possibly learning from Califano’s experience in the Carter
Administration, Koop was afraid that his SFA2000 message might meet opposition from
his superiors in the Reagan Administration, so he discussed the speech’s contents with
only a handful of trusted advisors. Few, if any, had any idea that Koop was about to
deliver such an aggressive anti-smoking message, that if effective, would banish the very
41
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lucrative American cigarette enterprise to the ash tray of history.43 When news of his
SFA2000 initiative was made public it was, to say the least, a bombshell. Horace
Kornegay, who had moved from President of the Tobacco Institute to Chairman, was
particularly furious when he read news of the speech and Koop’s escalation of the
cigarette war. In a speech delivered just eleven days after Koop’s bombshell, Chairman
Kornegay, as he had a decade prior when Weinberger had released the HEW’s annual
report on smoking in America in 1975, provided the enterprise response to the SFA2000
Campaign. If he was aiming to match Koop’s audacity with his own brand of shocking
rhetoric, Kornegay succeeded beyond imagination.
Kornegay to the Breech
The occasion for Kornegay’s retaliatory speech was a gathering of the Burley
Auction Warehouse Association in Ashville, North Carolina, on May 31, 1984, less than
two weeks after Koop’s SFA2000 speech. Offering apologies that Dr. Koop was unable
to sojourn among them that night, Kornegay offered a response to Koop’s plan to
extinguish smoking in America. Connecting the dots between Califano’s federal antismoking campaigns of the late 1970s, which had now become his corporate anti-smoking
campaign at Chrysler, Kornegay commented that Koop had “out Califanoed-Califano”
and that he had taken over Califano’s position as “National Antismoking Ayatollah
Number One.”44
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After placing Califano in proper conversation with Koop, the enterprise’s
previous enemy number one, Kornegay, in a move to make Koop the new target, took the
rhetoric to a place almost awkward to recount. Referring to Koop’s efforts to enlist
children in the nation’s anti-smoking agenda, Kornegay compared Koop’s SFA2000 plan
to Hitler’s Nazi Youth and the Chinese Red Guard. In a particularly vitriolic and
unfortunate portion of his speech, Kornegay rhetorically asked whether or not Koop
planned on a “final solution for the recalcitrant ones who refuse to obey your order to
quit.” He wondered if cigarette smoking hold-outs would have to go into “exile” or face
“deportation” or banishment to “concentration camps” or the cold fate of execution by
“death squads?”45 Lobbying for a highly lucrative industry was one thing; comparing
anti-smoking campaigns to the Holocaust and the extermination of the Jews was another.
To make matters worse, later in the speech, Kornegay audaciously accused Koop of
being “susceptible to a virus that causes antismoking agitation and violent rhetoric.”46
The cigarette war surely took a dark turn.47
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Leaving such emotional, irrational rhetoric for analysis of another sort, Kornegay
next chose to match Koop’s policy discussion of smoking and health care economics with
his own counter-assertion that the cigarette enterprise added $59 billion to America’s
gross national product. With such massive impact on America’s economy as a substantial
contributor to the nation’s bottom line, the enterprise was able to command considerable
political influence on Capitol Hill. However, in what amounted to tortured logic,
Kornegay opined that while cigarettes had contributed such vast treasure to America’s
coffers, Koop and Califano’s programs had drained taxpayers of billions of dollars. Of
course President Reagan and a host of military and civilian researchers already made the
argument that smoking-related health care costs were indeed a substantial portion of the
wasted expenditures to which Kornegay referred.
Kornegay continued his speech with a litany of other accusations. He argued that
smoking was not the threat to millions of Americans. It was actually Dr. Koop who was
the real hazard, “representing a grave threat to millions of Americans.”48 He described
discrimination against smokers as a situation akin to the Civil Rights struggle,
commenting: “It is unfair that at this time in our country’s history when we have broken
down the barriers that divide people on the basis of race, creed, color and gender, we are
letting zealots erect new barriers to divide people on the basis of whether or not they
political figure of this period, S. H. Hobbs, Sr., expressed his opposition to federal regulation of tobacco
production calling its supporters “Bolshevik,” “undemocratic,” and “un-American.” He added that in
regards to such federal meddling that “a Hoovercart looks better . . . than the dead carcass of personal
liberty” and that “if I perish to death I don’t want a government man coming to tell me what to do and what
not to do.” Ironically, the issues of patriotism, faith, freedom, and liberty were co-opted at various times
throughout this saga, by those for and against crop control, as well as those opposed to government
meddling in Americans’ smoking behavior. Later Hobbs, similar to Kornegay, Hobbs would take the
rhetoric one step further, calling federal crop control and allotment a “Hitler or Staling form of
government.”
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smoke.49” He persisted with the Civil Rights accusations, calling Koop’s agenda “antismoking apartheid,” and arguing that cigarette smokers are mercilessly “relegated to the
back of planes, trains, and buses” and are “segregated in factories, offices and public
places” and “refused employment.”50 This strategy of relating the smoking issue to other
emotional issues such as the Civil Rights Movement, South African apartheid, the
holocaust, veteran’s benefits, soldiers, patriotism, and the Constitution, as previously
discussed, became an industry mainstay for the remainder of the cigarette war.
And it became the mainstay for the remainder of his speech that night. After
registering these arguments against Koop’s great smoke-out, mostly based in rhetoric and
unfounded emotion, Kornegay ended his speech by cunningly co-opting a sensitive
Veterans’ issue. Seeking to connect smoking with rights and freedoms won on foreign
fields of battle, Kornegay recalled:
On Memorial Day, they buried the unknown soldier of the Vietnam War in Arlington National
Cemetery. He joins his fellow unknowns of WWI, WWII, and the Korean War. Of this unknown
Vietnam War serviceman, the President said, ‘An American hero has returned home. God bless
him. We may not know of this man’s life, but we know of his character. We may not know his
name, but we know his courage. He is the heart, the soul and the spirit of America.’ And my
question to the Surgeon General is this: Dr. Koop, what if he were a smoker? Would he be less a
hero, would he have less character, less courage, be less of an American? I think we all know the
right answer . . . but I would like to hear Dr. Koop’s answer.51

With that, the trench lines were dug even deeper. The great captains of the
cigarette war had once again marshaled onto the field and were engaged in a struggle
over the future of smoking and smoking policy in America. Some of the names, like
Weinberger, Califano, Helms, and Kornegay, were familiar. Others, like Koop and
Iacocca, were relatively new to the high-stakes cigarette war, and additional names would
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soon join the ranks. Moreover in 1985, all these captains, as well as those new to the
struggle, would become either directly or indirectly involved in the soldier-cigarette saga
either through legislative action, policy formulation, or the appropriations process. The
smoke had barely settled from the most recent skirmish of the war—the Koop-Kornegay
exchange—when Casper Weinberger fired the next shot: a shot aimed at unhinging the
soldier and the cigarette once and for all.
1985: The Year of Transition
By 1985, Congress’s ability to stomach such massive deficit-funded defense
spending was about to end.52 The Weinberger defense era budgets were enormous.
However these budgets, at least in theory, were underpinned by Reagan’s economic
growth. With an economy that had expanded by one-third during his first term, a portion
of this increase reaped the tax treasure that was earmarked to fund Weinberger’s military
expansion.53 Whereas FDR and LBJ had dreamed of an American corporate welfare
capitalism that funded social welfare programs and full-employment machinations,
Reagan invested in a form of war-welfare capitalism which materialized as the largest
peacetime expansion of the military in American history.54
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Historian of the twentieth century James Patterson described this as the paradox
associated with National Security Council Report-68 (NSC 68). A top-secret paper
prepared for the Truman Administration in 1950, the document set forth an aggressive
policy of a greatly expanded military-industrial complex, among other things. Patterson
argues that the NSC 68 military-economic-policy consortium also envisioned more than
just communist containment. This uniquely American consortium grandly expected a
situation where an equally expanded American economy, along with the high-tech
weapon systems churned out by this military-industrial complex, would fund both
military and social welfare expansion and provide security without massive tax burdens
on American citizens.55
However, by 1985, according to a powerful group of fiscal conservatives,
Patterson’s NSC-68 bank account was nearly dry. Weary of a slumping economy, five
decades of unprecedented federal spending, and doubtful that America could continue
such drunken forays into war and welfare capitalism, fiscally conservative Congressmen
fought back.56 The Senate soon passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget
Deficit Control Act of 1985, which bit into the largest budget deficit in US history.57 This

deceptive budgetary allocations and threat assessments, assessments that the military-industrial complex
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momentous legislation was a form of sequestration-oversight for reining in government
spending of which defense was the most profligate.
Most significant to the soldier-cigarette discussion, in this Gramm-Rudman spirit
of austerity, some in Congress chose to directly focus their gaze on the costs arising from
funding health care for military members, dependents, and retirees who were burning
through more than 26 billion government-subsidized cigarettes a year.58 At long last, the
soldier and the cigarette, a mainstay since WWI, finally came under the microscopic gaze
of congressional appropriators, fiscal activists, and DoD programmers struggling to
understand how soldiers, cigarettes, freedom, patriotism, and cradle-to-grave health care
benefits should continue as a single policy issue. Soldiers, freedom, and patriotism would
survive this fight; the cigarette would not. Further, unconditional cradle-to-grave health
care benefits, to this point an industry and military standard, was never the same again.
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CHAPTER XI
THE END OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE:
SFA2000 INVADES THE DOD
When Surgeon General C. Everett Koop announced his audacious plan to
drastically reduce smoking in America, he did so with a supreme confidence in timing.
Just four years before his momentous 1984 SFA2000 declaration, Americans had smoked
a record number of cigarettes. What gave him the confidence to believe in his timing?
Could the nation go from 620 billion to zero in just two decades? If the plan was a bit of a
stretch, his confidence was found at the intersection of twenty years of science linking the
physical costs of cigarette smoking and more recent articulation of the mountainous fiscal
costs. Yet, to make such a declaration was one thing, to enact policy measures and
legislation to bring it about was another.
If Koop was to achieve his SFA2000 objectives, he required help from antismoking’s most powerful and consistently anti-cigarette government executive: Secretary
of Defense Casper Weinberger. Jesse Helms had sensed imminent doom when he and his
protégé John Porter East had cast their votes against the anti-smoking California
bureaucrat. Possibly, he saw the writing on the wall when the cigarette lobby pressured
Carter to pull the plug on Califano. However, Califano’s firing and these two votes
against Weinberger, in retrospect, were minor skirmishes in the cigarette war. What
loomed on the horizon was a showdown threatening to end the enterprise’s decades’ long,
deeply acculturated, state-supported access to their most faithful customers. To
Califano’s campaign at Chrysler and Koop’s crusade at the Capitol, Weinberger now
added his own front: a dislodging attack at Defense.
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The Resolution Heard ‘Round the Pentagon
The end started as a minor continuing resolution issued by Congress as the
members were hurrying to finish business so they could leave for their homes to enjoy
Christmas recess. On December 19, 1985, they headed out to what would become one of
the coldest winters in modern memory.1 However the continuing resolution they left
behind would spark a flame that would grow to a full-scale fire for the enterprise by the
time the winter of 1986 drew to a close. In order to grasp the importance of this
resolution, one must go back a few months to October 1985.
On October 24, Senators Ted Stevens (R-AK) and David Boren (D-OK)
exchanged letters with each other confirming their plans to introduce an amendment to
the FY86 Defense appropriation that would call for an increase to the price of cigarettes
on military posts so that they at least matched the prevailing per-pack cost off-post. In
essence, they called for the end of military cigarette subsidies. They reasoned the
precedent was already in place stemming from the VA’s 1978 decision, followed by the
DoD’s 1982 guidance, that on-post alcohol prices be adjusted to reflect the off-post cost.
In a personal letter to Stevens, Boren summed up his determination to end military
cigarette subsidies saying, “Ted, I know you agree with me that there is no reason for the
federal government to encourage or subsidize the detrimental smoking habit” anymore.2
The Stevens-Boren cigarette pricing amendment passed through the Defense
Appropriation Subcommittee on October 29, and then sailed through the full committee.
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By early November, their legislation appeared on the Senate floor as a resolution to
amend the FY86 defense appropriation to remove cigarette subsidies and increase
cigarette prices on all military instillations. Now on the floor for all to see, the
amendment was quickly assailed by the enterprise, first from the inside, and then from
the outside. On the inside, Senator John Warner from Virginia dashed off a memo to
Stevens warning him that, though he understood Steven’s noble purpose was to end
subsidized smoking, this is not how it would be perceived by the troops. He warned that
they would see it as “yet another attempt to reduce the overall military compensation
system.” Further, he warned Stevens that he was tampering with “the most successful
aspect of DoD operations—people,” and that the only losers in Steven’s scheme were the
good folks who put the uniform on every day.3 With these words, Warner instantly
moved the conversation to a place it had already been, and would stay for years to come:
from one focused on fiscal and physical liabilities to one re-focused on rights, patriotism,
benefits, promises, compensation, and veteran’s issues.
On the outside, the issue was quickly picked up by enterprise lobbyists like Amy
Millman who reported the emergence of the amendment to her industry client Phillip
Morris. Though Millman was alarmed at the amendment, she was not worried because
her contacts informed her that “the DoD is solidly in our corner as are the veterans
groups” and that both had “promised to lobby against this amendment.” Further, she
reported that groups friendly to tobacco were “carrying with them a paper which was
prepared by the Tobacco Institute and the DoD,” and that both organizations (TI and
DoD) were acting in concert with each other on this issue. Finally, she uncovered the
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chief proponent of the anti-smoking agenda inside the DoD policy-making apparatus as
Dr. William Mayer, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and labeled
him as a “friend” of Dr. Koop.4
In her summation of the amendment event, Millman highlights two key factors
that would become crucial in the months ahead: enterprise interference strategy and the
irony of the TI and DoD working together to formulate military smoking policy. As it
turns out, the situation was much more complex than meets the eye. The TI was
interacting with certain inside elements at DoD and taking advantage of an internal
breakdown at the Pentagon over smoking, cigarette policy, and cigarette subsidies.
In what may be shocking to any unfamiliar with the way politics and getting
things done in the federal bureaucracy works, the main detractor of the Stevens-Boren
legislation, other than the tobacco state politicians, appeared as none other than Casper
Weinberger. How is it that Weinberger, who was such a thorn in the side of enterprise
officials for so many years, appeared to come out as their ally in this initial fight? The old
adage says that politics makes strange bedfellows; in this case, Weinberger’s desire for
incremental change drove his choice of beds. He knew that the anti-cigarette moment had
come, but he was also aware it would never be the slam dunk Koop had envisioned.
Weinberger anticipated the enterprise would drive the discussion straight to the
emotional, divisive issues like soldiers’ rights and benefits, and if he was to achieve any
level of meaningful change to the smoking culture in the military, he had to do it in
measured, incremental steps. As events unfolded over the next several months, it became
clear that his strategy was to make changes in-house at DoD first through policy
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implementation, and that these policies had to be in place before any outside measures
like forced price increases should be attempted, if at all. Among organizational behavior
parlance, this is described as a process of socializing change rather than legislating
change.
With this incremental strategy in mind, Weinberger quickly sent off a note to
Senator Mark Hatfield who was Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. In
this letter, Weinberger, the old infantryman, essentially repeats Warren’s fears that the
price increases might be perceived incorrectly by his soldiers, and asks the Senator to
hold off on any price reductions or decreased appropriations. Considering Weinberger’s
remonstration, and the enterprise’s swift interference, there was almost no chance that the
amendment would move forward in the Senate, and it was tabled. Rather than kill the
amendment completely, Stevens met Weinberger in the middle and requested a study on
the impacts of the use and sale of tobacco within the military; this was a request that
proved pivotal. This tabled amendment eventually made its way through the legislative
process and emerged as Continuing Resolution 4657, which was the document drafted by
those legislators anxious to leave town on December 19, 1985. This resolution, and the
study it requested, was the proverbial spark that lit the fire, or in this case, burned the
cigarette.5
A Tent Divided
As Congress headed off for a cold winter break, in the bowels of the Pentagon the
policy wonks were still hard at work. In late December, they were given this study
directive from Senator Stevens demanding data regarding the impacts of the use and sale
5
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of cigarettes in the military. The visible hand of bureaucracy had determined that within
the Pentagon, two offices would handle health care policy: the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OSD/HA), led by the aforementioned Dr.
William Mayer, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Personnel (OSD/MPP), led by newcomer Chapman B. Cox. Within OSD/MPP, the
civilian leader, Cox, had a military deputy, Lieutenant General Edmund Chavarrie.
Mayer, Cox, and Chavarrie played prominent roles during the drama that unfolded within
the Pentagon during 1986 over cigarette pricing and cigarette subsidies.6
When the staffs at OSD/HA and OSD/MPP began work on the Stevens
Resolution, an internal riff quickly became apparent within the Pentagon regarding the
cigarette issue. On one side were Mayer and Cox, who staunchly supported aggressive
measures to reduce smoking in the military, including cessation programs, price
increases, banning cigarette sales in commissaries, and caving to pressures to end
cigarette subsidies. On the other side was General Chavarrie who aggressively supported
the enterprise’s position. 7 It appears that Chavarrie was the insider that lobbyist Millman
spoke of when she said, “the DoD is solidly in our corner.”8 Chavarrie played the part of
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enterprise juggernaut in this policy struggle, consistently sticking to the position that any
adjustment to the price or availability of cigarettes would be perceived as an attack on
soldiers’ rights and freedoms.
In this way, the discourse on cigarette subsidies quickly became a discussion
about commissary rights as opposed to cigarette subsidies or health issues, harkening
back to the healthcare benefits discourse. The plan to remove the cigarette subsidy was
touted as yet another example of a breach in trust and an infringement on an important
part of the overall compensation package: commissary benefits.9 In the point papers
Millman delivered to DoD, the enterprise highlighted this commissary benefit and the
fact that Congress, not the DoD, managed appropriations in this area. DoD was advised
to quickly wash their hands of the issue regarding pricing and subsidies and let the
legislators (and lobbyists) handle those issues. In this way the enterprise hoped to wrench
control of smoking policy out of the hands of the DoD anti-smoking cabal, and back into
the hands of Congressional appropriators, many of whom were enterprise supporters from
tobacco states.
As events unfolded, this commissary argument, and therefore the soldier-cigarette
issue, increasingly fell under the purview of the powerful House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) which was disproportionately represented by a number of tobacco
state representatives. Specifically, the Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee and
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Chairman of the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Subcommittee Dan Daniel
exerted considerable influence over the soldier-cigarette issue. Daniel was a former
soldier and tobacco farmer and was then a Congressman from Virginia. As a cigarette
booster alongside Helms, he went out of his way to ensure that soldiers who desired
smokes would not come under what he termed the “brass nanny” supervision of the anticigarette zealots in Congress or at DoD.10
As these DoD officials worked to hammer out a unified response to Steven’s
inquiry, they struggled to develop a smoking policy that accounted for their boss’s
(Weinberger’s) desire for compromise, and their own instincts as a staff ranging from
support of cessation to insistence upon adhering to the enterprise’s freedom position. At
one point, discussions were terse. One source said that Chavarrie refused to go along with
his superior Cox’s insistence that the military revise manpower recommendations to the
SECDEF regarding cigarette policy. In a back-and-forth bureaucratic battle within the
cigarette war, Cox was said to have rejected several policy drafts that did not include his
desire to shift DoD’s position on cigarette pricing and subsidies. This led to a tense
environment in the OSD/MPP office and a situation “bordering on insubordination” as
Chavarrie refused to provide a position paper that incorporated Cox’s
recommendations.11 When the policy guidance was released in March 1986, and followed
up by official DoD regulations, it became obvious whose position appeared to have won.
However, the March 1986 release of the DoD guidance was still in the distant
future, and the struggle under the DoD tent continued. The enterprise soon discovered the
10
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internal disagreement at DoD; chiefly the Mayer-Cox plan to persuade Weinberger to go
against the advice of his military staff (i.e. Chavarrie). When Congressman Stephen Neal
of North Carolina found out about the struggle, and rumors that Weinberger was
considering tampering with the cigarette benefit, he was quick to pen a response to the
SECDEF.
Neal’s message to Weinberger was succinct: of course soldiers smoke! After
trying to shift the attention to alcohol, which Neal claimed had a much more detrimental
effect on soldiers than cigarettes, Neal’s main line of argument focused on the historic
link between soldiers and smoking. He wanted Weinberger to understand that “in times
of war, tobacco has been a tremendous morale booster,” and his actions infringed upon
this special relationship. He informed Weinberger, the old infantryman, that soldiers’
military training was incomplete if they did not know how to “police the area and field
strip cigarette butts.” Not only does this argument speak to the pervasiveness of smoking
among the troops, it uncovers the level of acculturation that the cigarette had gone
through among the ranks as it had essentially become synonymous with “field stripping”
a rifle—one cannot be done without the other.12
Neal went on to exclaim that a 50 percent smoking rate was “astonishingly low”
considering what it must have been 20 years ago. After all, are not soldiers just doing
what they are supposed to do, “enjoy[ing] simple pleasures in situations and settings that
are not always pleasurable?” When chain smokers from the 1950s and 60s hit the
CHAMPUS system in the 1980s, many were not so quick to laugh off the whole affair as
another case of soldiers will be soldiers. In an amazing piece of frankness, Neal ends his
12
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note with a concession that his argument was not grounded in health and wellness, or
even data for that matter, but in the morale of the force. Regarding the morale issue, Neal
closes:
I do not think, either, that the historic and traditional link between the services and tobacco can be
ignored. In times of war, tobacco has been a tremendous morale booster to the soldier, and a
source of great pleasure and satisfaction. Armies ceased fire to trade it during the Civil War (a
most civil thing to do). In WWII, the soldier often extracted the cigarettes from a K-Ration packet
and threw the ration away. In every war, cigarettes are a currency and are bartered for all sorts of
13
booty.

Though not as sentimental as Neal, and surely not quick to point out his rejection
of science and data, TI President Sam Chilcote said much about the issue as well. In a
memo to the TI executive board, Chilcote referred to the Mayer-Cox action during the
Christmas recess as a “lightning strike” timed to take effect while all the enterprise’s
Congressional friends were safely away on Christmas recess. On this point Chilcote was
emphatic: if Mayer and Cox were able to end cut-rate cigarette sales in the military as a
health measure, this would form the proverbial slippery slope upon which all would slide
into Koop’s sea of complete cessation.
Regarding the Mayer-Cox end run, Chilcote felt the enterprise was in a position of
strength since Weinberger had already made previous statements in the autumn against
the aggressive Mayer-Cox policy position. He pointed out that “should [Weinberger]
cave in to the anti-smoking forces in the Pentagon . . . [he] would be in the embarrassing
position of doing a complete reversal on a position he has previously taken in writing.”14
Chilcote was confident that the enterprise appeared to have Weinberger wedged in a
corner. Weinberger was giving no indication that he was caving on his previous
13
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commitment not to adjust prices or subsidies; he remained true to his plan to allow for
internal DoD processes to work. As events unfolded, Weinberger appeared as one
committed to changing the smoking culture in the military. However, he wanted to do it
cautiously and incrementally−too cautious and incremental for some. With the tabling of
the Stevens Amendment in December, the fizzling of the Mayer-Cox strike in January,
the interference from General Chavarrie throughout, and Weinberger’s apparent desire to
settle with a weak compromise, the enterprise was positive it had weathered yet another
storm.
As the Pentagon staffers continued to work on developing a cigarette policy,
General Chavarrie was invited to speak at a Commissary Round Table meeting in San
Antonio, Texas, on February 13, 1986. Commissary stake holders were considerably
alarmed over the cigarette pricing issue and how it would affect both commissary sales
and commissary foot traffic, issues linked to one another. They were concerned that as
cigarettes were the main draw at commissaries, no cigarettes would mean substantially
less shoppers. If soldiers were not attracted by cut-rate cigarettes, not only would they
lose the cigarette sales volume, they would forfeit the rest of the purchases these soldiers
would have made as well. However, a PM representative who was at the roundtable
discussion was pleased to report that it appeared the enterprise had a strong advocate at
DoD in General Chavarrie. He described Chavarrie as squarely on the side of the industry
and its position that cigarette prices remain free of nanny-state interference. Their fears
were further alleviated when Chavarrie reported that despite Dr. Mayer’s efforts, the
issue was and remained an issue of “service personnel rights and freedom of choice.”15
15
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The enterprise was not the only group to pick up on the internal struggle at DoD
over smoking policy. Before long, the issue had come to the attention of anti-smoking
Senators who supported Stevens and Boren in their struggle to amend DoD funding to
exclude cigarette subsidies and curb tobacco sales on military instillations. In a February
memo from a select group of anti-smoking Senators addressed to Weinberger, the issues
of smoker’s rights, commissary benefits, and quality of life were prominent:
Raising the price of cigarettes would not take away a smoker's right to smoke. Nor would this
provision deny a benefit to the military community, unless lung cancer and heart disease are
benefits. We find the argument that raising tobacco prices would endanger the commissary system
specious, for there must be better ways to keep commissaries open . . . Health promotion and
disease prevention programs in the Department of Defense have the potential to improve the
quality of life for hundreds of thousands of service members and their families. We strongly
support the health initiatives already undertaken by the Department and encourage you to affirm
and expand these initiatives by promptly issuing the health promotion directive, including the
tobacco price increase provision. You have an historic opportunity to reverse the traditional role
which the military services have played in promoting smoking in our society. We hope you will
16
seize it.

This was a straight-forward, clear statement from a powerful group of anticigarette Senators urging Weinberger to listen to his subordinates’ advice (Mayer and
Cox) and take historic action on the soldier-cigarette issue now. They were frustrated that
Weinberger seemed intent to compromise and delay issuance of the DoD health
promotion directive his staffers labored over—even if under a tent divided. The Senators,
as well as the enterprise, would have to wait another month to find out Weinberger’s
decision.
The DoD Report on Smoking and DoD 1010.10
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The DoD issued its extensive Department of Defense Report on Smoking and
Health in the Military on March 10, 1986, followed the next day by the Department of
Defense Health Promotion Directive 1010.10. These two documents represent a major
step in the history of the soldier and the cigarette. Initially, it appeared the enterprise had
won this latest round of the cigarette war. However, the documents require close scrutiny
in order to understand who the winners and losers were and what the documents meant to
the future of smoking in the military.
The first document, the DoD Report on Smoking, consisted of Weinberger’s
response to the December 19, 1985, continuing resolution that included a request for the
DoD to provide a study on the pervasiveness and effects of the military smoking culture.
Weinberger acknowledged that the report:
concludes that smoking rates are high for active duty personnel, that smoking is a major health
hazard, that increasing the price of cigarettes could result in an 8 to 10 percent reduction in
consumption, but that a formalized and structured anti-smoking campaign with no increase in
17
prices would also result in significant reduced consumption.

In this sentence, Weinberger is acknowledging that, behind the scenes, his policy staff at
DoD is at loggerheads on the issue. In general terms, one side wanted to stop funding the
smoking habit by slashing subsidies and price breaks; the other wanted to hold the line on
commissary benefits and simply afford soldiers educational opportunities and then let
them make their own choice. In reality, the Chavarrie side wanted the enterprise
standard—status quo—and provided the reasoning that the smoking rate in the military
was on a four percent per year downward trend, thus the military was better served by
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letting the soldier-cigarette bond fizzle out on its own without giving the perception they
were cutting into benefits.
The 93 pages of reports, analysis, graphs, and appendices confirmed what was
essentially already known: soldiers and retirees smoked copious amounts of cigarettes
that were injurious to health and a huge burden on the military health care system and the
defense medical budget. The study goes on to provide four options to address the
smoking problem in the military. The first was to seek status quo—do nothing. The other
two involved some version of price hikes, and the last option was to ban the sale of all
tobacco in commissaries.
These basic options were followed by a conclusion that is a tortured piece of logic
obviously written by a tent divided. It darts from one position to another, and then to no
position at all; it is disjointed at best, preposterous at worst. At one point, the study says
that price hikes would definitely work to achieve smoking reduction targets, and then
casts off such hikes as a drastic infringement on soldiers’ rights that would have profound
effects on morale and retention. Then it maintains such price hikes will have only
negligible impacts on soldier finances, to the tune of about $100 a year on average. Next
it backs completely away and places the military smoking problem squarely in the lap of
the federal government: “Smoking is a behavior that has the appearance of being
officially sanctioned by a number of policies including federal programs subsidizing the
tobacco growing industry and the sale of low-cost cigarettes at military installations.”18
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How could Weinberger’s DoD staffers who authored this report extol low-cost
cigarettes as a virtue, right, and indeed an important part of retention, and then reason that
a price hike is a negligible inconvenience . . . that would work to reduce smoking?
Finally, how could they place blame for the whole situation on federal cigarette subsidies
when the report previously lauded such cut-rate cigarettes as vital to retention? The
pretzel logic found in the conclusion of this report, and indeed the entire soldier-cigarette
issue, is yet another symptom of a much greater theme in modern American history: the
warp and woof of a modern corporatocracy which attempts to weave together various, oft
opposing interests in the name of good business.
Thus in these bureaucratic trenches, where policy meets politics, one finds the
modern economic arrangements that fuel American political-economy. Taxable
transactions, in the government’s eyes, fuel this arrangement. In these trenches, actors
with varying motivations work tirelessly to create, or block, policies as informed by their
constituencies. In this way, similar to a sausage grinder, the needs of big business,
taxpayers, industry, and the military-industrial complex are ground together with the end
product a mixed bag of industry-friendly incentives and taxpayer-friendly efficiencies.19
As with all such transactions, there are winners and losers, and there are inherent
paradoxes. The art is to maximize the winning, minimize the losing, and, like Thomas
Jefferson, develop the “capacity to rest comfortably with contradictions.”20
In Weinberger’s report, he acknowledges the paradoxical warp and woof
phenomenon as he explains his selected course of action to Congressman Jamie Whitten,
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Chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Weinberger concedes “the tobacco issue has
presented the government (federal, state and local) with a paradoxical situation
attempting to balance the negative health impacts against the positive economic impacts
(Italics mine).”21 With the paradox duly registered, he further explains the nuances of the
line he is forced to walk between inconsistency and expediency, stating:
There are some understandable inconsistencies in the Government directly or indirectly making
available for purchase at lower prices than could be obtained elsewhere, products that we know are
injurious to the individual’s health. Therefore, at the end of a period of time reasonable to measure
the effectiveness of our aggressive anti-smoking campaign in decreasing use of tobacco by the
troops, I will review our progress and consider whether it would be appropriate, in addition, to
22
make changes in the present policies of tobacco sales in commissaries and post exchanges.

And finally, he informed Congress, the enterprise, and the soldiers that his chosen course
of action was to “direct that an intense anti-smoking campaign be conducted at all levels
of all Services and that it become a major responsibility of all commanders and
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commanding officers, up to and including the highest levels of each Service and the
Department.23”
In the end, Weinberger did not choose any of the options he was offered by the
staff. Instead of status quo, price hikes, or ending cigarette sales, he chose an aggressive
program of education, with a wait and see fallback option. This was essentially a hedging
strategy that pursued compromise in the short term, yet opened the door to further action
in the long term. Words are important, especially regarding crucial policy issues pertinent
to the war room, the boardroom, and the American living room. It is important to note
that Weinberger ordered an intense anti-smoking campaign as a major policy issue
Services must pursue with utmost vigor at the highest levels. In essence, the Secretary of
Defense ordered the Army Chief of Staff to make anti-smoking one of his top policy
issues. Through a cascading set of ordered effects, some anticipated, others not, these
were the words that eventually sounded the death knell of the smoking culture in the
Army.
The very next day, March 11, 1986, Weinberger and the DoD released regulatory
guidance to implement the policy options he had chosen based on (and in some ways not
based on) the DoD’s own report on smoking released the day before. Health Promotions
Directive 1010.10 was essentially just that—a directive to the Services to promote
healthy lifestyles. Tobacco use was just one of many healthy lifestyle issues addressed in
this directive. At first glance, it appears non-committal, offering little substance to the
anti-smoking lobby. Using classic status quo language, for example, it asks military
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commanders to “coordinate and monitor” the “use of tobacco products in DoD occupied
facilities.”24
However, in the same section it tells commanders to coordinate and monitor just
about everything else health related. It invites them to monitor and reduce stress, fat,
hypertension, and to coordinate calisthenics programs. The regulation addresses smoking
in general terms and waters down the smoking issue by lumping cigarettes in with other
vague, ill-defined topics such as positive work environment and stress. Further diluting
the issue, it calls for the formation of “coordinating committees” to monitor smoking
policy and health. In most bureaucracies, “coordinating committees,” in reality, are
formed to work hard to achieve status quo.25
However, peering deeper into the document, there are parts of the guidance that
directly address smoking as a separate, distinct issue. Yet these are attenuated as well, or
even offer clear loopholes. The regulation does call for plans to address “smoking
prevention and cessation,” only to admonish leaders not to, under any circumstance,
coerce or pressure soldiers to actually enter smoking cessation programs. Leaders were to
only provide information and education if they are asked. The soldier would have ample
opportunity to ask for help with cessation at yearly physicals, dental exams, or feedback
sessions.26
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In terms of direct smoking policy and workspace management, the directive
allowed smoking in buildings as long as it did not “impair non-smokers.” It also gave
provisions to restrict smoking to designated areas outside buildings, yet at the same time
allowed smoking inside if there were well ventilated areas that could accommodate
smokers. It allowed for smoking in private offices, and encouraged supervisors, where
space permitted, to allow for smokers to have their own work stations. Finally it
encouraged supervisors and commanders to consider billeting smokers and non-smokers
in ways that consider smoking preferences, and it banned cigarette companies from
marketing directly to military personnel.27
The reaction to Weinberger’s report and follow-on guidance ranged from cautious
optimism from the enterprise to disgust from certain anti-smoking legislators. The
enterprise initially saw the rather demure, weak sounding guidance as a victory. Tobacco
Institute President Sam Chilcote said, “despite intense lobbying by the Coalition on
Smoking or Health and the support of two key Pentagon officials (Mayer and Cox) . . .
there will be no change in status quo” regarding the DoD cigarette policy.28 Ironically,
the TI was happy to join Weinberger and his military staff in blocking Congress’ attempt
to erode soldier benefits even further. The TI attributed the entire 1010.10 fiasco to an
internal power struggle among certain DoD staffers rather than an honest attempt to
address health promotion in the military. In a statement provided to the Washington Post,
a TI spokesman said, “What is going on is a Pentagon staff dispute, with the health affairs
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people and other anti-smoking forces on one side and a number of other people looking at
the broader issue of commissary rights.”29
Enterprise booster Daniel swung into action as well, describing the whole
cigarette affair as a kneejerk reaction by certain overzealous DoD officials (Mayer and
Cox) who had made a carnival out of the whole affair. Later he would comment the
1010.10 matter not only threatened soldiers’ benefits, it threatened combat readiness.
“Scientists agreed that in the stressful environment of war ‘the positive effects [of
smoking] offset the negative.’”30 Daniel does not say which scientists; although it is
possible he is referring to the enterprise-backed St. Martins meeting where cigarette
scientists gathered to find out why people smoked—to allow the industry to market more
effectively.31
If the enterprise was cautiously optimistic, the more aggressive members of the
anti-smoking lobby were seething. On Capitol Hill, Senator Bingaman was particularly
disappointed in Weinberger’s weak 1010.10 guidance. In the Congressional Record for
March 13, 1986, the Senator comments:
By omitting from this directive positive and substantive provisions which would have discounted
the DoD subsidies for tobacco products sold on military instillations, the Secretary missed a
significant opportunity to improve the quality of life of those who serve in the armed forces . . .
This directive guarantees that the DoD will continue to subsidize disease and premature death
among its personnel and their families. Additional service members and their families will suffer
from lung cancer, heart disease, and other smoking related maladies as a result of this directive.
These individuals will seek medical care for their diseases in military hospitals and in VA medical
32
centers.
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Bingaman further lamented, “the taxpayers are the biggest losers,” in Weinberger’s
decision not to adjust prices or cut cigarette subsidies. He reiterated that he and other
concerned Senators had urged the Secretary to take action on this matter, however he
“has chosen not to do so.”33 He accused Weinberger of caving to the enterprise he had
spent most of his federal career fighting, saying that he believed Weinberger “would have
liked to have included an end to the military tobacco subsidy in his directive” were it not
for pressure from “supporters of the tobacco industry, both in Congress and in the
administration” that are both “many and vocal” and have “persuaded the Secretary to put
off any increase in tobacco prices.” Finally, he characterized the newly established DoD
policy on cigarette smoking as found 1010.10 as “absurd” and “schizophrenic.”34
Chilcote felt he summed up the whole episode best with his assessment that “We
have won the battle, but not the war . . . the issue remains.”35 Another lobbyist felt the
battle was “far from being over.”36 With such strong words against the enterprise
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becoming a normal part Senate floor discussion, and debate often followed by strongly
worded amendments and legislative proposals against the tobacco enterprise, how long
could the enterprise stave off the onslaught? Chilcote did not realize at the time how
correct he was in his other assessment that the enterprise had to “respond to the adverse
findings in the report” in the very near future.37 Notice that he emphasized the report and
not the DoD 1010.10 guidance. In the end, the report, with the 1010.10 guidance playing
only a secondary role, was the document that brought about the final unraveling of the
enterprise’s tight grip on the soldier-cigarette bond.
The Army Executes the Dislodging Maneuver
Whether Weinberger recognized it or not may never be known, but his actions on
March 10 and 11 set in motion a sequence of events that ensured the final demise of the
soldier and the cigarette. After nearly a decade debating back and forth about the special
soldier-cigarette relationship, the industry’s targeting of young soldiers, and the mounting
costs of health care in America and a cigarette-smoking military, the Army shocked all
involved with the release of their April 17, 1986, US Army Tobacco Cessation Plan.
The 1010.10 language was so weak it was open to interpretation in any number of
ways by commanders responsible for implementation. However Weinberger’s report,
with its guidance that “an intense anti-smoking campaign . . . become a major
responsibility of all commanders . . . up to and including the highest levels of each
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37

Sam Chilcote, memo to TI Executive Committee, “Cigarette Sales in Commissaries,” March 11,
1986, accessed January 15, 2015, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dir4fe007/pdf.

304
Service,” proved almost binding.38 Moreover, it was supported by nearly a hundred pages
of evidence documenting the irrefutable dangers, both physically and fiscally, of soldier
smokers, and these two elements, the binding order and the data, proved intensely
problematic for an enterprise intent to keep Army soldiers smoking at the rate they had
for decades.39 For in the Army, an old adage governs all orders from higher commands:
the subordinate commander can be more restrictive, but they cannot be less restrictive. In
this case, the Army chose the former as opposed to the latter.
April 17, 1986, was the day the Army took matters into its own hands. Issuing its
own supplement to the DoD 1010.10 directive, the Army’s Tobacco Cessation Program,
in true Army fashion, was blunt, direct, and to the point. There was no mention of stress,
calories, hypertension, workspace rights, or exercise programs. However the document
had much to say about the vice of excessive cigarette smoking, a vice the Army now
determined was neither conducive nor acceptable any longer in the military profession.
Rather than establish committees or work groups, the Army established timelines, tasks,
clear objectives, and offices of primary responsibility (OPR).
In cover letters that accompanied the Army’s guidance, the Army gave tobacco
cessation the highest priority and the highest level of support, both of which were after all
demanded by Weinberger in his DoD smoking report. Signed by the Secretary of the
Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the
top brass stressed the fact that service in Army is a “profession unique in many respects,
38
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requiring physical fitness and stamina to get the job done,” and that every member was
charged with the responsibility to make the smoking cessation goal a reality. Lieutenant
General Robert M. Elton, who was the OPR for the entire Army program, made the goal
quite lucid, stating that the goal was “elimination of tobacco products usage in the
Army.”40 These were very strong words, especially considering the weak language in the
DoD guidance.
In designing their cessation program, the Army took the tradition of assuming
HHQ allowed more, rather than less restriction, to nearly its most extreme conclusion.41
The program included a set of milestones and OPRs, and a goal of meeting stated
cessation objectives within five years. The overarching goal of the entire Army program
was to achieve a level of smoking in the Army that, at minimum, matched the national
goal of reducing smoking levels by 1990 to a point where only one in four Americans
were still smoking. In order to flip digits and drop from the 52 to the 25 percent level,
half the soldiers in the Army who smoked would have to quit smoking in the next four
years. Moreover, at least half that entered the service during this time would have to quit
as well, or not start. With plans to join the “Great American Smoke-out,” the Army’s
“Great Army Smoke-out” was scheduled for November 1986.42
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However the Army was not dragging its feet on this issue. Commanders were
directed to boldly implement the Army smoking cessation plan by July 7, 1986, giving
them just three months from the time the order was published to implement tobacco
cessation. After this date, they were held accountable for their actions regarding the
strong, clear guidance from the Army Chief of Staff. After outlining smoking and nonsmoking space management issues in a similar manner to DoD 1010.10, with the Army
adding emphasis on secondhand smoke, the Army document takes it one step further and
prescribes a punishment section for non-compliance. Punishment for violating the
provisions of the Army cessation program included prosecution under the UCMJ, but not
normally, unless the “smoking behavior clearly . . . involved either direct threat to safety
or security, or evidences a willful disregard for the health and comfort of a nonsmoker.”43
With that, the official Army culture changed in an instant. From then on, if a
soldier smoked a cigarette in a non-designated area and was asked to remove to a proper
location, and if that soldier blew smoke in a hostile manner, they now had to prepare for
UCMJ action and possible jail time. This is light years away from the smoke ‘em if
you’ve got ‘em and field strip the area for butts culture that dominated the Army during
the six previous decades. It would take years for the informal Army culture to change and
even more years to officially end subsidized smokes for the soldiers and subsidized
tobacco crops for the farmers. April 1986 was not the end of the state-sponsored
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sanctioning of cigarette smoking in the Army; however it was the end of the Army’s
cultural sponsorship of the soldier and the cigarette.
When the Army ordered a change to the soldierly cult of smoking, obedience soon
followed. To those in the enterprise who complained the Army’s draconian policy on
smoking was unenforceable and that it was “unimaginable the number of military
policemen . . . required to enforce the regulation,” one Congressional panel commented
“when the Army wants to enforce anything, anything is enforceable.”44 In the end, when
an organization such as the Army chooses to change the culture, either through issuing
billions of cigarettes during WWI or snuffing cigarettes in 1986, the rest is simply history
. . . and a matter of statistical accounting. To discover the veracity of this statement,
simply review the numbers of cigarettes smoked by soldiers and Americans from 1918 to
1986 . . . and then light a cigarette at the Pentagon welcome center next time you visit.
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CHAPTER XII
EPILOGUE
Casper Weinberger
A year after releasing DoD 1010.10 guidance, Weinberger decided to leave his
post at Defense in order to properly care for his ailing wife. After nearly 40 years rotating
as a federal and corporate executive and sparring with the cigarette enterprise,
Weinberger bowed out of the cigarette war. Despite the criticism he received from antismoking Congressmen, and the laud he received from the enterprise over his weak
1010.10 guidance, it appears Weinberger had the last laugh after all. The guidance was so
ambiguous, and was backed by such strong language in the DoD study that preceded it,
that the door was left wide open for the Army to enact strong smoking cessation
measures. The Army stepped through that door just one month after Weinberger’s DoD
report and follow-on guidance were released. This was a short lived victory for the
enterprise in this case.
Though Weinberger left federal service, he did not leave the corporate service. In
what can only be described as ironic, President Reagan appointed Weinberger to the
National Economic Council, whose mission was to “look for ways to reduce the federal
budget deficit,” in 1988. The paradox of one of the federal government’s most legendary
spenders appointed to lead federal cost-cutting drills is an interesting selection to say the
least. To credit Weinberger though, he stuck to his guns. His input to the committee was
to slash taxes and spend even more on defense. He reasoned “substantial defense
spending” was the best “social program” because it kept people alive and healthy (as
opposed to nuked or invaded).
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In another spate of irony, Weinberger, like Califano, was invited to the WaldorfAstoria for a high-stakes power lunch in the fall of 1988. Instead of Iacocca telling
Califano that he had authored much of the Chrysler health care problem and then inviting
him to join his Chrysler board, this time it was billionaire Malcolm Forbes Sr., who had
consistently criticized Weinberger in his magazine for Weinberger’s budget-busting
defense programs, inviting Weinberger to be Forbes’s new publisher. Weinberger was
eventually named Chairman of Forbes.1
Chapman B. Cox
Similar to Mayer, Cox left the Pentagon when Reagan left the White House and
became the CEO of the USO and later the Senior Vice President of Lockheed Martin
Information Management Systems.
Charles Bennett
As a debt-averse fiscal conservative, Bennett was a throwback to the Jeffersonian
tradition in American political history. Bennett’s 2003 obituary in the Florida TimesUnion recounts his life of public service:
First and foremost, Bennett had integrity. In fact, a lot of people called him ‘Mr. Clean’—a
moniker that made him stand out during the scandal-plagued eras in which he served. He also tried
his best to clean up Capitol Hill, sponsoring legislation that created the House Ethics Committee
and serving as its first chairman. That didn't always endear him to his colleagues. The Almanac of
American Politics 1980 reported, ‘He opposes unofficial office accounts, outside income for
members and congressional pay raises, which led one colleague to call him ‘a bit too pious.’ . . .
Bennett made many personal sacrifices. He refused his paycheck during his early tenure on
Capitol Hill, saying he had simple tastes, and often returned raises in later years. Excess campaign
funds were donated to the National Park Service. Often, he would drive from Washington to
Jacksonville, rather than flying, to save tax money . . . House records indicate he never missed a
legislative roll call . . . When dealing with Bennett, it was difficult to become cynical about
government . . . It was his legislation that put ‘In God We Trust’ on the nation's currency and
coins, and he was always proud of that. Bennett personally triumphed over adversity, having
contracted polio while overseas in the Army during WWII and spending his last 16 months of
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active duty in a hospital. Although slowed for the rest of his life, he didn't allow the affliction to
ruin his career. 2

Dan Daniels
After working hard to oppose limitations to soldiers’ access to cigarettes during
the 1984 to 1986 period, Daniels elevated his game in 1987. In order to prevent further
DoD cigarette pricing activism, Daniels worked with the TI to quietly pass an obscure
amendment that essentially forbade the DoD from adjusting cigarette prices or
availability without the express consent of Congress. With strong tobacco state
representation on the House Armed Services Committee, this measure worked for a time
to halt efforts to end cigarette subsidies. Daniels also chose to directly take a stand
against further activism by the Services. Falling in line with the Helms-Kornegay
carnival of rhetoric, when Strategic Air Command’s General John Chain instituted
smoking restrictions even more aggressive than the Army 1986 cessation plan, Daniel
was quick to fire back. In December 1987, Daniel sent Chain a letter where he accused
him of using “fascist tactics.” Daniel also bristled at Chain’s apparent determination to:
impose the current fad of ‘wellness’ on this group of individuals who have volunteered to serve
their country despite the fact that those who served before them managed to do so without
excessive nannyism . . . it is frightening as we observe the 200th Anniversary of our Constitution
that a denial of freedom by a branch of our Armed Services is permitted.3

With this statement, Daniel joined a host of tobaccoland politicians who became very
comfortable applying industry strategy developed in the 1970s calling for a unification of
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issues related to smokers’ rights, freedom, patriotism, veterans’ benefits, and Red State
politics.
Dr. C. Everett Koop
After the Army issued their Smoking Cessation Plan, a plan that was much
stronger than Weinberger’s guidance, during Senate testimony Dr. Koop later referred to
the Army’s plan as “a courageous stand.” Koop later released his “landmark” 1986
Surgeon General Report which was the first government report to link second hand
smoke to lung cancer.4
Dr. William A. Mayer
Mayer left the Pentagon in 1989 when President Reagan left the White House.
Horace Kornegay
After two decades at the Tobacco Institute providing some of the most vociferous,
memorable, and divisive quotes of the entire cigarette struggle, Kornegay retired as the
TI’s chairman in 1986, quietly quit smoking, and returned to private law practice.
Jeff Bingaman (D-OK)
Bingaman tried to introduce an amendment to the FY87 Defense Authorization
Act, similar to the Stevens-Boren legislation the previous year. In a floor debate he
argued “what sort of signal is sent to a service member . . . if on one hand he is told not to
smoke and on the other hand, he is encouraged to smoke through DoD pricing.” Further,
he added that his amendment was not an erosion of benefits, unless “a lifetime of poor
health and premature death be regarded as a benefit” or “unless lung cancer and heart
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disease are benefits.” Further, Bingaman advanced the idea that soldiers “should pay the
same for these products as the civilian citizens of this country have to pay.” He further
questioned the notion that soldier are recruited, retained, and motivated to serve based on
cheap access to cigarettes.
Bingaman’s amendment was met with sharp objection from tobaccoland
politicians. Most notably, Senator Ford from Kentucky who said such tinkering with
cigarette pricing and availability was “social engineering” that would force soldiers to
buy unhealthy, unregulated cigarettes off-post. Ford accessed the recruitment and
sustainment argument with his assertion that before soldiers “count the cost of service”
they consider commissary benefits . . . “shopping and saving” are rights guaranteed to the
uniformed service member. Senator Mitch McConnell from Kentucky joined in with his
contention that soldiers might miss out on “high-quality American cigarettes” if such
legislation was allowed to pass. With strong opposition registered from the powerful
tobacco coalition, the Bingaman Amendment was tabled in similar fashion to the BorenStevens Amendment the previous year and additional studies on cigarette pricing were
ordered.5
Jesse Helms
Helms was a powerful force in the Senate for 30 years. If he was anything, he was
consistent. Be it tobacco, defense spending, or his scorn of welfare, Helms remained true
to his conservative, North Carolina roots. In many ways, he is an archetype of the
Jacksonian tradition in American politics: strong on defense, quick to a fight, fond of a
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hammer-and-nail foreign policy orientation, averse to free rides, and accepting of vice, to
some degree or another.6
Joseph A. Califano
At the same time Weinberger released his DoD 1010.10 Health Promotion
guidance in 1986, Califano published his book America’s Health Care Revolution: Who
Lives? Who Dies? Who Pays? In the end, Weinberger and Califano’s 1986 releases were
works of solidarity because both were oriented in preventative health care as physically
and fiscally prudent. Further, both point out the dangers and costs of excessive cigarette
smoking. In another irony, Califano cites RJR in his book as a prime exemplar of a
company that was taking giant strides toward controlling health care costs. Reynolds was
cited a leader in providing in-house medical and dental on site for their employees and
emphasizing preventative health care in all areas but one. Of this one area, Califano
commented, “Just think what RJR could achieve if they mounted a campaign to get its
employees to quit smoking!”7
Lt Gen Edgar Chavarrie
General Chavarrie retired from the USAF in September 1986. The Tobacco
Institute provided Chavarrie with a lavish retirement ceremony through their PR firm
Flieshman-Hillard. Ironically, guests listed at this reception included Weinberger, Mayer,
and Cox. Chavarrie later formed a lobbying firm with noted Congressional staffer and

6

For more on the Jacksonian tradition, see Walter Russell Meade, “The Jacksonian Tradition and
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York: Random House, 1986), 32.
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enterprise lobbyist Will Cofer, and he worked on the enterprise’s Project Breakthrough
Campaign, which was a formal effort to link smoking, soldiering, veterans, and freedom.8
Peyton March
March continued as the Army Chief of Staff until 1921 when he retired. He lived
a long life and died in 1955, possibly never realizing the part he played in linking the
soldier to the cigarette. Interestingly, March Air Force Base in California was not named
for General Peyton March, but for his son, Peyton March Jr., who died in a plane crash
while training for service with the Army Air Corps in WWI.
Sam Chilcote
Chilcote was president of the Tobacco Institute from 1981 to 1987. Once the
Army cessation plan became a reality in July 1986, Chilcote drafted a plan of action
involving a multi-front offensive for the enterprise to fight back. On the international
front, he called the Army plan dangerous, as it would encourage foreign armies to
implement smoking cessation. On the domestic, he suggested a focused effort to recruit
scholars to write about the historic link between tobacco and national defense. On the
science front, he suggested articles that express the importance of cigarettes to soldiers’

8
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overall psychological health. However he does comment, “Actual science does not seem
to me to be very important in this aspect of the overall tobacco issue.”9
Regarding the Congressional front, Chilcote suggested the enterprise leverage the
fact that “Congressman of vast seniority (Mendel Rivers, Rayburn, Byrd, John
McClellan, and two score more) dipped deeply in the barrel of pork to load their states
with eternally flowing defense dollars. Most of the instillations happen to be where most
tobacco is grown.”10 Therefore, he suggested an intense lobbying campaign to influence
what he saw as pliable legislators bound to and wrapped up in the modern economic
arrangements that form the heart of America’s modern political-economy.
Finally, on the soldier front, Chilcote suggested the enterprise retain a cartoonist
to develop a stable of sketches to poke fun at the whole Army cessation campaign. He
recommended slogans and quips such as, “The Soviet development of a new weapon—a
parachute bomb which releases cartons of cigarettes behind the lines” or “Who ever
heard of an army without tobacco?” or “The beer goes next” or “Toward a defenseless
society by the year 2000” or “Disarmament at Geneva gets a new twist . . . two more
ICBM’s (allowed) per 50,000 soldiers deprived of cigarettes.”11 Chilcote remained
President of the Tobacco Institute until 1997.
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Tobacco Institute response to Army’s 1986 smoking cessation guidance
The official TI response to the Army’s smoking cessation directive and the DoD’s
flirting with cigarette price adjustments are found in sample statements from TI point
papers developed in April and May 1986. One said:
The attitude which this will convey to the serviceman, the potential recruit, and the public is that
“Army brass” in their infinite wisdom have decided that they are going to see to it that Army
personnel do what they think is good for them, because the “brass” do not believe that Army
personnel have the capability to make proper personal decisions on their own. It is obvious that
this perception will have a significant adverse effect upon recruitment and retention and that it will
adversely affect Army morale.12

The TI commissioned the marketing firm Savarese and Associates to present data linking
the commissary and soldiers’ rights issues in May 1986. This report argued that adjusting
prices upwards is a “breach of contract” between the soldier and the conditions under
which they enlisted and is essentially an “arbitrary pay cut.” The reasoning stated that
any “reduction of any element of the total compensation package represents a breach of
this implicit contract.”13
Further, the report argued there is a working class discrimination element to the
cessation and price adjustment proposals. Savarese argued that blue collar laborers,
enlisted soldiers, and low-income workers have high smoking prevalence both in and out
of uniform. Joining the military is not an inducement to smoke; they already smoke. So if
the Army increases the price of cigarettes, it is only punishing the blue collar backbone of
the Army and the American workforce—the enlisted soldier and the blue collar worker.14
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All these points regarding soldiers’ smoking rights and the commissary benefit became a
major element of the enterprise’s strategy between 1986 and 2001 as it continued to fight
cessation programs and the reduction in cigarette subsidies.
Tobaccoland’s Congressional response to Army’s smoking cessation guidance
In a letter to Weinberger’s replacement Les Aspin, Walter B. Jones, Congressman
from North Carolina and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, commented
on behalf of a group of concerned Congressmen, all from North Carolina, said:
We have serious concerns that the army’s “game plan” exceeds the parameters established by the
DoD directive (1010.10) and that the stated objective is not supported by conclusive scientific
evidence. We are unaware of any conclusive study . . . which substantiates the Army’s declaration
that use of tobacco products impairs “critical military skills.”15

The document further claims that Weinberger and the Army took their abrupt action
without considering the long term impact on “recruitment, retention, and morale.”
Finally, Jones described smoking cessation plans in the Army not as a “health initiative”
but an attempt “to mandate certain personal habits of not only active duty personnel, but
civilian employees, retirees, and their families.” In essence, Jones called the Army’s
program social engineering, a bumper sticker slogan used extensively by the enterprise
for the remainder of the twentieth century. The members of Congress who signed this
remonstrance to Secretary Aspin include Charles O. Whitley (NC), W.G. “Bill” Hefner
(NC), Stephen L. Neal (NC), Tim Valentine (NC), James T. Broyhill, William M.
Hendon (NC), Howard Coble (NC), J. Alex McMillan (NC), and William M. Cobey, Jr.
(NC).16
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And finally . . .Military Smoking Rates post-1986
The 1986 Army Smoking Cessation program forever changed the military
smoking culture; however it did not change the state sponsorship of cigarette subsidies
for uniformed personnel. The enterprise was able to hold the line against several more
attempts to amend defense appropriations bills throughout the 1990s to remove funding
that supported cut-rate cigarettes in the military resale system. Nearly four decades after
the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report, fiscally conservative Congressmen were finally able
to remove military cigarette subsidies in 2001.17
Since 1986, cigarette smoking among the ranks has slowly dwindled to the point
where soldiers smoke at about the rate of civilians. If one goes on a military installation
today, he or she would be hard pressed to find a single uniformed officer smoking a
cigarette. If you find any smokers at all, they would likely only be a few diehard junior to
mid-grade enlisted huddled around a tree or a can far from buildings.18 For example, on a
recent trip to Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, the author observed a smoking area
fifty meters from the main buildings of the Air University Campus over a several day
period. The smoking gaggle over this period was comprised of a large group of foreign
military officers who were chain smoking one after the other—no Americans anywhere.
On a personal note, the starkest example of this tobacco-free cultural phenomenon
that has invaded the military since 1986 came when I took my recent military physical.

17
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However, from personal experience, it must be noted that smoking rates among military officers
and enlisted deployed to combat zones such as Iraq or Afghanistan increase dramatically. Whether combat
in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or Operation Enduring
Freedom, or far-flung battle fields in-between, when it comes to the soldier and the cigarette (or pipe, or
cigarillo, or cigar), some things never change.
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Out of curiosity, I selected “yes” to the question, “have you smoked more than 20
cigarettes in your entire lifetime.” With my “yes” selection registered, all manner of
chaos occurred as the questionnaire directed me to a host of other diagnostics, referrals,
further tests, and cessation programs that I would have to step through in order to
complete the exam. Then, with bravado that Jesse Helms and Dan Daniel surely would
have labeled social engineering, the survey finished by asking, “When do you plan to quit
smoking?”
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